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TMI Blog1982 (12) TMI 225X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ice. This contention was partly accepted. It was held by this Court that prior hearing is not necessary in all cases and that when immediate action is to be taken, a post decision hearing can meet the requirements of natural justice. It was on this basis that the Court by order dated 8th Sept. 1980 allowed the petition and directed the Central Government to give an opportunity within two months to the petitioner-company to show cause against the order under Section 18AA and to cancel the order if the petitioner was able to satisfy that the conditions requisite for making of the order did not exist. There was no appeal against the decision of this Court which has now been reported as Indore Textile Ltd. v. Union of India, 1981 MPLJ 236 : (1981 Lab IC 545). 2. The Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818, had to consider the same question. The Supreme Court also took the iew that the power conferred under Section 18AA on the Central Government is quasi-judicial in nature and that the said power has to be exorcised consistent with the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court, however, held that a pre-decisional hearing under Section 18 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the petitioner-company. Thereafter, additional return was filed by the Central Government on 12th March 1982. It was seated in the additional return that the order was passed by the Minister for Commerce. It was also stated that although the communication sent to the petitioner-company did not disclose reasons, all relevant matters were considered and the Central Government is now willing to communicate a reasoned order. It was further stated that it was awaiting the direction of this Court and then to pass a reasoned order if the Court so directed. On 23rd April 1982, the Court was told that the Minister's order contained reasons on which we directed that those reasons be conveyed to the petitioner-company within a month. Thereafter, an order signed by Shri V. K. Shunglu. Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce (Department of Textiles) was issued. This order states that having regard to the facts and circumstances mentioned in the order, the take over of the undertaking was not only proper but necessary. This order briefly contains the reasons. It is Annexure 'D'. The petitioner then further amended the petition for challenging this order also. Thereafter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ter was quasi-judicial, and that that hearing had already been given by Joint Secretary Shri Ram Krishna. Thereafter the file went to Shri Ram Krishna again who by his note dated 7th Aug. 1981 again recommended withdrawal of the take over. When tho file reached the Commerce Minister, he on 14th Sept. 1981 ordered processing of the case in the light of the brief prepared by Shri Ram Krishna. The Deputy Secretary Shri Damodaran then prepared a note on 15th Dec. 1981 supporting the take over. Joint Secretary Shri Shunglu On 18th Dec. 1981 agreed with the opinion of Shri Damodaran and the Commerce Minister approved the same on 30th Dec. 1981. The Minister did not personally hear the petitioners. The question on these facts is whether it can be said that the petitioner company was not given an opportunity to show cause or in other words was not heard as directed by this Court in the earlier writ petition because the person passing the order i.e. the Minister did not himself hear the petitioner company. There is, however, no rule of construction or general principle from which such an implied requirement could be inferred. 7. When a quasi-judicial power is conferred on the Gover ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 5 AC 120) was accepted by the Privy Council in the case of Jeffs v. New Zealand Dairy Production and Marketing Board, (1967) 1 AC 551 (PC). In this case, the respondent Board was conferred with a quasi-judicial power by a statute to make a zoning order, it was held that the Board could appoint a person or persons to hear and receive evidence and submissions from interested parties, and if it reached the decision after fully informing itself of the evidence and submissions made, it could not be said that the Board had not heard the interested parties and had acted contrary to the principles of natural justice. It was also held that in some circumstances it may even suffice for the Board to have before it and to consider an accurate summary of the relevant evidence and the submissions if the summary adequately disclosed the submission and evidence to the Board. The decision of the Board was, however, set aside on the ground that the report which the Board considered did not state what the evidence was and the Board reached its decision without consideration of and in ignorance of the evidence. 9. The principle that when a auasi-judicial power is conferred on a Government dep ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l cannot delegate its functions unless it is enabled to do so expressly or by necessary implication, the position is different in case of an administrative power which has to be exercised in a quasi-judicial manner and the statutory functionary exercising such a power cannot be said to have delegated his functions merely by deputing a responsible and competent officer to enquire and report. It was further observed that what cannot be delegated is the ultimate responsibility for the exercise of the power. Arlidge's case had also decided that when hearing is held by one officer and the final decision is taken by another on the basis of the hearing officer's report, it is not always necessary to disclose the report to the affected person for inviting his comments before making the final decision. This principle has also been accepted by our Supreme Court : (Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala, AIR 1969 SC 198; Kesava Mills Cc. v. Union of India. AIR 1973 SC 389: Shadi Lal v. State of Punjab. AIR 197.) SC 1124 and Hira Nath v. Rajendra Medical College, AIR 1973 SC 1260. 11. In the light of the principles stat-ed above, the argument of the learned counsel for the petit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ry to what is laid down in Arlidge's case. In our opinion, the case of Nage-swara Rao must be confined to the construction of Section 68D of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules made thereunder which specifically required giving an opportunity to the person of being heard in person . The case cannot be understood to have decided that whenever a quasi-judicial power is conferred on the Government, the Minister concerned must himself hear and he cannot act on the report of an officer to whom the hearing function is delegated. This view that we have taken is in line with the decisions of the Kerala and Allahabad High Courts : (Raghava Menon v. I. G. of Police. AIR 1961 Ker 299, and Triambak Pati v. B.H.S. I. Edn., Allahabad, AIR 1S73 All 1 (FBI). 13. Coming to the second contention, we will assume for the purpose of this case that a reasoned order of the Central Government is necessary under Section 18AA after hearing the objection of the owner whose undertaking is taken over under that section. Even so, we do not find any good ground to accept the contention that the action taken by the Central Government is invalid. It is true that to begin with, no reasoned order wa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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