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TMI Blog2018 (12) TMI 1297X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the case of SINGH ENTERPRISES VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF C. EX., JAMSHEDPUR [2007 (12) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] - appeal dismissed. - ST/20341/2018-SM - Final Order No. 21809/2018 - Dated:- 28-11-2018 - MR. S.S GARG, JUDICIAL MEMBER None Written Submissions For the Appellant Mr. Madhup Sharan, Asst. Commissioner (AR) For the Respondent ORDER Per: S.S GARG The present appeal is directed against the impugned order dated 7.12.2017 passed by the Commissioner (A) whereby the Commissioner (A) has dismissed the condonation of delay application as well as the appeal because the same was filed after a delay of 298 days beyond the time limit prescribed for filing the appeal before the Commissioner (A). 2. No ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) has to be presented within 60 days from the date of communication of order. As per proviso to Section 85(3A) of Finance Act, 1994, if the Appellate Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within 60 days of the receipt, he can condone a further delay of 30 days. Further, the Commissioner (A) has observed that in the present case, admittedly, the Order-in-Original was received on 31.3.2016 and the due date for filing appeal was up to 30.5.2016 but the appeal was filed on 24.3.2017 with a delay of 298 days. 4. I have heard the learned AR and seen the grounds of appeal. In the written submission, the appellant has submitted that th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only upto 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore just ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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