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TMI Blog2017 (3) TMI 1628X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al before this Court. Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act which is to be entertained by the Court. We are singularly concerned with entertaining of an application for condonation. If the delay is statutorily not condonable, the delay cannot be condoned. There is no impediment to consider the preliminary objection at a later stage. That will be in consonance with the statutory provision. - Civil Appeal No. 1315 of 2010 - - - Dated:- 1-3-2017 - Dipak Misra A.M. Khanwilkar and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar For the Appellant: Amit Pawan, Adv. For the Respondents: Ranjitha Ramachandran, Swapna Seshadri, M.G. Ramachandran, Hemantika Wahi, Jesal Wahi and Pooja Saigal, Advs. JUDGMENT Dipak Misra, J. 1. The present appeal preferred Under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (for brevity, 'the Act') assails the correctness of the judgment rendered by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (for short, 'the tribunal') in Appeal No. 276 of 2006 whereunder the order dated 10.10.2006 passed in Application No. 812 of 2004 filed by the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC), the Appellant herein, before the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ation of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908): Provided that the Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. 5. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear as crystal that this Court, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the period of 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the appellate tribunal to him, may allow the same to be filed within a further period not exceeding 60 days. It is quite clear that this Court has the jurisdiction to condone the delay but a limit has been fixed by the legislature, that is, 60 days. 6. In Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors . (2010) 5 SCC 23, the issue that arose before this Court was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for allowing the aggrieved person to file an a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eserved, the date of pronouncement shall be notified in the cause list and that shall be a valid notice of pronouncement of the order. The counsel appearing for the parties are supposed to take cognizance of the cause list in which the case is shown for pronouncement. If title of the case and name of the counsel is printed in the cause list, the same will be deemed as a notice regarding pronouncement of order. Once the order is pronounced after being shown in the cause list with the title of the case and name of the counsel, the same will be deemed to have been communicated to the parties and they can obtain copy through e-mail or by filing an application for certified copy. 9. The eventual conclusion that was arrived at by the Court was that there is no escape from the conclusion that the appeal, in the said case, had been filed for more than 120 days from the date of communication of the tribunal's order and, therefore, as such the same could not be entertained. 10. In Suryachankra Power Corporation Ltd . (supra) the case at hand, the Court referred to the earlier decisions and also deliberated upon application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act relying on the pron ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... wer to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. 13. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr . (1988) 2 SCC 602, while explicating and elaborating the principles Under Article 142, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as His Lordship then was) opined thus: The fact that the Rule was discretionary did not alter the position. Though Article 142(1) empowers the Supreme Court to pass any order to do complete justice between the parties, the court cannot make an order inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. No question of inconsistency between Article 142(1) and Article 32 arose. Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for the majority of the judges of this Court said that Article 142(1) did not confer any power on this Court to contravene the provisions of Article 32 of the Constitution. Nor did Article 145 confer power upon this Court to make rules, empowering it to contravene the provisions of the fundamental right. At page 899 of the Reports, Gajendragadkar, J., reiterated that the powers of this Court are no doubt ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tus of the authority or the court on which conferment of powers--limited in some appropriate way--is contemplated. The limitations may not necessarily reflect or be based on any fundamental considerations of public policy. Sri Sorabjee, learned Attorney General, referring to Garg case, said that limitation on the powers Under Article 142 arising from inconsistency with express statutory provisions of substantive law must really mean and be understood as some express prohibition contained in any substantive statutory law. He suggested that if the expression 'prohibition' is read in place of 'provision' that would perhaps convey the appropriate idea. But we think that such prohibition should also be shown to be based on some underlying fundamental and general issues of public policy and not merely incidental to a particular statutory scheme or pattern. It will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers Under Article 142 are subject to such express statutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea that statutory provisions override a constitutional provision. Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the idea is that in exercising powers Under Article 142 and in ass ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ndoned for a further period not exceeding sixty days, needless to say, it is based on certain underlined, fundamental, general issues of public policy as has been held in Union Carbide Corporation's case. As the pronouncement in Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (supra) lays down quite clearly that the policy behind the Act emphasizing on the constitution of a special adjudicatory forum, is meant to expeditiously decide the grievances of a person who may be aggrieved by an order of the adjudicatory officer or by an appropriate Commission. The Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with regard to the limitation has to be the binding effect and the same has to be followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a different way, the prescription of limitation in a case of present nature, when the statute commands that this Court may condone the further delay not beyond 60 days, it would come within the ambit and sweep of the provisions and policy of legislation. It is equivalent to Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is uncondemnable and it cannot be condoned takin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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