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TMI Blog1955 (9) TMI 77X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) as amended by the C.P. Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act.$ 1947 (Act III of 1948). Prior to the amendment section 58 of the Motor tVehicles Act, 1939 was in the following terms:- 58(1). A permit other than a temporary permit issued under section 62 shall be effective without renewal for such period, not less than three years and not more than five years, as the Regional Transport Authority, may in its discretion specify in the permit. Provided that in the case of a permit issued or renewed within two years of the commencement of this Act, the permit shall be effective without renewal for such period of less than three years as the Provincial Government may prescribe. (2) A permit may be renewed on an application made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit: Provided that, other conditions being equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new applications for permits . It will be noticed that under the section as it originally stood the permit granted thereunder was for a period of not less than 3 years and not more than 5 years and a permit- holder applying fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n to the Government (i) to fix fares or freights throughout the Province or for any area or for any route, (ii) to cancel any permit after the expiry of three months from the date of notification declaring its intention to do so and on payment of such compensation as might be provided by the Rules, (iii) to declare its intention to engage in the business of road transport generally or in any area specified in the notification, (iv) to limit the period of the license to a period less than the minimum specified in the Act and (v) to direct the specified Transport Authority to grant a permit, inter alia, to the Government or any undertaking in which Government was financially interested. It may be mentioned here that in the State of Madhya Pradesh there are two motor transport companies known as C. P. Transport Services Ltd., and Provincial Transport Co. Ltd., in which, at the date of these writ petitions, the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Union of India held about 85 per cent. of the share capital. Indeed, since the filing of these petitions the entire undertakings of these companies have been purchased by the State of Madhya Pradesh and the latter are now running the services. on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it prescribes or empowers any authority to prescribe, or prevent the State from making any law prescribing or empowering any authority to prescribe, the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business . The fundamental rights conferred by articles 14 to 35 are protected by the provisions of article 13 the relevant portions of which are as follows:- 13. (1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. (2)The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void The amending Act (III of 1948) was, at the commencement of the Constitution, an existing law. The new provisions introduced by the Act authorised the Provincial Government to exclud ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,-- (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise . It will be noticed that clause (6), as amended, was not made retrospective as the amended clause (2) had been made. The contention of the respondents before us is that although the amending Act, on the authority of our decision in Shagir Ahmad's case (supra), became on and from the 26th January 1950 void as against the citizens to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of article 19(1)(g), nevertheless, after the 18th June 1951 when clause (6) was amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 the amending Act ceased to be inconsistent with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1) (g) read with the amended c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d to the extent of such inconsistency . As explained in Keshavan Madhava Menon's. case (supra) the law became void not in toto or for all purposes or for all times or for all persons but only to the extent of such inconsiatency , that is to say, to the extent it became inconsistent with the provisions of Part III which conferred the fundamental rights on the citizens. It did not become void independently of the existence of the rights guaranteed by Part III. In other words, on and after the commencement of the Constitution the existing law, as a result of its becoming inconsistent with the provisions of article 19(1)(g) read with clause (6) as it then stood, could not be permitted to stand in the. way of the exercise of that fundamental right. Article 13(1) by reason of its language cannot be read as having obliterated the entire operation of the inconsistent law or having wiped it out altogether from the statute, book. Such law existed for all past tran- sactions and for enforcement of rights and liabilities accrued before the date of the Constitution, as was held in Keghavan Madhava Menon's case. The law continued in force, even after the commencement of the Constitutio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ment of clause (6) of article 19 on the 18th June 1951, the impugned Act ceased to be unconstitutional and became revivified and enforceable against citizens as well as against non-citizens. It is true that as the amended clause (6) was not made retrospective the impugned Act could have no operation as against citizens between the 26th January 1950 and the 18th June 1951 and no rights' and obligations could be founded on the provisions of the impugned Act during the said period whereas the amended clause (2) by reason of its being expressly made retrospective had effect even during that period. But after the amendment of clause (6) the impugned Act immediately became fully operative even as against the citizens. The; notification declaring the intention of the State to take over the bus routes to the exclusion of all other motor transport operators was published on the 4th February 1955 when it was perfectly constitutional for the State to, do so. In our judgment the contentions put forward by the respondents as to the effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 are well, founded and the objections urged against them by the petitioners are untenable and must be negat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . It is quite true that the impugned AN became inconsistent with article 31 as soon as the Constitution came into force on the 26th January 1950 as held by this Court in Shagir Ahamad's case (supra) and continued to be so inconsistent right up to the 27th April 1955 and therefore, under article, 13(1) became void to the extent of such inconsistency . Nevertheless, that inconsistency was removed on and from the 27th April 1955 by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. The present writ petitions were filed on the 27th May 1955, exactly a month after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act. 1955 came into force, and, on a parity- of reasoning here in before mentioned, the petitioners cannot be permitted to challenge the constitutionality of the impugned Act on and from the 27th April 1955 and this objection also cannot prevail. Learned counsel for the petitioners sought to raise the question as to the invalidity of the impugned Act even before the advent of the Constitution. Prior to the Constitution, when there were no fundamental rights, section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which corresponds to article 31 had been construed by the Federal Court in Rao Ba ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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