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TMI Blog1976 (9) TMI 186X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the presence of artificial dye. On the strength of this report, the appellants were chargesheeted under Section 7(i) read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) before the Judicial Magistrate, Delhi. The defence of the 1st appellant was that the 2nd appellant was at no time engaged by him as the salesman and no mustard oil was purchased by Bahnot from the 2nd appellant. The 2nd appellant also claimed that he was never an employee of the 1st appellant and while he was going to his house after purchasing sarson oil for his personal use, he was caught by two or three persons near Maharani Bagh and a sample was taken from the oil which he was carrying and his signatures were obtained by threat on certain papers. The learned Judicial Magistrate accepted the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution and rejected the defence version and held that the appellants were guilty of the offence of selling in seed oil containing artificial dye which was an offence punishable under Section 7(i) read with Section 16(1)(a)(i). The learned Judicial Magistrate accordingly convicted the appellants and sentenced each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for nine months and to pay a fine of ₹ 1000/-. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... result in the guilty escaping the punishment but lead to general deterioration in standards of honesty and integrity. This is a highly reprehensible phenomenon which has to be curbed in the larger interest of the administration of justice. Here, apart from the endorsement B to B in the panchanama and the signature at the foot of it showing that Keshav Dutt Sharma was a witness to the taking of the sample, we have the statement of Bhanot who said in his evidence that Keshav Dutt Sharma was taken by him to witness the taking of the sample and Keshav Dutt Sharma made the endorsement B to B on the panchanama and put his signature below it and this statement made by Bhanot was not challenged in the cross-examination, nor was it even suggested to Bhanot that Keshav Dutt Sharma was not present at the taking of the sample. The prosecution case obviously cannot be thrown out merely because Keshav Dutt Sharma refused to support what had been stated by him, in his own hand writing in the panchanama and went back upon it to the utter dismay of the prosecution. It is true that by reason of the defection of Keshav Dutt Sharma, the prosecution was left only with the evidence of Bhanot and Bhatnag ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r than that prescribed in respect thereof and in amounts not within the prescribed limits of variability is present in the article. 5. and Clause (1) deems an article of food to be adulterated : (1) if the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standard or if constituents are present in quantities which are in excess of the prescribed limits of variability. In the present case what was sold by the appellants was linseed oil which contained artificial dye. The standard of quality of linseed oil is defined in Paragraph A. 17.04 of Appendix B to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 as follows : A-17.04.-Linseed oil (Tilli ka tel) means the oil obtained by process of expressing clean and sound linseed (Linum usitatissimum). It shall be clear, free, from rancidity, suspended or other foreign matter, separated, water, added colouring or flavouring substances, or mineral oil. It shall conform to the following standards : (a) Butyro-refractometer reading at 40C.............69.5 to 74.3 (b) Saponification value ..............188 to 195 (c) Iodine value ..........Not less than 170 (d) Unsaponifiable matter ........Not more than 1.5 perc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... applicability of another Clause of the section an article of food may be deemed to be adulterated under more than one clauses of Section 2(i). It is, therefore, not a valid argument that because the present case falls under Clause (1) of Section 2(i), the applicability of Clause (j) is ipso facto negatived and the case cannot come within that clause. 7. That takes us to the question whether the present case falls within Clause (j) of Section 2(i), for if it does, it would be immaterial whether it falls also within Clause (1) of Section 2(i) and in so far as the linseed oil sold by the appellants is deemed to be adulterated under Clause (j) of Section 2(i), the proviso to Section 16(1) would not be attracted. Now, the report of the Public Analyst showed that the linseed oil sold by the appellants contained artificial dye and this was clearly prohibited under the Rules. Rule 23 provided that the addition of a colouring matter to an article of food, except as specifically permitted by the Rules, shall be prohibited. The only artificial dyes, which were permitted to be used in food, were those set out in Rule 28, and Rule 29 prohibited the use of permitted coal tar dyes in or upon ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s permitted to be used in an article of food, what is prescribed in respect of the article is that no colouring matter shall be used and if any colouring matter is present in the article in breach of that prescription, it would clearly involve violation of Clause (j) of Section 2(i). The words of Clause (j) of Section 2(i) other than that prescribed in respect thereof recall to the mind similar words used in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act which makes certain provisions of the Limitation Act applicable in cases where a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. These words of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act came up for interpretation before this Court in Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel. [1964]6SCR129 . It was contended' in that case that, on a true construction of these words, it is only where a period of limitation is specifically prescribed in the Schedule and a special or local law prescribes 'a different, period of limitation, that Section 29(2) would be attracted and that section would have no application where no time limit is prescribed by the Schedule. This conte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... even under the Act . But in the .very same decision in Isher Das's case (supra) this Court sounded a note of caution which must be borne in mind: Adulteration of food is a menace to public health. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has been enacted with the aim of eradicating that anti-social evil and for ensuring purity in the articles of food. In view of the above object of the Act and the intention of the legislature as revealed by the fact that a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a period of six months and a fine of rupees one thousand has been prescribed, the courts should not lightly resort to the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act in the case of persons above 21 years of age found guilty of offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 9. The imperatives of social defence must discourage the applicability of the probation principle. No chances can be taken by society with a man whose anti-social activities, in the guise of a respectable trade, jeopardise the health and well being of numerous innocent consumers. The adulterator is a social risk. It might be dangerous to leave him free to carry on his nefarious activities by applying the p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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