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TMI Blog1967 (1) TMI 88X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... istered Vaid. Initially, the application for leave was for four days, but, by subsequent applications, he continued to extend his leave up to 2nd May, 1956. The other four Clerks, mentioned above, also put in applications between 12th and 15th April, 1956 on similar Medical Certificates and continued their leave up to dates falling between 30th April and 4th May, 1956. The industrial dispute decided by the award, against which the present appeal is directed, related to four of these Clerks - Kanraj Mehta, A. C. Sharma, V. D. Sharma and G. S. Saxena, against whom the Society decided to take disciplinary action. The case of the Society was that these persons had conspired to paralyse the working of the Society at the time of the impending Annual General Meeting on 28th April, 1956, by collectively submitting sickness certificates. In the case of Kanraj Mehta, the Society issued a letter in response to his application for leave directing him to attend the Railway Dispensary at 7.45 hrs. on 20th April, 1956, and asking him to report to Dr. B. P. Mathur for medical examination. Kanraj did not comply with this direction and continued to send further applications for leave accompanied by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ficial, specially shareholders who had interest in the Society's affairs and constituted the very structure of the Society in order to represent him. A Committee of Enquiry was appointed, consisting of Shri Deodutta Gaur as Chairman, and Bhailal and Vishwadeo Purohit as members to enquire into the charges against Kanraj. The information of the Constitution of this Committee was conveyed to Kanraj by the letter dated 28th June 1956, and he was also told that he would be allowed to be accompanied by any employee of the Society at the enquiry if he so desired, but not by any other person as requested by him. Kanraj, however continued to insist that he must be permitted to be accompanied by a Railway employee or a Union official, particularly because he was the senior most employee of the Society and he could not expect to get any assistance from any other junior employee. This correspondence went on, and his request was not acceded to. Ultimately, on the date fixed for enquiry, Kanraj refused to appear on the ground that he had not been allowed to be represented as desired by him. 4. The Committee then submitted its report on 4th August, 1956. In the report, the Committee first ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... had asked the Secretary to inform him that it was only as a matter of grace that he was being given another three days to reply to the show cause notice, and that there was no enquiry report envisaged in the Railway Board's order as the enquiry could not be held. It was further added that the report was only that the employee did not participate, and Kanraj was told that any dilatory replies would not be taken as proper replies and action would be taken under the Rules. Kanraj, on 16th September, 1956, sent a further letter in reply to this letter sent by the Hony. Secretary. In this letter, he made a grievance of the fact that he had not been permitted to be represented as desired by him in the enquiry, and took notice of the fact that the provisional decision of the Vice-Chairman had been arrived at on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Committee which only reported that he did not participate. Then he proceeded to plead not guilty to the charges and again gave an explanation on each individual charge. Once again, the grievance made included the plea that the charges were vague. On 17th September, 1956, a letter was then issued under the signature of the Honorary Secretar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ployees, A. C. Sharma, V. D. Sharma and G. S. Saxena, but the orders in their cases need not be reproduced, as the appeal before us does not relate to their cases. The appeal by the Society is directed against the order of the Tribunal insofar as it governs the case of Kanraj Mehta. In this appeal, learned counsel appearing for the Society urged three points before us and we proceed to take them one by one. 8. The first point urged was that, in this case, the reference to the Industrial Tribunal was incompetent, because the dispute referred to the Tribunal was an individual dispute of four employees and was not an industrial dispute as it was not taken up by the workmen of the Society. It was urged that the Union which had sponsored the dispute was a Union of Railway employees only and not of the workmen of the Society which was separate and distinct from the Railway Administration. When this point was raised on behalf of the appellant, a preliminary objection was taken by learned counsel appearing for the respondents that this plea sought to be raised on behalf of the appellant was barred by the principle of res judicata. It was urged that, while the reference was pending befor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sequent Amendment Act and remanded the case to the Munsif for disposal according to law. Thereafter, the Munsif passed the final decree in the suit, and against that decree, an appeal was brought to this Court after going through the usual procedure of moving the other Courts having jurisdiction. It was in these circumstances that this Court held that the order of the High Court, holding that section 28 of the Act was applicable, could not operate as res judicata in the appeal before this Court, because the High Court's order of remand was merely an interlocutory order which did not terminate the proceedings pending in the Munsif's Court and which had not been appealed from at that stage. Consequently, in the appeal from the final decree or order it was open to the party concerned to challenge the correctness of the High Court's decision. It is to be noted that there were two special features in that case. One was that the order of the High Court, which was held not to bring in the principle of res judicata, was an interlocutory order, and the other was that it was made in a pending suit which, as a result of that order, did not finally terminate. In fact, the order of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iate remedy was to come up in appeal against the judgment of the High Court either by a certificate under Article 133 or by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. The appellant having failed to do so, the judgment of the High Court became final, and, consequently, binding between the parties. The parties to that petition were the parties now before us in this appeal. In this appeal brought up against the award of the Tribunal, consequently, it is no longer open to the appellant to raise the plea which was rejected by the High Court by its judgment dated 7th February, 1962. The first point raised on behalf of the appellant, therefore, fails. 10. The second point urged by learned counsel was that, in this case, the Tribunal in its award held that, when the enquiry was held by the Committee appointed by the Society, Kanraj was not entitled to claim that he must get assistance from a stranger to the Society and that the rejection of his request was justified, so that the validity of the proceedings before the Committee of Enquiry was not open to challenge by Kanraj. It was urged that in this appeal also, since there is no appeal on behalf of Kanraj or the Union represe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the parties and the points of law and fact arising in the appeal. It further provides that in Part II a party shall set out the proposition of law to be urged in support of the contentions of the party lodging the case and the authorities in support thereof. The Court held that there is no reason to limit the provisions of this rule only to those contentions which dealt with the points found in favour of that party in the judgment appealed from. The Court further proceeded to hold that apart from that, we think that, while dealing with the appeal before it, this Court has the power to decide all the points arising from the judgment appealed against and even in the absence of an express provision like O. XLI, rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it can devise the appropriate procedure to be adopted at the hearing. There could be no better way of supplying the deficiency than by drawing upon the provisions of a general law like the Code of Civil Procedure and adopting such of those provisions as are suitable. We cannot lose sight of the fact that normally a party in whose favour the judgment appealed from has been given will not be granted special leave to appeal from it. Consid ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a Vaid practicing Ayurvedic medicine. The charge of disobedience of orders, which were not enforceable under any rule, could neither be the basis of any order of dismissal or removal, nor could it lead to any inference that Kanraj had merely been pretending to be sick. 14. As regards the remaining four charges, they were clearly very vague. The first charge, in general terms, stated that Kanraj had instigated and conspired to paralyse the working of the Society by collectively submitting sickness certificates. The charge did not mention whom he had instigated or with whom he had conspired, nor did it indicate how this conspiracy was being inferred. Similarly, the third charge of taking active part in the issue and distribution of certain leaflets against the management of the Society did not at all indicate what those leaflets were and what part Kanraj had taken in the issue and distribution of those leaflets. The fourth charge of carrying vilifying propaganda in connection with the elections of the Society at the Annual General Meeting on 28-4-1956 was again similarly vague as there was no specification as to the persons with whom this propaganda was carried on by Kanraj and w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he omission to disclose to him the material in support of those charges. In the enquiry, no adequate opportunity having been given to Kanraj, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in setting aside the order of removal based on the report of the Committee of Enquiry, and it appears that it was in view of the aspect explained by us above that the Tribunal proceeded to lay down that it was open to the Society to institute a fresh enquiry and give an opportunity to Kanraj to show cause after supplying copies of necessary documents to him as claimed by him when the notice dated 13th September, 1956 was issued to him. Consequently, we consider that the order passed by the Tribunal was fully justified. 16. The third and the last point urged by learned counsel for the appellant was that, even if the Tribunal held that the order of removal of Kanraj was unjustified, the Tribunal should not have directed his reinstatement, because the Society had taken a specific plea before the Tribunal that the Society had lost confidence in Kanraj. In support of this proposition, learned counsel relied on the decision of this Court in Assam Oil Co. Ltd. New Delhi v. Its Workmen.: (1960)ILLJ587SC It appe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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