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TMI Blog2020 (12) TMI 791X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s appointed under TSGST Act or CGST Act or by the affected person, if such action is taken within a period of three months from the date of such decision, or order or notice or certificate or any other documents as the case may be. The first proviso stipulates that no such rectification shall be done after a period of six months from the date of issue of such decision or order or notice or certificate or any other documents. The second proviso provides that the said period of six months shall not apply in such cases where the rectification is purely in the nature of correction of clerical or arithmetical error, arising from any accidental slip or omission. It is apparent on the face of the said provision of Section 161 of the TSGST Act that this is a complete code within itself and it has impliedly excluded the Limitation Act. Thus, what has been observed by the Superintendent of Taxes in the decision communicated by the reply dated 17.12.2019 does not suffer from any infirmity. Moreover, the Limitation Act will not apply automatically unless it is extended to the special statute such as TSGST Act inasmuch as law in this regard is absolutely unambiguous that except in the case o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d IGST at ₹ 3,690.00, CGST at ₹ 12,67,409.84 and SGST at ₹ 12,67,409.84 but as per Form GSTR- 2A (inward supply), the taxpayer is entitled for utilization Input Tax Credit (ITC) against its liabilities at ₹ 2,67,307.94 as CGST and ₹ 2,67,307.94 as SGST only, but the tax payer had been found to have wrongly utilized excess ITC at ₹ 3,690.00 as IGST, ₹ 10,00,101.90 (₹ 12,67,409.84-₹ 2,67,307.94) as CGST and ₹ 10,00,101.90 (₹ 12,67,409.84-₹ 2,67,307.94) as SGST. 2. By the order of seizure dated 04.09.2018 tax invoices were seized in presence of witnesses by the Superintendent of State Tax, Dharmanagar charge. For purpose of seizure, due authorization was issued by the competent authority under Section 67(1) of TSGST Act. At the time of seizure, one Ajit Kumar Deb, son of the proprietor was present. As it appeared that the petitioner has committed offence under Clauses-(c) and (d) of Section 12 (2) of TSGST Act, a notice under Section 74(1) of the TSGST Act was issued to the petitioner to showcause as to why the amount of ₹ 20,03,893.80 along with interest payable thereon and penalty equivalent to the tax ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ) of M/S New Kiran Enterprise, GSTIN: 16ACIPD2157R1ZA against M/S Kiran Enterprise, GSTIN : 16ACIPD2157R2Z9 though both the distinct persons PAN is same. In respect of excess ITC claimed, the taxpayer is also submitted an application dated 15/10/2018, it will be adjusted by their Auditor and it is under process but it appears from the GST Portal that the taxpayer namely M/S Kiran Enterprise, GSTIN: 16ACIPD2157R2Z9 did not reverse the ITC. Therefore, it is evidently proved that the taxpayer M/S Kiran Enterprise, Nayapara Road, Dharmanagar wrongly availed or utilized input tax credit an amount of ₹ 3,690.00 as IGST, ₹ 10,00,101.90 (₹ 12,67,409.84 - ₹ 2,67,307.94) as CGST and ₹ 10,00,101.90 (₹ 12,67,409.84 -₹ 2,67,307.94) as SGST. Totally wrongly availed or utilized input tax credit an amount of ₹ 20,03,893.80 (₹ 3690.00 + ₹ 10,00,101.90 + ₹ 10,00,101.90). In view of what has been observed in the order dated 15.11.2018 [Annexure-4 to the writ petition], the respondent No.4 has imposed penalty in the manner as under : It is crystal clear that the tax payer willingly and knowingly committed offences ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... such petition was required to be condoned. Accordingly, prayer for condoning the delay was advanced on the ground that the sole proprietor of the petitioner is about ninety six years of age and is suffering from various old age diseases. In the said petition filed under section 161 of the TSGST Act, the petitioner has asserted inter alia that Bharati Hexacom Limited prepared the tax invoices erroneously in the name of M/s Kiran Enterprise (instead of M/s New Kiran Enterprise). It has been stated further that Bharati Hexacom Limited owes payment of SGST as well as CGST and the petitioner does not have any liability to pay the tax, interest etc. It is Bharati Hexacom Limited which raised the tax invoices erroneously in the name of M/s Kiran Enterprise, the petitioner herein. The petitioner before the respondent No.4 had further urged as follows : 13.2 It is stated that admittedly, in the instant case, for the periods, stretching from July, 2017 to August, 2017, the tax due and payable, for the transaction in question, amounting to ₹ 24,05,159.44/- has been deposited, by Bharati Hexacom Ltd., against the correct GSTIN No.16ACIPD2157R2Z9, and therefore, by no stretch of imag ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d penalty. They have asserted that the petitioner utilized more amount of ITC for which the petitioner was not entitled. The petitioner had submitted the said prayer before the order dated 15.11.2018 was passed, to the respondent No.4 but no document was submitted in support of her said claim. The respondents have restated that the rectification as sought did not involve a clerical or arithmetical error arising from any accidental slip or omission to apply. Proviso to Section 161 of the TSGST Act clearly provides that no rectification can be done after expiry of six months from the date of passing of the order. The petitioner did not file the petition under Section 161 of the TSGST Act within the period of six months. The petition for rectification was filed to the Superintendent of Taxes after the notice was issued by the respondent No.4 in pursuance to the order dated 15.11.2014. Hence, the said petition under Section 161 of the TSGST Act was barred by limitation. No rectification can be done after expiry of six months from the date of passing of the order and as such, the said petition was rejected being barred by limitation. 7. Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... under : 161. Without prejudice to the provisions of section 160, and notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act, any authority, who has passed or issued any decision or order or notice or certificate or any other document, may rectify any error which is apparent on the face of record in such decision or order or notice or certificate or any other document, either on its own motion or where such error is brought to its notice by any officer appointed under this Act or an officer appointed under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act or by the affected person within a period within a period of three months from the date of issue of such decision or order or notice or certificate or any other document, as the case may be: Provided that no such rectification shall be done after a period of six months from the date of issue of such decision or order or notice or certificate or any other document: Provided further that the said period of six months shall not apply in such cases where the rectification is purely in the nature of correction of a clerical or arithmetical error, arising from any accidental slip or omission : Provided also t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... .11.2018 cannot be entertained for the reasons as recorded in the said communication dated 17.12.2019 which reads as under : As per record, the order against the taxpayer was passed by the Superintendent of State Tax of Dharmanagar Charge under section 74 of the TSGST Act, 2017 on 15.11.2018. The taxpayer after expiry of approximately twelve months furnished a petition under section 161 of the TSGST Act, 2017 for rectification of defects/errors before the Superintendent of State Tax. The petition under Section 161 of the TSGST Act, 2017 was submitted by the taxpayer on 08.11.2019 but the proviso to the section 161 mandated that no such rectification should be done after expiry of six months from the date of issue of such decision, order or notice. Here, the adjudicating authority has no right to rectify any error after expiry of a period of more than six months. But this limitation is not applicable to such cases where the rectification involves only a clerical or arithmetical error. So, after perusing the taxpayer's petition under Section 161 of the TSGST Act, 2017 it is observed that no rectification can be done by the adjudicating authority after the period prescr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Act is not a persona designata, it becomes obvious that it functions as a court. In the present case all the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the Rent Act have been extended are constituted as appellate authorities under Section 18 by the Govt. notification noted earlier. These District Judges have been conferred the powers of the appellate authorities. It becomes therefore, obvious that while adjudicating upon the dispute between the landlord and tenant and while deciding the question whether the Rent Control Court's order is justified or not such appellate authorities would be functioning as courts. The test for determining whether the authority is functioning as a court or not has been laid down by a series of decisions of this court. We may refer to one of them, in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Bank Ltd.: AIR 1967 SC 1494 . In that case this court was concerned with the question whether the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies functioning under Section 48 of the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 was a court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Contempt of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urn to the aforesaid provision of the Limitation Act. It reads as under : 29(2). Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for its applicability to the facts of a given case and for importing the machinery of the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision. (i) There must be provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application. (ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lable. Proviso of Section 20(2) of the RDDB Act would apply in view of the provisions made in Section 18(2) of SARFAESI Act. This interpretation is clearly borne in two statutes, as stated. But that advances the cause of justice. It has been emphatically observed that unless the scheme of the statute expressly excludes the power of condonation, there is no reason to deny such power to an appellate tribunal when the statutory scheme so warrants. It has been observed in Baleshwar Dayal Jaiswal (supra) as follows : 11. We approve the view taken by the Madras [(2009) 2 CTC 302], Andhra Pradesh [AIR 2013 AP 24] and Bombay High Courts [(2008) 4 Mah LJ 424], but for different reasons. The view taken by Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sajida Begum v. State Bank of India: AIR 2013 AP 24 is based on applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. In our view, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act has no absolute application, as the statute in question impliedly excludes applicability of provisions of Limitation Act to the extent a different scheme is adopted. If no provision of Limitation Act was expressly adopted, it may have been possible to hold that by virtue of Section 29(2) power ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... we differ with the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court as well as Madras and Bombay High Courts. We are also in agreement with the principle that even though Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be impliedly inapplicable, principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act can be held to be applicable even if Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act does not apply, as laid down by this Court in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department : (2008) 7 SCC 169 and M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise: (2015) 7 SCC 58. 15. As a result of the above discussion, the question is answered in the affirmative by holding that delay in filing an appeal Under Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act can be condoned by the Appellate Tribunal under proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDB Act read with Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act. The contrary view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Seth Banshidhar Media Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. case : AIR 2011 MP 205 is overruled. 18. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has on the question of applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 for invoking the provisions of Section 5 for purpose of condon ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Sub-section (2) thus, provides that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to any Act which prescribes a special period of limitation, unless they are expressly excluded by that special law. 27. This Court in the case of Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpuravil Aboobacker:(1995) 5 SCC 5 examined the question of whether the Limitation Act will apply to the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1965. While holding that the appellate authority under the Kerala Act acts as a Court, it was held that since the Act prescribes a period of limitation, which is different from the period of limitation prescribed under the L ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. 26. According to Hukumdev Narain Yadav (supra), even if there exists no express exclusion in the special law, the court reserves the right to examine the provisions of the special law, and arrived at a conclusion as to whether the legislative intent was to exclude the operation of the Limitation Act. 19. In Anshuman Shukla (supra), the apex court has considered Nasiruddin versus Sita Ram Agarwal reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577 where it was explained why Section 5 of the limitation act is not applicable in the matter of the deposit by the tenant as the provision of Section 5 cannot be extended when the default takes place in complying an order under sub-Section 4 of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... emedy, and where its language is ambiguous, that construction should be preferred which preserves such remedy to the one which bars or defeats it. A court ought to avoid an interpretation upon a statute of limitation by implication or inference as it may have a penalizing effect unless it is driven to do so by the irresistible force of the language employed by the legislature. 22. In Mahinder Singh (supra), the Civil Judge by a judgment discarded the objection raised against the suit being barred by limitation inasmuch as Article 2(b) of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 provides the period of limitation of three years for a suit for possession of an ancestral immovable property which has been alienated but that alienation was not bound on the plaintiff. The Civil Judge had observed that dismissal of the execution proceeding cannot be said that the decree sheet was not prepared during the proceedings of the said execution case. But in fact, the decree sheet was prepared much earlier than what had been claimed by the defendant. Thus, it was held that the suit was within the period of limitation as prescribed. Even the appeal filed from the said order stood dismissed by an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on non-judicial stamp paper supplied by the parties within the time specified by the Court and the same is signed by the Judge and sealed. It is in this context that the observations of this Court in Shankar Balwant Lokhande v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande: (1995) 3 SCC 413 have to be understood. These observations do not apply to a money decree and, therefore, Appellant can derive no benefit from them. 21. As in the present case, even though the declaratory judgment was pronounced by the Court in the previous suit on 20th August, 1963, on the basis of compromise entered into by Mohinder Singh (original Plaintiff) and Rura Singh (original Defendant), that declaration could be given effect to only after the death of Ujjagar Singh. The decree as passed was enforceable only thereafter. Suffice it to observe that the decree sheet having been made ready on 19th August, 1972 and the suit for possession filed three years thereafter on 11th June, 1974, was thus within the prescribed period of limitation in terms of Article 2(b) of the Schedule to the 1920 Act. 22. Assuming for the sake of argument that the three years' period provided in Article 2(b) ought to be reckoned ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rictly so called but others more or less neighbours to such deficiencies. Any circumstances, legal or factual, which inhibits entertainment or consideration by the Court of the dispute on the merits comes within the scope of the Section and a liberal touch must inform the interpretation of the Limitation Act which deprives the remedy of one who has a right. 23. Thereafter, the apex Court having noticed the facts of that case had observed as under : 26. It may be apposite to also advert to Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act, the same reads thus: 29. Savings.- (1) (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. (3)-(4) * * * 27. We find force in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ordinarily be imposed unless the party so penalised either acted deliberately in defiance of law or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will not be imposed merely it is lawful to do so. Where the penalty should be imposed for failure to perform the statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority. Discretion is to be exercised judicially and on consideration of all relevant circumstances. The relevant passage from Hindustan Steel Ltd.(supra) is reproduced hereunder : 7. Under the Act penalty may be imposed for failure to register as a dealer : Section 9(1) read with Section 25(1)(a) of the Act. But the liability to pay penalty does not arise merely upon proof of default in registering as a dealer. An order imposing penalty for failure to carry out a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding, and penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will not also be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether penalty should be imposed for failure ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ification or correction of a clerical or arithmetical error arising from any accidental slip or omission. The provision of Section 161 provides rectification only of the decision or order or notice or certificate or any other document as issued by any authority under the TSGST Act. Thus, the clerical or arithmetical error from any accidental slip or omission would mean rectification in the decision or order or notice or certificate or any other document as issued by any authority under the TSGST Act. Mr. Bhowmik, learned Advocate General has emphasized that Section 161 is without any prejudice to the provisions of Section 160 of the TSGST Act. Section 161 of TSGST Act provides only rectification of the decision or the order or the notice or the certificate or any other document issued by any authority. Either of the parties of the proceeding meaning any officer appointed either under TSGST Act or CGST Act or the affected party may apply for rectification within a period of three months from the date of issue of such order, decision, notice or certificate or any other document as the case may be. He has referred the first proviso to Section 161 of the TSGST Act to advance his plea o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... esent and manage the business, clerks to record and attest its acts and decisions, and ministerial officers to execute its commands and secure order in its proceedings. 14. The constitution of Court in this country has been by legislative enactments. For constituting Civil Courts, the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 was enacted which provided classes of civil courts and provided for constitution of courts of District Judges, Sub- ordinate Judges and Munsifs. Similarly for civil courts in the town of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, the Presidency Small Causes Act, 1882 was enacted. 15. The definition of Court as contained in Section 6(7) as noted above, thus, clearly indicates that what Act, 1959 refers to a Court is a civil court created in the State. The scheme of the Act clearly indicates that Commissioner is an authority under the Act who is to be appointed by the Government. The Commissioner is entrusted with various functions under the Act and one of the functions entrusted to the Commissioner is hearing of the appeal Under Section 69 of the Act, 1959. In the present case we are concerned with Section 69 which is to the following effect: 69. Appeal to th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ication may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens. Similarly, Section 5 provides that any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the Appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Section 6 refers to institution of a suit or making of application for the execution of a decree by a minor or insane, or an idiot who may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased. *** *** *** *** *** 26. The Schedule of the Act provides for Periods of Limitation . First Division deals with different kinds of suits. Second Division deals with appeals and Third Division deals with applications. The suits, appeals and applications which have been referred to in the Schedule obviously mean suits, appeals and applications to be filed in Court as per the provisions referred to in the Act noted above. 27. Section 29(2) provides that where any special or local law presc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d the tribunal. We shall notice both sets of cases to find out the ratio which need to be applied in the present case. 29. The first case to be noticed is Town Municipal Council, Athani v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts, Hubli,: (1969) 1 SCC 873. In the above case applications Under Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were filed by various workmen of the Appellant. The question which was considered by this Court in the above was as to whether Article 137 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 governs applications Under Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Referring to various articles of Limitation Act, 1963, this Court laid down following: 12. ...The scope of the various articles in this division cannot be held to have been so enlarged as to include within them applications to bodies other than courts, such as a quasi judicial tribunal, or even an executive authority. An Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court dealing with applications or references under the Act are not courts and they are in no way governed either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. We cannot, therefore, accept the submission m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on is filed and the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply for the purpose of the computation of the said period.' On a plain reading of the Section it is absolutely clear that its effect is only to render applicable to the proceedings before the Collector, the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to computation of the period of limitation . The provisions relating to computation of the period of limitation are contained in Sections 12 to 24 included in Part III of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 is not a provision dealing with computation of the period of limitation . It is only after the process of computation is completed and it is found that an appeal or application has been filed after the expiry of the prescribed period that the question of extension of the period Under Section 5 can arise. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Venkaiah case that Section 93 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the proceedings before the Collector. It has been observed in Sakuru(supra) as follows: 37 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t has been observed in Patel Brothers(supra) as follows : 21. The judgment in Mangu Ram(supra) would not come to the aid of the Appellant as the Court found that there was no provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure. from which legislative intent to exclude Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be discerned and, therefore, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was taken aid of. Similar situation prevailed in Anshuman Shukla's case. On the contrary, in the instant case, a scrutiny of the scheme of VAT Act goes to show that it is a complete code not only laying down the forum but also prescribing the time limit within which each forum would be competent to entertain the appeal or revision. The underlying object of the Act appears to be not only to shorten the length of the proceedings initiated under the different provisions contained therein, but also to ensure finality of the decision made there under. The fact that the period of limitation described therein has been equally made applicable to the Assessee as well as the revenue lends ample credence to such a conclusion. We, therefore, unhesitantly hold that the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... en the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court. [Emphasis added] 32. In a different context, having reference to the scheme of Representation of the People Act in Hukumdev Narain Yadav versus Lalit Narain Mishra reported in (1974) 2 SCC 133 the apex Court has unambiguously laid down the principle of law as follows : 17. ... but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... out of step with at least five earlier binding judgments of this Court, it does not square also with the subsequent judgment in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principal secy., Irrigation Deptt.: (2008) 7 SCC 169. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court was asked to decide whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act would apply to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. After discussing the various provisions of the Arbitration Act and the Limitation Act, this Court held: 23. At this stage it would be relevant to ascertain whether there is any express provision in the Act of 1996, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. On review of the provisions of the Act of 1996 this Court finds that there is no provision in the said Act which excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application submitted Under Section 34 of the said Act. On the contrary, this Court finds that Section 43 makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to arbitration proceedings. The proceedings Under Section 34 are for the purpose of challenging the award whereas the proceeding referred to Under Section 43 a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ble to an application submitted Under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside an arbitral award. 30. While discussing Parson Tools, this Court held: 25...In appeal, this Court held that (1) if the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation, then the Tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith, on the analogy of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, and (2) the appellate authority and the revisional authority were not courts but were merely administrative tribunals and, therefore, Section 14 of the Limitation Act did not, in terms, apply to the proceedings before such tribunals. 26. From the judgment of the Supreme Court in CST: (1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 185 : (1975) 3 SCR 743] it is evident that essentially what weighed with the Court in holding that Section 14 of the Limitation Act was not applicable, was that the appellate authority and the revisional authority were not courts . The stark features of the revisional powers pointed out by the Court, showed that the legislature had deliberately excluded the application of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o the proceedings before such Tribunal, and consequently, neither Section 29(2) nor Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act applied. The decision of the Full Bench was challenged by the Commissioner of Sales Tax before this Court, contending that the Limitation Act did not apply to tribunals, and Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act was excluded in principle or by analogy. This Court upheld the view that the Limitation Act did not apply to tribunals, and that as the revisional authority Under Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act was a tribunal and not a court, the Limitation Act was inapplicable. This Court further held that the period of pendency of proceedings before the wrong forum could not be excluded while computing the period of limitation by applying Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. This Court, however, held that by applying the principle underlying Section 14(2), the period of pendency before the wrong forum may be considered as a sufficient cause for condoning the delay, but then having regard to Section 10(3-B), the extension on that ground could not extend beyond six months. The observation that pendency of proceedings of the nature contemplated by Section 14(2) of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the apex Court in the International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Limited (supra) as follows : 13. The RDB Act is a special law. The proceedings are before a statutory Tribunal. The scheme of the Act manifestly provides that the Legislature has provided for application of the Limitation Act to original proceedings before the Tribunal under Section 19 only. The appellate tribunal has been conferred the power to condone delay beyond 45 days Under Section 20(3) of the Act. The proceedings before the Recovery officer are not before a Tribunal. Section 24 is limited in its application to proceedings before the Tribunal originating Under Section 19 only. The exclusion of any provision for extension of time by the Tribunal in preferring an appeal Under Section 30 of the Act makes it manifest that the legislative intent for exclusion was express. The application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by resort to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 therefore does not arise. The prescribed period of 30 days Under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act for preferring an appeal against the order of the Recovery officer therefore cannot be condoned by application of Section 5 of the L ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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