9911796707
TMI Blog2002 (9) TMI 873X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... "KYUN KI SAAS BHI KABHI BAHU THI". Full consideration has been paid and, thus, the plaintiffs are the exclusive owners of the copyright in this serial. Balaji's services were engaged by way of contract of service and as such the plaintiffs are the first copyright owners under Section 17 of the Copyright Act. The theme of the serial involves a renowned business house known as Virani Group, headed by Dhirubhai Virani. Dhirubhai has three sons, Mansukh, Himmat and Jamnadas and a married daughter Pradnya. The family resides in palace like bungalow "Shantiniketan" at Juhu. The story involves around Amba Virani, wife of Dhirubhai Virani, her three daughters-in-law Savita, Daksha and Gayatri and grand-daughter-in-law Tulsi. Savita's eldest son Mihir marries Tulsi, a simple girl from an ordinary middle class family, against the wish of his mother, who wanted him to marry Payal, daughter of a big businessman. The other members of the family excluding Savita, Daksha and Gayatri are happy with the marriage. They attempted, after marriage, all possible tactics to create a barrier between Mihir and Tulsi to break the marriage. Their plans fail. Soon after marriage M ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by defendant No. 1. It was the case of the plaintiffs that the comparison of the plaintiffs serial with the commercial would show that there is substantial copying. Comparisons are set out in paragraph 12 of the plaint. It is then contended that the overall impression of any viewer who sees both the works would be that the subsequent work of the defendants is a copy of the original work of the plaintiffs, authorized by the plaintiffs and/or licensed by the plaintiffs. An average person viewing the defendants commercial would immediately notice the glaring identity similarity between the plaintiffs' serial and the defendants' commercial and such a person would get an impression that the defendants' commercial has been authored by the plaintiffs or has been produced under the permission or licensed by the plaintiffs. Further an ordinary person would get an impression, that the plaintiffs who are the producers and proprietors of the serial "KYUN KISAAS BHI KABHI BAHU THI" are whole heartedly and unreservedly endorsing the product of the defendant No. 2. An average viewer would, thus, have an unmistakable impression that there is connection in the course of busine ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... also the cinematographic film for merchandising the said product of the defendant No. 2 when the true fact is just contrary. By the defendants telecasting the commercial, and that too, in close proximity to the areas of activity of the plaintiffs, an erroneous impression has been created that the defendants are authorized and entitled to make use of the works in the serial. Creation of such misrepresentation and confusion and probability of apprehension is apparent, given consideration to the repute of the defendants. Various reliefs are prayed for and as the matter involves violation of intellectual property rights and as the Court is the guardian of public interest, injunction must follow and other reliefs as prayed for. The motion taken out is supported by the affidavit Sheenaz R. Patel which reiterates and places reliance on the averments of the plaint. 3. Defendant No. 2 has filed a reply opposing the grant of relief to the plaintiffs through an authorized signatory Shefali Chaddha. It is the case of the defendant No. 2 that it belongs to the P&G group of companies which carries on business worldwide as a leading multinational group of companies in the world. The products em ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aintiffs' work. The T.V. commercial, it is contended, is extensively aired on T.V. channels since January, 2002 and defendant No. 2 has incurred a huge expenditure. The commercial was submitted for the purpose of airing it on Star T.V. it was accepted and as such the plaintiffs/its sister concern has acknowledged that the Tide T.V. commercial was not objectionable. It is further submitted that there is no copyright in an idea, concept or theme. The defendants have put the plaintiffs to a strict proof insofar as its contention that the programme enjoys tremendous popularity. It is further denied that the alleged artistic work constitutes an original artistic work. The defendants deny and do not admit that, the work was commissioned by the plaintiffs and made by Balaji pursuant to the Agreement. The title "KYUN KI SAAS BHI KABHI BAHU THI" is a commonly known saying/proverb/creation which has not been devised by the plaintiffs or by Balaji. The manner in which it is written does not constitute an artistic work and the same is not copyrightable. The depiction of overlapping bonds in the logo is the age old expression of the 'saas' handing over the keys to the ' ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eated that the plaintiffs are endorsing the product of defendant No. 2. There are other denials. The defendants do not admit that the serial has acquired by goodwill and/or reputation in India as is alleged or its popularity on its character. It is the case of the defendants that the plaintiffs are not entitled to exclusively encash upon the alleged goodwill of the serial and its characters. It is specifically denied that airing of Tide T.V. commercial would require any authorization from the plaintiffs for merchandising purposes. It is also averred that even assuming that there are some features of defendant No. 2's Tide T.V. commercial found in the serial, of the plaintiffs, even then the alleged copying does not amount to a reproduction or substantial reproduction of the plaintiffs' serial, that is, alleged copying, if any, is of an unsubstantial part of the serial and, hence does not amount to infringement. The alleged logo at Exhibit 'C' does not constitute a separate work or original artistic work. Without prejudice to the aforesaid copyright, it does not vest in the plaintiffs under Section 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957 or under Clause 8 of the Agreement. At ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the film, have an exclusive right to make a copy of the film including a photograph of any image forming part thereof. It is contended that unlike the U.K. and Australia Copyright Acts, the word 'copy' is not defined in the Indian Copyright Act and, therefore, recourse must be had to the technical meaning of the word 'copy'. Reference is placed on the Oxford English Dictionary and Random House Dictionary of the English Language as to the meaning of the word 'copy'. It is then contended that the definition of 'infringing copy' is contained in Section 2(m)(ii) of the Act. Hence, imitating the film or making another film which bears likeness or striking resemblance to a copyrighted film would amount to making a copy of the film and, therefore infringement of the copyright in the film. Assuming that to establish infringement, copying should be of a substantial part of the plaintiffs' film, the test of substantiality must be from the point of view of the infringing work. It is, therefore, the duty of the Court to ascertain whether a substantial part of the defendants' work consists of a copy of the plaintiffs work. Reliance is placed on the judgme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... xpression 'to make a copy of the film', it is submitted, is to make a physical copy from the copyrighted film itself and not a reproduction of the copyrighted film, that is another film which merely resembles the copyrighted film. From the affidavits of Kumuda Rao and Shetty it is clear that the defendants have not copied the film but have "made a new film. The only contention of the plaintiffs is that the film made/shot by the defendants resembles the plaintiffs' film and, therefore, constitutes reproduction. Reliance is placed on various judgments. The defendants, alternatively, contend that the plaintiffs' film and the defendants' film are different. There is no copying or substantial copying of plaintiffs' work, hence, no question of any copyright infringement can arise. It is also once again alternatively submitted that what is to be compared is the 'whole' of the respective works and 'not part' and if so compared, there is no copying or substantial copying. 6. It is, therefore, necessary to deal with the submissions as to whether the commercial film made by the defendants is a copy of the plaintiffs' film. Firstly, let me refe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d out as to the meaning of the word copy' in the absence of it being defined in the Act. Reference can be made to Copinger and Skone James on copyright, Thirteenth Edition, at paragraph 3.29, some portions of which may be reproduced: "......it has been stated that skill labour and judgment merely in the process of copying cannot, confer originality and the mere copyist cannot have protection of his copy. Particularly, therefore, where the reproduction is in the same medium as the original, there must be more than an exact reproduction to secure copyright; there must be some element of material alteration or embellishment which suffices to make the totality of the work an original work. If the original, in the case of a painting, is used merely as a model to give the idea of the new work or, in the case of a photograph, merely as a basis to be worked up by photographic process to something different, then the net work may be entitled to protection; but, if the result is simply a salvish copy, it will not protected." The same Authors in the Fourteenth Edition in paragraph 7.98 have dealt with "Films". The learned Authors have stated as under: "It is an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nal to satisfy the test of copyrightability, whereas the requirement of originality is absent for claiming copyright in cinematograph films/sound recordings. In Telmak Teleproducts (Aust.) Pty. Limited v. Bond International, 1985 (5) IPR 203, the defendants made, an advertisement film for the same products as were contained in the plaintiffs' advertising film and the Court found that the products of the rivals (which were advertised) and the films were also similar. As the defendants, however, had made their own film, though it was similar to the plaintiffs' film, the Court held that the making of the defendants' film was not an act within the categories of exclusive rights conferred on the copyright owner of the plaintiffs' film. The defendants' film had been shot and sound recorded by the defendants own agents. The defendants' film was not copied from the recorded medium of the plaintiffs' film. It was, therefore, held that the defendants had not made a copy of the plaintiffs' film. The defendants had not copied the visuals, images and sounds which together made up the plaintiffs' cinematographic film. The defendants had not caused the plainti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lm. It was on these facts that the Court had held that it was a copy of the plaintiffs' film. Therefore, considering the terminology used in the Act the facts on record and the cases discussed it is clear that the defendants made their own film independently. The film of the defendants, therefore is not a copy and, therefore, would not amount to an infringement of the plaintiffs copyright in its film considering the language of Section 14(d) of the Copyright Act. 7. Then the issue to be addressed is whether there is substantial copying which would give rise to a cause of action to the plaintiffs. At this prima facie stage once the view is taken that the defendants' film is not a copy of the plaintiffs film, it really would not require that this second submission be considered. However, as it has been advanced, it may be dealt with briefly. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that the test of substantially must be from the point infringing the work. Hence, the Court must ascertain whether a substantial part of the defendants; work consists of a copy of the plaintiff's work. See. R.G. Anand v. Delux Films (supra). Relying on Copinger paragraph 8.26 it is also s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ore, does not arise. It has been factually established from the affidavits on record that the defendants' film has been made independently. The T.V. commercial of the defendant No. 2 promotes the product Tide detergent. The commercial does not purport to be nor can be taken by anyone viewing it to be a cinematographic film/serial at all, much less as the plaintiffs' film. The T.V. commercial has a beginning of about 8 to 10 seconds as prelude to the Tide detergent T.V. commercial but the major and real substantial part consists of the Tide detergent. The over all impact on the viewer which is sought to be impacted is of the Tide detergent. The defendants have placed on record material to show that the number of the characters in the film are different The young lady whose remarriage is proposed is present in the defendants commercial but is absent in the corresponding part of the plaintiffs' film. The script of the two films is different. No portion of the dialogues or scenes are common. In the defendants' commercial the other family members present are opposed to be proposal of remarriage and the elderly lady raises the hand to strike the person making such proposa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l copying of the film. For this purpose reference may be made to the decisions in Francis Day and Hunter Limited v. Twentieth Century Fox Corporation Limited and Ors., 1940 AC 112 (PC); Ladbroke (Football) Limited v. William Hill (Football) Limited, 1964 (1) WLR 273; Merchandising Corporation of America Inc. and Ors. v. Harpbond Limited and Ors., 1983 FSR 32; R.G. Anand v. Delux films and Ors. (supra) and Fritco Lay Limited v. Uncle Chips Private Limited, 2000 PTC 341. Applying the tests on the material as it stands there is no substantial copying on facts. 8. In respect of the contention of the photographs taken from film it may be noted that the contention is contrary to the plain wording in Section 14. The section itself speaks about the work or any substantial part thereof. They also fully, apply to Section 14(d)(i). There is no material on record to hold that the defendants, have taken a photograph of any image of the plaintiffs' film. No single image is identical, as even in the first image there are material differences. The image/still allegedly copied and incorporated in the Tide T.V. commercial is not a 'photograph' as defined, which provides that where anyth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h forms a part of or is included in a cinematographic film does not fall within the definition of 'photograph' under the Act. Under Section 2(s), 'a frame or image which forms a part of the film is excluded from photograph'. Hence, such image does not fall within the meaning of photograph in Section, 14(d)(i). Since the plaintiffs have not made a photograph of any image from the plaintiffs' film the question of infringement by copying a single still does not arise. Further, there are several differences even in the first image which forms part of the defendants' film. Considering this and as Section 16 of the Act provides that there is no copyright except as provided in the Copyright Act, 1957 or under any law for the time being in force, a single image or a single frame taken from a cinematographic film cannot constitute infringement of copyright as it is not photograph within the meaning of Section 2(s) and hence not a copy of the film within Section 14(d)(i). For all the aforesaid reasons, it is clear that, insofar as contention is concerned, the plaintiffs have not been able to establish that the defendants have infringed their copyright by making a cop ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... plaintiffs for violating the copyright in their work. Considering the number of episodes already broadcast, it will, therefore, not be possible to accept this contention on behalf of the defendants that considering Section 55 of the Act the plaintiffs not being the owners of the copyright are not entitled to sue and seek reliefs. The plaintiffs have sought to on the Agreement dated 9th April, 2000 under which the plaintiffs are claiming right. By virtue of Article 6(a) and Article 8 all rights of Balaji have been given/assigned in favour of the plaintiffs. I, therefore, do not accept the contention of the defendants that at this prima facie stage the plaintiffs have been unable to show their copyright in the artistic work. Is the logo lettering as an original artistic work Section 13(1)(a) of the Act provides that copyright can subsist only in an original artistic work. The contention of the defendant is that the logo consisting of the two hands is a symbol in common use and in the public domain and open to anyone to use. Reliance is placed on the affidavit of Shefali Chaddha dated 14th June, 2002 and the wedding invitation card annexed thereto. The holding hands it is contended ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... le common cause of action which can apply, to an extremely wide range of factual situations. Being a cause of action available in common law, the Court will guide itself on basis of strong common sense approach to the facts of each case. It is contended that the Courts must adopt the tort of passing off to fit changing situations. In the instant case it is contended by the plaintiffs' that the motive for the defendants misappropriation of the plaintiffs' goodwill is obvious. The defendants have attempted to encash the goodwill generated by the plaintiffs serial to boost the sale of the defendants' product. This is actionable per se. If such conduct is not injuncted, it would amount to a licence to every defendant in the case like the present to appropriate the benefit of goodwill assiduously built up by another. The law of passing off, it is contended, is meant to counter precisely such conduct. The classic submission of passing off, it is contended requires (a) existence of goodwill or reputation attached to the plaintiffs' serial and characters in the serial in the minds of the public viewers; (b) misrepresentation by the defendants to the public such as is likel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the plaintiffs' serial, the confusion in the minds of the public is inevitable. It is theft submitted that the appropriation by the defendants of the plaintiffs' characters and representing a connection between their commercial and the characters therein, is bound to cause loss and of damage to the plaintiffs directly by way of loss in merchandising inasmuch as the, owner of such characters and the, serial would have been able to merchandise characters. The defendants by making use of the characters for use of a commercial and unauthorizedly are utilizing the goodwill of the plaintiffs' characters without paying in licence fees to the plaintiffs and without the plaintiffs' permission. The defendants therefore have deprived the plaintiffs of such licence fees and merchandising profits. Further, as the plaintiffs have no control of the quality over the defendants product any inadequacy or shortfall in the same would rub off directly on the plaintiffs. The defects in the defendant's commercial could in the long run adversely affect the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' serial. As the Court in the passing off action is concerned with 'likelihood damages', ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed to itself what is essentially the characters and symbols of the plaintiffs' serial so as to attract the public, but are doing so for commercial gain. The defendants wish to boost the sale of their products by encashing the goodwill of the plaintiffs. A more fraudulent case than the present case would be difficult to find given the fact that the defendants are a large multinational Company and are well advised. It is all the more obvious that there is no innocence in the action of the defendants. Reliance is placed on the observations by Judge Murphy in the second Lone Ranger case, which are as under : "Where a defendant expressly and deliberately commits a fraud by representing that his goods or services are those of the plaintiff, or that plaintiff is in some way connected with or interested in his business, equity will grant relief. Even in the absence of express and deliberate fraud equitable relief will be granted where there is shown bad faith on the defendant's part, i.e., an intention of the defendant to gain advantage from the reputation and goodwill of the plaintiffs trade-mark or trade-name.....": Coming to the test of common field of activity, it i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the plaintiffs. Referring to the pleadings it is pointed out that plaintiffs have mentioned about Star Plus Channel alongwith themselves and the said serial, the paragraph itself would clarifying that the owners of the goodwill in the serial and the fictional characters in it are the plaintiffs. The submission that Star Plus is the owner of the goodwill and not the plaintiffs is misconceived. It is well known that in a given case, the plaintiff himself may be unknown to customers, it is necessary to show to the customer who knew whatsoever about the plaintiff. It is sufficient to prove that the purchaser of his goods recognised, by the use of the marks in question in connection with them, that they were goods of a particular class, and to show that such class is, in fact, constituted by his goods. See paragraph 16.32 of Kerry's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names-12th Edition. It is, therefore, submitted that the plaintiffs have established that fictional characters can enjoy goodwill and the goodwill in such fictional characters belong to the owner of the serial. Adverting to the defendants' submission that no passing off action will lie until the plaintiffs involve thems ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ired or broadcasted on the Star Plus Channel at all. Therefore, when the public sees the defendants Tide commercial on any other channel, the question of the public associating the defendants' commercial with the plaintiffs film/serial cannot and does not arise, on the plaintiffs own case and averments in paragraph 19 of the plaint. This rules out any possibility or likelihood of the one being taken by the other or of the public being, misled of one with the other or the public having association with the other. The plaintiffs, therefore, fail in the alleged claim of passing off on their own case and averments in the plaint. 12. It will, therefore, be essential to examine whether the plaintiff has established the basic ingredients giving rise to a cause of action in a case of breach of the tort of passing off. The three predicates to be established may be reiterated as under: (1) The plaintiffs goodwill and reputation, in the mark amongst the public (2) The defendants misrepresentation that the article is that of the plaintiffs; and (3) Actual, damages or real likelihood of damage to the plaintiffs by the defendants' act. The two items being considered are prima facie di ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... manner to believe one to be the other or even associating the defendants' commercial with the plaintiffs or their serial or the characters therein is very much doubtful. It is, therefore, clear considering the material on record and the test of a prudent person, it is not possible that a reasonable person or the public would be misled or confused in any manner to believe and/or associate the defendants' commercial with the plaintiffs' cinematographic film and or the characters therein. The second predicate which is to be considered is whether the defendants are guilty of misrepresentation and thereby occasioned damage to the plaintiffs or possibility of damage. The plaintiffs' serial is a film which has its viewers and which is not telecast on the same Channel as that of the defendants' commercial. It is only in the event those watching the plaintiffs' film happen also to come across the defendants' commercial, an occasion would arise of misrepresentation. The defendants' commercial cannot in anyway affect the viewership of the plaintiffs' film or the potential TRPs or sponsorship value/possibilities thereof. Therefore, the possibility of any da ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cord. It is not the plaintiffs' case that a member of the public on seeing elsewhere a scene or incident similar to one in the plaintiffs film will think that what he has seen elsewhere is the plaintiffs' film is necessarily associated with the plaintiffs' serial or is put out by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have no monopoly over such incidents/scenes and at least no evidence has been produced to establish this, which is purely a question of fact. The entire case of the plaintiffs is based on an incident in one of the episodes of the film. The incident is an ordinary serial one in a family. It is not exclusive or particular to the plaintiffs' film. Probably the public view the scene without any regard to its source and solely, as a part of the defendants work promoting the product 'Tide'. At any rate, there is no material, at this stage, to hold that the public associates the defendants' commercial Tide detergent as coming from or of the plaintiffs. The case of the plaintiffs is, as of today, that they have not endorsed any products based on the serial or its characters. The necessary element of citation required has, therefore, not been established as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t of sucking lollipops. The plaintiff Company did not have a licence to use the name from the proprietors of the television series. The defendant Company, which claimed that it did have such a licence, began to sell the lollipops under the brand name "Kojak Lollies". The plaintiff commenced an action. The question posed was, do those two fields of activity interest in any such way as would enable the Universal City Studios to claim that, by putting out their lollipops as "Kojakpops", the plaintiffs were infringing any right of Universal City Studios? The Court observed in its judgment, the answer to that is in the negative, because there is no relevant field of activity either actual or existing in the mind of the public which is common to both of them. The Court observed further that the business of what is called character merchandising, has become very well known in our present times and everyone who has a character, whether real or fictional, to exploit, does so by the grant of licences to people who wish to use the name of the real or fictional character, but when one has a fictional character such as Kojak, obviously Kojak in that sense does not exist and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cters "Oscar the, Grouch". "Big Bird" and "The Cookie Monster", which had not been made under licence from the first plaintiff. On the grant of interim relief the Court held that the toys sold by the defendants would be taken by the public to be toy representations of the Muppet characters; that the first plaintiff had established a business reputation in Australia in relation to toys. The Muppet characters were only recognised because they were "out of the first plaintiffs' show and there was an association in the minds of the public between the first plaintiff and the representations of its characters in any form, and certainly in toys of the present sort, and that established the reputation of the first plaintiff in them; the third plaintiff has no such reputation; until it established itself as licensee and carried on business in this field it would not be proper to assume an association between it and the sale of the Muppet characters as would entitle it to claim that the defendants' toys were being passed off as products emanating from it or as products made under its licence; that the defendants and the plaintiffs were operating in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stablished on evidence as a fact, that the claimant may be able to claim a right to prevent any one else from using such a character for other purposes. In the instant case, the plaintiffs, admittedly, have not done any character merchandising at all so far as any character in their film/serial is concerned. There is no question, therefore, of any character in the serial having acquired any public recognition or reputation or an independent life of its own separately from its position as a character in the serial. There is no material on record to show that any character in the serial has become a commodity in its own right, independently of the film/serial. In these circumstances, the question cannot arise of the plaintiffs making any claim to exclusive right to a character or be entitled to any reliefs on the alleged basis that the public associates any character in the serial exclusively with the plaintiffs, in relation to the business of character merchandising. On the facts of this case, there is no fictional character involved like 'Superman', Teletubbies' or 'Lone Ranger'. In the serial there are ordinary people in common life who play the role of some ch ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... endants actions of making the commercial. As laid down earlier, prima facie, authorities show that an action based on character merchandising there must be in fact, character merchandising and that mere potential for merchandising the character by itself is not sufficient. However, it is not possible to rule out the proposition that the mere potential for merchandising is not sufficient to maintain an action, A character may have grown out beyond the film when the people would identify and, therefore, there is a probability of it being potentially merchandised. On the facts of this case there is no such material, of any from character setting this roles None of the models or actors have acquired such fame or a character has become identifiable in the minds of the public, which can be said to be particularly merchandised. The plea of the plaintiff is that the public associate the characters. Tulsi, Savita and J.D. with the plaintiffs serial. There is nothing to show that the characters Tulsi, Savita or J.D. by themselves are capable of being marketable independently or jointly. They are merely the main characters in the serial as the material now stands. In the instant case, the de ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the need for a real possibility of confusion is the basis of the action. It is necessary to show that reasonable people might think that the plaintiffs activities were associated with the defendants' goods or business, and on evidence the Court must be satisfied that there is a real possibility of confusion Miss World (Jersey) Limited & Anr., (supra) and Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, Thirteenth Edition, Paragraphs 14.75 to 14.77. Establishing passing off by goods in which the claimant does not trade, calls for special evidence to establish that the defendants' action would induce the belief, if any, that his goods are those of the claimant, at least that his business is an extension of or somehow connected with that of the claimant or that his goods have been some-how approved or authorized by the claimant. In relation to character merchandising, unless the public can be shown to be will aware of merchandising in the particular field, there will be, in general, no obvious link between the production of television programmes or films and the manufacturer of toys, clothes etc., with which character names may be profitably used. Once merchandising is well o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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