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TMI Blog1972 (10) TMI 133X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Chief Settlement Commissioner, which appeal was accepted without notice to Dev Raj, but this order was set aside on the matter being brought to the notice of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The matter was ultimately dealt with by Shri Parshotam Sarup, Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner and, treating the appeal as a revision suo motu, he set aside the order of the Managing Officer in favour of Gurcharan Parshad and remanded the case for fresh decision after determining the eligibility according to law, after due notice to the parties. This order is dated 23rd October, 1961. 4. No action was taken by the subordinate authorities in spite of this order, in spite of a number of applications sent by Pt. Dev Raj, till 24th May, 1966, when the Assistant Settlement Officer, Jullundur, passed the impugned order holding that since rule 30 of the Rules has been repealed on 3rd August, 1963, the property in question could not be transferred to any one of the occupants and directed the same to be put to auction. An appeal filed by Pt. Dev Raj to the Chief Settlement Commissioner and a revision under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, to t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... A 92 of 1963(Punj) was correct and directed themselves only to the question, whether the same rule would be applicable to the revisions or would be confined to appeals. 9. It was also urged that, in fact, in the Full Bench judgment observations were made that there was good deal to be said for the proposition that the modification of a rule would not have retrospective effect. 10. Be that as it may, we feel that this matter shall have to be decided authoritatively and we, consequently, refer the following question for decision by a Full Bench:-- Will the rights of a claimant with a verified claim be governed by rule 30 of the Rules, as it existed on the date of his application for the transfer of the property in his occupation or by the position as it existed on the date of the decision by the authorities concerned? ORDER OF FULL BENCH DATED 6-9-1971. P.C. Pandit, R.S. Narula and Gopal Singh, JJ. 11. The following question of law has been referred to us for decision by a Division Bench, consisting of Harbans Singh C.J. and Gurdev Singh J:-- Will the rights of a claimant with a verified claim be governed by rule 30 of the Rules, as it existed on the date of h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rsons may be allotted such other acquired evacuee property which is allottable as may be available. Provided that in calculating the gross compensation, the compensation due for agricultural lands, shall not be taken into consideration. Explanation--The provisions of the rule shall also apply where some of the persons in occupation of any acquired evacuee property which is an allottable property hold verified claims and some do not hold such claims. 14. The question that has been referred to us relates to the effect of this abrogation on claims for transfer of acquired evacuee property pending before the Rehabilitation Authorities on that date. For proper appreciation of the matter in controversy it is here necessary to advert to the facts giving rise to this reference. 15. The appellant Dev Raj is a displaced person from West Pakistan. On migration to India he settled at Ludhiana and took up his residence with his brother Jagan Nath in his House No. B-IV-1095, Hazuri road, Ludhiana, to whom a portion of this evacuee property had been allotted by the Custodian, Evacuee Property. On the transfer of Jagan Nath the appellant Dev Raj applied to the authorities in March, 19 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent Commissioner in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction set aside the order dated 29th of January, 1960, by which the District Rent and Managing Officer had directed the transfer of the house in dispute in favour of Respondents 4 and 5 to the exclusion of the appellant Dev Raj. He remanded the case for fresh decision, directing that the eligibility of the contending parties be first determined. This order forms Annexure 'A' to the writ-petition out of which this reference has arisen. 18. Finding that no steps had been taken to implement this order, on 13th of February, 1962 the appellant Dev Raj moved the Chief Settlement Commissioner (Annexure 'B'). Subsequently, he made another application (Annexure 'C') on the 24th of January, 1963, and ultimately, approached the Settlement Officer, Jullundur, for transfer of the house by means of the application (copy Annexure 'D') dated 8th of April, 1963. A copy of the same was sent to the District Rent and Managing Officer. Unfortunately, for a long time no action was taken to implement the order of Shri Parshotam Lal dated 23rd of October, 1961, Shri T.R. Chona, Assistant Settlement Commissioner, Jullu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f Justice and myself, reliance for upholding the view taken by the learned Single Judge was placed on the Bench decision of this Court in L. P. A. 92 of 1963, decided on 19-2-1964(Punj), wherein it had been held that the Rules, as they existed on the date of the decision and not on the date of the application, would apply to all pending proceedings under the Act. Subsequent to this decision a Full Bench of this Court in 69 Pun LR 1 = (AIR 1967 Punj 297)(FB), by majority (Mehar Singh C.J. And D.K. Mahajan J.), however, held that Rule 30 as amended on March 24, 1961 did not apply to Revisions pending on that date or filed thereafter under Sections 24 and 33 of the Act, implying thereby that the amended rule operated to affect the pending proceedings upto the stage of the appeal. On behalf of the appellant Dev Raj it was contended that the Full Bench decision had no bearing on the point as the learned Judges had proceeded on the assumption that the decision in Mela Ram's case, supra, was correct and had directed themselves solely to the question, whether the amended rule applied to the pending Revisions under S. 24 and applications under Section 33 or should be confined upto the s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ied. To compensate such claimants and to rehabilitate them, the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, was enacted and it came into force on the 9th of October, 1954. Its preamble is in these words: An Act to provide for the payment of compensation and rehabilitation grants to displaced persons and for matters connected therewith. 23. Section 3 of the Act sets up the machinery for carrying out its purpose and to enforce its provisions. Section 4 enjoins upon the Central Government to issue notifications in the official Gazette from time to time, but not later than the thirtieth day of June. 1955, requiring all displaced persons having a verified claim, to make applications for the payment of compensation. As before this Act came into force most of the available evacuee property had been leased out or allotted and occupied by displaced persons, provision is made in Section 5 for the determination of public dues recoverable from the applicant and they have to be adjusted in determining the amount of net compensation under Section 7 due to a displaced person. Section 8 prescribes the form and manner of payment of compensation. It lays down that compensa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent of the value of the property transferred against the amount of compensation. 27. It was in exercise of this power under Section 40 that the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, were framed. On their promulgation by publication in the Government Gazette they came into force on the 21st of May, 1955. The Scheme of these Rules and some of the provisions made thereunder may now be noticed. 28. Chapter II of the Rules lays down the procedure for submission of compensation applications and determination of public dues. Under Rule 4, which occures in this chapter an application for compensation has to be made by a displaced person in the form specified in Appendix I and it has to be accompanied by the questionnaire in the form specified in Appendix II and an affidavit in the form specified in Appendix III, besides certified copy of the scheme, assessment order and some other documents. Chapter III lays down the procedure to be followed by the Settlement Commissioner on receipt of the duplicate copies of the applications for compensation. Chapter IV contains provisions for determination of compensation. This brings us to Chapter V headed 'Payment o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pensation payable to him. Explanation I.--The provisions of the rule shall also apply where some of the persons in occupation of any acquired evacuee property which is an allottable property hold verified claims and some do not hold such claims. Explanation II.--If any acquired evacuee property has been allotted to a member of a family defined in sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 who does not hold any verified claim and if another member of the family holding a verified claim is in occupation of such property, the compensation payable to such other member of the family may be adjusted against the value of the property. 33. This rule was amended more than once. By the amendment dated 24th of March 1961 the words the highest were substituted for the words nearest to the value of the property . 34. Subsequent to these amendments Rule 30 in its entirety was deleted by the Sixth Amendment of the Rules effected on 3rd of August, 1963, and it is because of this abrogation that the authorities concerned have refused to transfer the property to the appellant who claims to have been in its occupation and holds a verified claim. His claim for transfer can be accepted only if it is found t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 36. By the Sixth Amendment of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, rules 30 and 31 have been omitted Rule 30, with which we are concerned in this case and which has been reproduced earlier, relates to the payment of compensation to a displaced person by allotment of acquired evacuee property which is in possession of more than one person. From the other provisions contained in this Sixth Amendment, it becomes apparent that the deletion of this rule became necessary because of the amendment of Rule 22, which lays down the various classes of acquired evacuee property that shall ordinarily be allotted. One of the categories of such property, clause (a), is any residential property in the occupation of a displaced person, the value of which does not exceed fifteen thousand rupees . By the Sixth Amendment to this provision the following Explanation was added: No property referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) shall be allottable, if it is in the occupation of two or more persons, whether any or all of them be displaced persons or not. 37. As a result of this Explanation the acquired evacuee property in possession of two or more persons, even ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rospective effect unless such intention appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or arises by necessary and distinct implication. Thus, we have to look to the repealing Act or provisions to find out whether the rule that has been abrogated would continue to govern the pending proceedings. 42. It cannot be disputed that prior to the abrogation of Rule 30, the appellant, who is a displaced person holding a verified claim and was in possession of the house in dispute, was entitled to apply for its transfer to him and, if found eligible, the authorities could transfer the same to him. It is also true that if the law as it stands on the date of determination of his eligibility or adjudication of his claim to transfer is to be considered, then because of the amendment of Rule 22 and the abrogation of Rule 30, it was no longer open to him to claim the transfer of this house and thus his right to the transfer of property in satisfaction of his claim stand adversely affected. The appellant, however, applied for transfer of this property long before this amendment in the Rules, when the property in his occupation was allottable under Rule 22 and he was entitled to ask for its transfer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... .... The same rule governs the applicability of an amending statute to a pending action. When an amending section avoids transactions, then it is necessary to have clear words in the statute if transactions entered into before the Act are to be affected. 46. At page 387 of Craies on Statute Law (Seventh Edition) it is stated: A statute is to be deemed to be retrospective, which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. But a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. In Laurie v. Renad, (1892) 3 Ch. 402 Lindley L.J. said: It is a fundamental rule of English Law that no statute shall be construed so as to have a retrospective operation, unless its language is such as plainly to require such a construction. And the same rule involves another and subordinate rule, to the effect that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary....... ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... AIR 1970 SC 385, their Lordships of the Supreme Court dealing with this matter said: It is open to a sovereign legislature to enact laws which have retrospective operation. The courts will not ascribe retrospectivity to new laws affecting rights unless by express words of necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature. The Parliament can delegate its legislative power within the recognised limits. Where any rule or regulation is made by any person or authority to whom such powers have been delegated by the legislature it may or may not be possible to make the same so as to give retrospective operation. It will depend on the language employed in the statutory provision which may in express terms or by necessary implication empower the authority concerned to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effect. But where no such language is to be found it has been held by the courts that the person or authority exercising subordinate legislative functions cannot make a rule, regulation or bye-law which can operate with retrospective effect. 52. In Arian Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 703 Hegde J. Observed: It is a well settled rule ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is an express provision making the amending provision retrospective, effect has to be given to it, but even in absence of any such a provision the amending statute can have retrospective effect, if its language is such as plainly to require such a construction. Even then a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary. The indication to affect existing rights or remedies must be clear and it has to be gathered either from the subject-matter or from the working of a statute. For that purpose we have to look at the general scope and purview of the statute, and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former state of the law, and what it was that the legislature contemplated. 56. The Sixth Amendment of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, effected in the year 1963, with which we are concerned in this case, admittedly does not contain any express provision making the amendments mentioned therein, including the omission of rule 30, retrospective. Indisputably rule 30, which has been reproduced above, as it stood before its deletion, is not a procedural provision b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 24 of the Act in obtaining property because his claim was inferior to that of his opponent under rule 30 as it then stood. He thereupon approached the Central Government under Section 33. During the pendency of those proceedings there was an amendment of rule 98(a) which placed the verified rehabilitation grant on the same footing as the verified claim for the purposes of rule 30. Because of this provision Harbans Lal, who was also entitled to a rehabilitation grant, claimed priority before the Deputy Secretary exercising the powers of the Government under Section 33. His plea was, however, rejected and the Bench ruled that the amended rule could not be given retrospective effect in the proceedings under Section 33 of the Act, which were in the nature of revisional powers intended to be used in much the same way as the revisional powers conferred on the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 24 of the Act. 59. In Chanan Dass's case (69 Pun LR 1 = (AIR 1969 Punj 297)(FB), the question referred to the Full Bench was: Whether Rule 30, as amended on March 24, 1961(published in the Gazette of India, Part II, on April 1, 19 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nor did it go into, the question whether the amendment of Rule 30 operated retrospectively so as to affect the claims under that rule which were yet awaiting adjudication before the original or appellate authority. It is emphasised that the effect of the amendment of Rule 30 on the claims pending before the original authorities and the appeals against orders passed under that provision did not arise in that case and both the order of reference and the decision of the Full Bench proceeded on the assumption that pending proceedings upto the stage of appeal were governed by the amended rule, which assumption, so the learned counsel urges, is not correct. 63. It is true that so far as the proceedings before the Rehabilitation Authorities upto the stage appeal are concerned the Full Bench has not ruled that the amended rule would not apply retrospectively and to that extent the decision in Mela Ram's case LPA 92 of 1963 D/- 19-2-1964(Punj) continues to hold the field. All the same it is abundantly clear that the finding in Mela Ram's case that the pending proceedings upto the stage of appeal would be governed by the amended Rule 30 was not specifically affirmed by the Full Be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... has been referred to us is, however, of wider amplitude. We have to consider whether the amendment of rule 30 resulting in its abrogation can apply retrospectively to any pending proceedings at whatever stage it be before the Rehabilitation Authorities. This involves going into the decisions in both Mela Ram, LPA No. 92 of 1963 D/- 19-2-1964(Punj) and Chanan Dass's case, 69 Pun LR 1 = (AIR 1967 Punj 297(FB). As has been observed earlier, it is not correct to say that Mela Ram's case so far as it lays down that the amendment of the rule would apply retrospectively upto the stage of appeal before the Rehabilitation Authorities, has been approved by the Full Bench in Chanan Dass's case. The whole matter relating to the retrospective operation of the rule to the pending proceedings at whatever stage they may be is now before us. 66. In fact, the decisions of this Court with regard to the retrospective applicability of the amended Rule 30 even upto the stage of appeal are not uniform and it was because of this conflict of judicial opinion that I sitting in Single Bench, considered it necessary, by my order D/- 16-9-1963 in Mohan Lal v. Union of India C. W. 1586 of 1961. ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ty to the dispute can be said to have acquired a vested right in the property when the matter is still pending before a revisional or an appellate authority. My attention has been invited to another decision of Pandit J. Reported as Lal Chand v. The Financial Commr. Punjab. Chandigarh. (1962) 64 Pun LR 581. In which dealing with the amendment of Section 19 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 of 1953) his Lordship held that the subsequent change in the law could not affect the rights of the respondent-allottee retrospectively. In this connection, he observed: It is undisputed that when a law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statue shows a clear intention to vary such rights (59 P.L.R. 386 Full Bench). No such intention is apparent from the Amending Act 32 of 1959. 69. Later, however, in Mela Ram v. Govt. Of India (Civil Writ No.307 of 1962 reported in 1963 Cur LJ 254) Shamsher Bahadur J., while again considering the amendment of Rule 30 the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules. 1955, accepted the view that the authorit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t Commissioner. It is a well recognised rule of construction that statutes should be interpreted if possible, so as to respect vested rights. While learned counsel for the appellant contends that as under the old rule as window who was a member of a joint Hindu family had a statutory right to claim compensation separately for her share and as the appellant had made a claim in that regard under the rule as it stood then the subsequent amendments could not be so construed as to have retrospective operation to deprive her of that right, learned counsel for the respondents argues that, as the amended rules are declamatory of the law, the Court should give retrospective operation to the new rules as a s to apply to pending proceedings. 72. Thereafter their Lordships summed up their conclusions in these words: Chapter IV provides the mode of determination of the compensation....... Rule 19 of Chapter IV of the Rules describes how to ascertain the amount of compensation in the case of a joint family....... Chapter V provides for payment of compensation by transfer of acquired evacuee property is transferred to any person under this Chapter the property shall be deemed to have b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ly made retrospective, cannot be so constructed as to affect the right of a claimant who has exercised his right by filing an application under the Rules. 73a. Basing himself on these observations, the appellant's learned counsel argues that the decisions in Mela Ram's case L. P. A. 92 of 1963 and Chanan Dass's case 69 Pun LR 1 = (AIR 1967 Punj 297) FB which proceed on the premises that the Rules relating to the determination of compensation and its payment to a displaced person do not clothe the claimant with any right much less a vested right, are no longer good law. Rule 19, with which their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing in Sardarni Attar Kaur's case Civil Appeal 2145 of 1966 D/- 3-2-1967(SC)(Supra) bears the heading Special provision for payment of the compensation to joint families and lays down the method of computing the compensation payable to them. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Rehabilitation Authorities Rule 19 was amended so as to affect the amount of compensation which could be claimed by the members of the joint family. Their Lordships ruled that such an amendment in the Rules could not operate retrospectively so a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mined and satisfied as Rule 30 as it was originally enacted or stood before its abrogation, only related to the mode of satisfaction of the claim and not to the determination of the amount. It is vehemently argued that a displaced claimant has no vested right in the mode of payment of compensation or satisfaction of his claim and it is entirely in the discretion of the authorities to pay him the compensation due in any of the forms or manners specified in Section 8 and the Rules made under the Act. 75. Support for this contention is sought from the decision of the Letters Patent Bench in Meal Ram's case. L.P.A. 92 of 1963(Supra) where Dua J. Noticing the provisions of Section 8 of the Act, said: This section does not seem to me, prima facie to create any vested right in a displaced person to insist on payment of compensation by means of allotment of immovable property. 75a. Dealing with the argument that in that case an offer of property had in fact, been made to the displaced claimant under ₹ 30 is Lordship proceeded on to say: Looked at in the background of these provisions, it appears to me that the offer of property to a displaced claim holder within th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed as vested or substantive rights: this view, in my opinion, is not destructive of any known equitable doctrine or principle. It for carrying out the general pattern of the scheme of payment of compensation by transfer of acquired property from the compensation pool the rules governing the manner, terms and conditions of such transfer are changed as a result of administrative experience on the whole a retrospective operation of these rules controlling all incomplete transfers would seem to yield more just and equitable results that mere prospective operation. Of course such an operation may adversely affect a few individual cases but the legislative intention would appear to be more concerned with the overall effect of the working of this statutory provision. 76. As has been observed earlier, the observations of the learned Judge that unless the property has in fact been completely transferred to the claim-holder and the controversy between the rival contesting claim-holders finally settled by the highest departmental authority under the Act, right to get the property transferred does not vest in the person to whom the department has chosen to make the offer need modification ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t was not found to be tenable Mehar Singh C.J. dealt with this matter in these words: Fifthly, it has been said that the decisions of the department also point to the same way but such decision, after the amendment, if I understand this matter right are not helpful because the retrospective operation of a statutory provision or a rule is to be seen on the date on which the same is made and not by anything done subsequently with regard to its reading or interpretation by the department operations or applying such law. If this approach were correct, it would means that what was not in fact retrospective law, will have to be read to be retrospective because those whose duty it is to apply that law have applied it retrospectively. I do not consider that this is the correct approach to the question. Art from this, the decisions of the department are by no means one way and consistent. An example of this is available in the appeal of Chanan Das (L.P.A. No. 305 of 1964). IN that case the Chief Settlement Commissioner exercising his powers of revision under Section 24 held that the amended rule is not retrospective as applying to the stage of proceedings before him and he proceeded to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ctful agreement with the observations of the learned Chief Justice with regard to the decisions of the department. Even if the department had been applying the amended rule retrospectively, that could not furnish justification for holding it retrospective it, in fact, on construction of the amended rule in the light of the well recognised cannons of judicial interpretation we find that the rule is prospective and not intended to impair on interfere with vested rights. 80. Turning again to the majority opinion in Chanan Dass's case 69 Pun LR 1 = (AIR 1967 Punj 297)(FB), we find that the learned Chief Justice, dealing with the argument that since the amendment had been necessitated by administrative experience it should be held to operative retrospectively even upto the stage of revision under Section 24 and an application under Section 33 of the Act, expressed himself in these words: If this consideration is of some assistance in this respect, it was the reason for the amendment. And it is settled that objects and reason for change in law are not an aid to interpretation though the same may be looked at for the matter of understanding and appreciating the circumstances wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is urged that it was obligatory upon the authorities to offer such property to the person whose net compensation was nearest to the value of the property and as such, it conferred a right on a such person to obtain the property in satisfaction of his claim for compensation subject to the value of the property and the amount of compensation to which he was found entitled. In an attempt to meet this argument, it has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that the use of the word 'shall' is not of much significance as in the context it has no more force than the word 'may' and even if a displaced person holding a verified claim is found to be eligible for allotment of property in his occupation, the Rehabilitation Authorities have the discretion to allot or not to allot the property to him but can direct that the compensation to paid to him in cash or in some other form prescribed by the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. This contention in my opinion is not tenable and I do not find it possible to agree that the word 'shall' should not be given its usual and ordinary meanings, but be read as having no more force than the word 'may'. A p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r in mind that we are not concerned with any statute in which this word has been used but with the judicially recognised rule of statutory construction that every statue which impairs or takes away vested rights must be presumed to be intended not to operate retrospectively. This rule is accepted by our Courts on the ground that the law-maker in our democracy does not ordinarily intend what is unjust and therefore does not impair an existing valuable right or obligation except in matter of procedure, without manifesting a clear intention to that effect. The expression 'vested right' in this background seems to me to convey the same idea as 'substantive right. 86. Adverting to the scheme of the Act. Dua J. Emphasised that Section 8 gave option to the department to pay compensation in any one of the forms mentioned therein any observed: This section does not seem to me, prima facie to create any vested right in a displaced person to insist on payment of compensation by means of allotment of immovable property. After referring to the rules he continued. This would show that these rules are clothed with virtually the same force and sanctity as the provision of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nded rule even to the original proceedings under Rule 30 and appeal arising therefrom is plausible and the matter is not free from difficulty. This certainly reinforces the argument that there is nothing in the language of the amending rule which clearly and unmistakably indicates that the proceedings before the Rehabilitation Authorities at whatever stage they be are to be governed by the amended rule. In fact, as has been observed earlier, the Full Bench in Chanan Dass's case 69 Pun LR 1 = (AIR 1967 Punj 297)(FB) has ruled that at least so far as the revisional proceedings under Secs 24 and 33 of the Act are concerned the amended rule cannot retrospectively apply. 89. It here becomes necessary to ask: Is there anything in the amending notification which may justify the conclusion that rule 30 as amended will be partially retrospective so as to affect the proceedings pending under unit that rule upto the appellate state and not beyond? Speaking with respect, who do not find that such an intention can be spelled out of the Sixth Amendment of the Rules, with which we are concerned in this case. If the situation as it emerges from the combined reading of the decisions in Mel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... niform and consequently, the rule of stare decisions could not apply that there is nothing to indicate that administrative experience called for retrospective operation of the amended provision: and that the purpose and scheme of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder is not a circumstance which indicates in the least whether the amended Rule 30 is by necessary intendment or implication to be held to be operative so retrospectively as to affect applications under Sections 24 and 33 of the Act. 91. It can no doubt be presumed that there must have been adequate reasons for the present amendment resulting in abrogation of Rule 30, but that would not lead us to the conclusion that this amendment was intended to operate retrospectively to affect all the pending proceedings at whatever stage they were. Unless such an intention can be gathered clearly and unmistakably from the language used in the amending provision itself the Court, will not be justified in giving retrospective effect to the amending rule simply because in its opinion it will lead to better administration of evacuee property or be in the larger interests of the displaced persons. If the amendment was of such an imp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nnot be accepted. 94. Even apart from this we find that there is no such vast discretion vesting in the authorities. Section 8 of the Act, on which considerable reliance is placed in support of the argument that the manner of satisfaction of the claim is within the discretion of the authorities, if property read, itself goes to show that this discretion is not so vast and unlimited but is subject to other provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. This is quite apparent from Section 8 which runs as follows: Form and manner of payment of compensation--(1) A displaced person shall be paid out of the compensation pool the amount of net compensation determined under sub-section (3) of Section 7 as being payable to him and subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, the Settlement Commissioner or any other officer or authority authorised by the Chief Settlement Commissioner or any other officer or authority authorised by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in this behalf may make such payment in any one of the following forms or partly in one and partly in nay other form, namely: (a) in cash: (b) in Government bonds: (c) by sale to the displaced perso ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s required to furnish, inter alia, particulars of rehabilitation benefits received, which include the particulars of the property allotted to him. This application is to be accompanied, inter alia, by Questionnaire in Appendix II. In this the applicant is required to give particulars of the evacuee quarter, house or shop occupied by him. 96. Section 10 of the Act, which lays down special procedure for payment of compensation in certain cases, provides inter alia, that where any immovable property leased or allotted to a displaced person by the Custodian is acquired under the notification mentioned in that section the displaced person concerned shall, so long as the property remains vested in the Central Government, continue in its possession on the same condition on which he held the property immediately before the date of the acquisition and the Central Government may, for the purpose payment of compensation to such displaced person, transfer to him such property on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. The conditions prescribed are to be found in the Rules. 97. As some of the acquired property may be in possession of more than one person, provision is then made fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... my Lord Gurdev Singh J. and need not be repeated. The relevant factual position which emerges from the said history is that the acquired evacuee property in question is in the occupation of more than one allottees, that out of the two contesting allottees, Dev Raj appellant is a displaced claimant, but Gurcharan Singh respondent No. 4 is a non-displaced person though his mother Lajwanti respondent No. 5 is a displaced claimant, that each of the two contesting parties had applied for transfer of the house in question long before the coming into force of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Sixth Amendment Rules on August 10, 1963, that each of them had on one occasion or the other secured an order for transfer of the house in his favour, and that no subsisting order for transfer of the house in favour of either the appellant or the contesting respondents held the field immediately before the amendment of Rule 22 and the abrogation of Rule 30 on August 10, 1963, by operation of notification, dated August 3, 1963. On the date on which the amendment with which we are concerned came into force the whole case was in the melting pot at the original stage before the Mana ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rwise than in exercise of the powers vested in it by Section 40 of the Act. That Section does not vest the Central Government either expressly or by necessary implication with the power to give retrospective effect to any rules made thereunder. The rule-making authority, i.e., the Central Government being a mere delegate of the Parliament, which is the Sovereign Legislature, cannot, therefore, give retrospective effect to any rule made by it under Section 40 in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Income-tax Officer, Alleppey v. M.C. Ponnoose (1969) 2 SCC 35 = (AIR 1970 SC 385), and in Cannanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Customs etc. (1970) 2 SCR 830 = (AIR 1970 SC 1950). 103. It was then argued before us that even in the absence of any express power having been given to the Central Government to give retrospective effect to the Rules framed under the Act, the Central Government should be deemed to have sovereign legislative power as a consequence of sub-section (3) of Section 40 of the Act, which requires the Rules made under sub-section under (1) or sub-section (2) of that section being laid before each of the two Houses of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lfilled (see Craies on Statute Law, page 297 Sixth Edition). The learned Solicitor General has not been able to refer to anything in Section 40 from which power of the Central Government to make retrospective rules may be inferred. In the absence of any such power, the Central Government, in our view acted in excess of its power in so far as it gave retrospective effect to the Explanation to Rule 49. The Explanation, in our opinion, could not operate retrospectively and would be effective for the future from the date it was added in February, 1960 . 104. The argument about the Central Government having been clothed by sub-section (3) of Section 40 with the same powers as are enjoyed by a Sovereign Legislature was repelled by the Supreme Court in the following words:-- The fact that the rules framed under the Act have to be laid before each House of Parliament would not confer validity on a rule if it is made not in conformity with Section 40 of the Act. It would appear from the observations on pages 304 to 306 of the Sixth Edition of Craies on Statute Law that there are three kinds of laying: (i) Laying without further procedure: (ii) Laying subject to negative reso ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... been entitled to obtain orders for the transfer of the property in question in his favour on his satisfying all the conditions of Rule 30, viz:-- (i) that the property in question is an allottable property: (ii) that more than one person holding verified claims are in occupation thereof: and (iii) that an amount of gross compensation payable to the appellant is higher than the amount of compensation payable to any other claimant in occupation of any portion of the house. 106. If the appellant is not able to satisfy any of the three conditions precedent for invoking the benefits of R. 30, he cannot claim the transfer of the house in question in his favour. The Managing Officer has no jurisdiction to transfer a property under Rule 30 if the proposed transferee does not fulfill all three conditions mentioned in that rule. Since, however, the question referred to us is a restricted one, and the appeal itself is not to be decided by us, we do not appear to be called upon to deal with the merits of the controversy between the contesting parties. 107. For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that:-- (i) the amendment of Rule 30 made in August, 1963, was not made retros ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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