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TMI Blog1965 (2) TMI 102X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... me High Courts including the majority of a Full Bench of this High Court took the view that the Criminal Procedure Code was not a local or special law within the meaning of Section 29 of the Limitation Act. Other High Courts held to the contrary. The Supreme Court in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, AIR 1964 SC 260, settled the controversy and held that Section 417 (3) and (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code was a special law and that Section 29(2) did apply to petitions for leave to appeal under Section 417 (3), Cr. P. C. The provisions of Section 29 of the new Limitation Act No. 36 of 1963, are, from this point of view similar to the corresponding provisions of the earlier Act. The same interpretation would be applicable to it. 4. The sec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tation Act is expressly excluded. Section 29(2) of the current Limitation Act states that the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not 'expressly excluded' by such special or local law. The learned counsel urges that Section 417 (4) Cr. P. C. which is the special law, expressly excludes the applicability of Sections 4 to 24, Limitation Act. He urges that in Section 417 (4) there is a clear mandate that no application for grant of special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal; and that this provision amounts to a direct prohibition By c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bba Rao, J. observed in paragraph 27 that Section 29 speaks of express exclusion and that though Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act 1951 provides a period of limitation for an appeal and also the circumstance under which the delay can be excused, vet it does not amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29 of the Limitation Act. 10. In Raja Pande v. Sheopujan Pande, AIR 1942 All 429, Iqbal Ahmad, C. J. speaking to the majority of the Full Bench, held that where the special or local Jaw was a self-contained Code in the matter of limitation the applicability of Section 29(2) is excluded. That was a case under the Provincial Insolvency Act. Sections 68 and 75 of the Provincial Insolvency Act prescribe pe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pplications for special leave to appeal by a complainant. It does not speak at all of the applicability of any of the sections of the Limitation Act. It does not lay down any rules for the computation of the period of limitation. It does not provide for exclusion of time in the computation of period of limitation. This provision of the Code, therefore, cannot be characterised as a self-contained Code in the matter of limitation. Consequently no intention of excluding the application of the various provisions mentioned in Section 29(2), Limitation Act can be gathered. 12. Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act 1908 did not make the provisions of Section 5 thereof applicable. In his respect the new Limitation Act is different. It does make S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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