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TMI Blog2021 (4) TMI 678X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing Authority heard both sides and by the Impugned Order dated 3rd March, 2020, inter alia after considering Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of "A.V. Murthy Vs. B.S. Nagabasavanna" (2002) 2 SCC 642 considered the balance-sheets available on record and found that there were acknowledgments of debts under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and rejected the Application filed by the Corporate Debtor and admitted the Application under Section 7 of IBC. Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP in short) was thus started. Hence, the present Appeal by Director of the Suspended Board of Corporate Debtor. 2. In the Impugned Order, Adjudicating Authority considered the Application filed by the State Bank of India; contents of the format and the amount stated to be in default. The Corporate Debtor claimed in the C.A. No. 1161 of 2019 that date of default mentioned in the Application is on 01st January, 2014. The Corporate Debtor filed Reply in the Application to defend itself. The Copy of C.A. No. 1161 of 2019 is at Annexure A-8 (Page126) and the Reply with annexures before Adjudicating Authority which was filed by State Bank of India is at Annexure A-9 (Page 132). Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , 2018. Appellant is arguing that NPA declared is on 30.09.2012 and thus the Application was time-barred. According to the Appellant, in the Application under Section 7, the date of NPA mentioned was wrong and the Appellant had not relied on balance-sheet in the Application under Section 7. It is argued that the Application was thus defective and should have been rejected. According to the Appellant, the State Bank of India wrongly relied on One Time Settlement (OTS in short) issued by the Corporate Debtor on 20th January, 2017 and rejection of the same, to claim extension of period of limitation. Appellant claims that balance-sheet cannot be relied on for acknowledgment under Section 18. Reference is made to Judgment in the matter of "Swiss Ribbons Vs. Union of India" MANU/SC/0079/2019 to submit that Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that there is a shift in the legislative policy from the concept of "Inability to pay debts" to "Determination of default" and that IBC is not adversarial litigation but a beneficial legislation to put a dying Corporate Debtor back to its feet. It is argued that there is distinction between "Date of default" and cause of action and IBC is concerned o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... begins to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops the same. In answer to the query raised by this Tribunal at the time of arguments, Learned Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act cannot be relied on as legislative policy has provided that there is shift to "date of default" from "inability to pay" and this date of default does not shift. That there is only one default recognised under IBC. It is argued that legislation excluded all other provisions of Limitation Act including Section 4 to 24 to file an Application under Section 7. Appellant claims that Section 238 (A) of IBC which was included subsequently states that the Limitation Act "as far as may be" applied thus the argument is that the intention to not to include Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act is there. That, date of default is material and thus section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act must be said to be excluded. Referring to Judgment in the matter of "Babulal Vardharji Gurjar" (Supra), it is claimed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "the intention of the law was not to give a new lease of life to debts which are t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... also made to Judgment in the matter of "Jignesh Shah" (2019) 10 SCC 750 and Paragraph 21 in the said Judgment where it was observed that when time begins to run it can only be excluded in the manner provided in the Limitation Act and for example it was observed that an acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act would certainly extend the limitation period, but a suit for recovery, which is a separate and independent proceeding distinct from remedy of winding up would, in no manner, impact the limitation. The Learned Counsel for the State Bank of India referred to other Judgments also where entries in balance-sheets and books of accounts have been held to be acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act by the Hon'ble High Courts as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. 9. We have gone through the Judgments, specially of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which are being relied on by both the parties. Ref: Judgment of this Tribunal in "Rajendra Narottamdas Vs. Chandra Prakash" 10. We have earlier dealt with similar averments being made by the parties in present matter with regard to the Limitation. In our Judgment dated 18th December, 2020 passed in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2018 where reference was made to the Report of Insolvency Law Committee and Paragraph 6 read as under: "6. Having heard the learned counsel for both sides, it is important to first set out the reason for the introduction of Section 238-A into the Code. This is to be found in the Report of the Insolvency Law Committee of March 2018, as follows: "28 APPLICATION OF LIMITATION ACT, 1963 28.1. The question of applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 (the Limitation Act) to the Code has been deliberated upon in several judgments of NCLT and NCLAT. The existing jurisprudence on this subject indicates that if a law is a complete code, then an express or necessary exclusion of the Limitation Act should be respected. In light of the confusion in this regard, the Committee deliberated on the issue and unanimously agreed that the intent of the Code could not have been to give a new lease of life to debts which are time-barred. It is settled law that when a debt is barred by time, the right to a remedy is time-barred. This requires being read with the definition of "debt" and "claim" in the Code. Further, debts in winding-up proceedings cannot be time-barred, and there appears to be no r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... accrues when a default occurs. If the default has occurred over three years prior to the date of filing of the application, the application would be barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, save and except in those cases where, in the facts of the case, Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applied to condone the delay in filing such application." (Emphasis supplied) 23.3. From the above it can be seen that there was no intention to give new lease of life to debts which are time-barred. Thus, the consideration is whether a given debt is time-barred. It is also clear from the above that for Applications under Section 7 of IBC the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that residuary Article 137 in the Third Division of Limitation Act dealing with "Applications" was the Article applicable. The Judgment shows that if there is delay in filing of Application one has to go to the Sections where Section 5 would apply. Section 5 would be relevant if an Application which is time-barred and extension of prescribed period is sought showing sufficient cause for not filing the Application within prescribed period. 23.4 In subsequent Judgments in the matter of "Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave" & " ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to sections 4 to 24. Relevant for the present matter are Sections 18 and 19 which read as under: " 18: Effect of acknowledgement in writing: (1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgement of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed. (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgement is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. Explanation. - For the purposes of this Section,- (a) an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set- ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot regularized benefit cannot be taken. It may be clarified that limitation issue is decided on facts and law both and it differs from case to case. In the instant case, when Bank declared NPA to recover dues, it moved DRT. If the Corporate Debtor made some payments, as a reasonable prudent person, Bank received the payments. Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not subject to any qualification/exception that after Account is declared NPA, if the debtor makes payments on account of debt, the Section would not be applicable. The Adjudicating Authority found that there were not merely repayments but also Acknowledgments." Ref: Judgment of this Tribunal in "A. Balakrishnan Vrs. Kotak Mahindra" 12. In the matter of "A. Balakrishnan Vs. Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited & Anr." (Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1406 of 2019) dated 24th November, 2020, we had in paragraph 12 reproduced paragraph 27 of the Judgment in the matter of "B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Parag Gupta and Associates" reproduced supra and discussed as under:- 13. In Judgment dated 18.09.2019 in the matter of Gaurav Hargovind bhai Dave vs Asset Reconstruction Company (I) Ltd. & Anr. (2019) SCC Online ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tter of Jignesh Shah. Vs. Union of India (2019) SCC Online SC 1254. In Paragraph 4 of the Judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India initially referred to the controversy as was arising in the Writ Petition No. 455 of 2019. 14.1. Briefly the facts may be referred from the Judgment. What appears is that on 20th August, 2009 a Share Purchase Agreement was executed between Multi Commodity Exchange India Ltd. (MCX), Multi Commodity Stock Exchange Ltd. (MCX-SX) and IL&FS whereby IL&FS had agreed to purchase 442 lakh equity shares of MCX Stock Exchange Ltd. from MCX. Pursuant to the Agreement La-Fin Group Company of MCX issued "Letter of Undertaking" on 20th August, 2009 stating that La-Fin or its appointed nominees would offer to purchase from IL&FS the shares of MCX Stock Exchange after a period of one year but before a period of three years, from date of investment. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed that on facts, this period of three years would expire in August, 2012. 14.2. It was noticed that IL&FS by Letter dated 03rd August, 2012 exercised the option to sell its entire holding of shares to MCX Stock Exchange and called upon La-Fin to purchase the shares as per the "Le ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the said Judgment observed in Paragraph 12 and 13 as under: "12. This Judgment clinches the issue in favour of the Petitioner/Appellant. With the introduction of Section 238 A into the Code, the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to applications made under the Code. Winding up Petitions filed before the Code came into force are now converted into petitions filed under the Code. What has, therefore, to be decided is whether the Winding up Petition, on the date that it was filed, is barred by lapse of time. If such petition is found to be time-barred, then Section 238 A of the Code will not give a new lease of life to such a time-barred petition. On the facts of this case, it is clear that as the Winding up Petition was filed beyond three years from August, 2012 which is when, even according to IL&FS, default in repayment had occurred, it is barred by time. 13. Dr. Singhvi relied upon a number of judgments in which proceedings under Section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956 had been initiated after suits for recovery had already been filed. These judgments have held that the existence of such suit cannot be construed as having either revived a period of Limitation or having ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion under Section 7." 13. Further, we had discussed in our Judgment in the matter of "A. Balakrishnan" supra paragraphs 19 to 21 as under: "19. It has already been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that when there is default and the Account is classified as NPA the time would start running. When this is so, if filing of the suit or filing of OAs did not extend the time, the question is whether consequential issuing of Recovery Certificate would trigger a fresh cause of action for filing Application under Section 7 of IBC. Clearly this is not so keeping in view above Judgments. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 appears to be not properly reading the Judgment in the matter of Vashdeo R Bhojwani Vs. Abhyudaya Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Anr. To complete the narration it would be appropriate to reproduce the Judgment as it is, as the same is not very long. The Judgment in the matter of Vashdeo R Bhojwani Vs. Abhyudaya Co- operative Bank Ltd. & Anr. reads as under: "1. In the facts of the present case, at the relevant time, a default of Rs. 6.7 Crores was found as against the Respondent No. 2. The Respondent No. 2 had been declared a NPA by Abhyudaya Co-operative Bank Limit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rs not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterized as continuing wrongs that S. 23 can be invoked. Thus considered it is difficult to hold that the trustees, act in denying altogether the alleged rights of the Guravs as hereditary worshippers and in claiming and obtaining possession from them by their suit in 1922 was a continuing wrong. The decree obtained by the trustees in the said litigation had injured effectively and completely the appellants' rights though the damage ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ils and for reasons recorded concluded that we are unable to accept the submissions that date of NPA was to be ignored and Limitation was to be counted from the date of Recovery Certificate. Even now, for reasons recorded by us in the Judgment of Digamber Bhondwe Vs. JM Financial Asset Reconstruction, when we have revisited the Judgment in the matter of Vashdeo R Bhojwani Vs. Abhyudaya Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Anr. we are unable to agree that the Judgment gives a fresh date to trigger Application under Section 7 of IBC." 14. In this regard, now we have the advantage of Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, dated 22.03.2021 in the matter of "Sesh Nath Singh & Anr. Vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Anr." (Civil Appeal No. 9198 of 2019). In the said matter, the Account of Corporate Debtor was declared N.P.A. on 31st March, 2013. On 18th January, 2014, Financial Creditor issued notice to Corporate Debtor under Section 13 (2) of Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act, in short) claiming the outstanding liability. Corporate Debtor made representation objecting to the notice. The represent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the time prescribed. Although, it is the general practice to make a formal application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in order to enable the Court or Tribunal to weigh the sufficiency of the cause for the inability of the appellant/applicant to approach the Court/Tribunal within the time prescribed by limitation, there is no bar to exercise by the Court/Tribunal of its discretion to condone delay, in the absence of a formal application. 64. A plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act makes it amply clear that, it is not mandatory to file an application in writing before relief can be granted under the said section. Had such an application been mandatory, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would have expressly provided so. Section 5 would then have read that the Court might condone delay beyond the time prescribed by limitation for filing an application or appeal, if on consideration of the application of the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, for condonation of delay, the Court is satisfied that the appellant/applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Alternatively, a proviso or an E ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... porate Debtor, and the provisions of the Limitation Act 1963, as far as may be, have been applied to proceedings under the IBC, there is no reason why Section 14 or 18 of the Limitation Act would not apply for the purpose of computation of the period of limitation. ........................................................................... 92. In other words, the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings under the IBC in the NCLT/NCLAT. To quote Shah J. in New India Sugar Mill Limited v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, "It is a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that expression used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislature"." Thus, it is clear that Section 18 of the Limitation Act applies. Balance-Sheets-Acknowledgment? 15. With regard to the Balance-Sheets, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant has relied on Judgment of larger Bench of this Tribunal in the matter of "V. Padmakumar Vs. Stressed Assets Stabilisation Fund (SASF) & Anr." (Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 57 of 2020). 16. In this regard, we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erty or right is claimed, a fresh period of limitation shall commence from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed. In an early case, in England, in Jones v. Bellgrove Properties, (1949) 2KB 700, it was held that a statement in a balance sheet of a company presented to a creditor- share holder of the company and duly signed by the directors constitutes an acknowledgement of the debt. In Mahabir Cold Storage v. CIT (1991) 188 ITR 91, the Supreme Court held: "The entries in the books of accounts of the appellant would amount to an acknowledgement of the liability to Messrs. Prayagchand Hanumanmal within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and extend the period of limitation for the discharge of the liability as debt." In several judgments of this Court, this legal position has been accepted." The Hon'ble High Court then referred to some of the Judgements. 9. In the Judgement in the matter of "Sheetal Fabrics" (supra), Hon'ble High Court of Delhi referred to Judgement in the matter of "In re. Padam Tea Company Ltd." AIR 1974 Calcutta 170 and referred to the said Judgement as under:- "10. Let me first deal with the case of Padam Tea Co. Ltd. (supra). ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... firmed or passed by the shareholders at the appropriate meeting and in order to do so it must be accompanied by a report, if any, made by the Directors. Therefore, even though the balance sheet may be a separate document these two documents in the facts and circumstances of the case should be read together and should be construed together. 13. In the same breath, the High Court also explained as to what would constitute an acknowledgement under Section 18 of the Limitation Act by referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court and this discussion would be found in the following passage: "It was held by the Supreme Court in the case of L.C. Mills v. Aluminium Corpn. of India Ltd., (1971) 1 SCC 67 : AIR 1971 SC 1482, that it was clear that the statement on which the plea of acknowledgement did not create a new right of action but merely extended the period of limitation. The statement need not indicate the exact nature or the specific character of the liability. The words used in the statement in question must, however, relate to a present subsisting liability and indicate the existence of a jural relationship between the parties such as, for instance, that of a debtor and a credi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... - 17, observed that in several Judgements of the High Court, the legal position has been accepted and added:- "In Daya Chand Uttam Prakash Jain vs. Santosh Devi Sharma 67 (1997) DLT 13, S.N. Kapoor J. applied the principle in a case where the primary question was whether a suit under Order 37 CPC could be filed on the basis of an acknowledgement. In Larsen & Tubro Ltd. v. Commercial Electric Works 67 (1997) DLT 387 a Single Judge of this Court observed that it is well settled that a balance sheet of a company, where the defendants had shown a particular amount as due to the plaintiff, would constitute an acknowledgement within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. In Rishi Pal Gupta v. S.J. Knitting & Finishing Mills Pvt. Ltd. 73 (1998) DLT 593, the same view was taken. The last two decisions were cited by Geeta Mittal, J. in S.C. Gupta v. Allied Beverages Company Pvt. Ltd. (decided on 30/4/2007) and it was held that the acknowledgement made by a company in its balance sheet has the effect of extending the period of limitation for the purposes of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. In Ambika Mills Ltd. Ahmedabad v. CIT Gujarat (1964) 54 ITR 167, it was further held that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an evidence of the acknowledgement of liability of the debtor, apart from being untenable in law, reiterates the attempt to evade liability and must be rejected. The submission that the letter was written without prejudice to the legal rights and remedies available under any law and therefore the acknowledgement or the undertaking has no legal effect must likewise be rejected. This letter is reminiscent of a letter that fell for consideration in Spencer's case as pointed out by Mr. Harish Salve, "as a Rule the debtor who writes such letters has no intention to bind himself further than is bound already, no intention of paying so long as he can avoid payment, and nothing before his mind but a desire, somehow or other, to gain time and avert pressure." It was argued in a subsequent case that an acknowledgment made "without prejudice" in the case of negotiations cannot be used as evidence of anything expressly or impliedly admitted. The House of Lords observed as follows: "But when a statement is used as acknowledgement for the purpose of Section 29 (5), it is not being used as evidence of anything. The statement is not an evidence of an acknowledgement. It is the acknowledgement ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d while considering Balance Sheet with regard to question of limitation, Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the Resolution and also the Balance Sheet and in the context of the facts of that matter came to a conclusion that the Resolution or the Balance Sheet did not help the Appellant. It is not that it was held that for the purpose of limitation, Balance Sheet cannot be considered at all. 25. In the matter of "A.V. Murthy Versus B.S. Nagabasavanna" reported as (2002) 2 SCC 642, while dealing with a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when dispute came up whether the cheque drawn was in respect of a debt or liability not legally enforceable, and the Additional Sessions Judge had held that there was error in taking cognizance of the offence, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in Para - 5 as under:- "Moreover, in the instant case, the appellant has submitted before us that the respondent, in his balance sheet prepared for every year subsequent to the loan advanced by the appellant, had shown the amount as deposits from friends. A copy of the balance sheet as on 31-3-1997 is also produced before us. If the amount borrowed by the respondent is shown in the ba ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law. (4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of "easement" in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend." It is clear that Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code is a special law. Section 238 A of IBC states that the provisions of the Limitation Act shall, as far as may apply to the proceedings or Appeals before the Adjudicating Authority and this Tribunal as the case may be. Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to the applications filed under Sect ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by way of first charge of current assets of the Company. 34. There is similar document of balance-sheet at Page 181 (which was filed as Annexure R-5 of the Reply Annexure A9 before the Adjudicating Authority). In this document also, there are similar entries for the year ending 31st March, 2016. Learned Counsel for the Appellant referred to auditor's report filed at Annexure A-10 (Page 202) and the observation of the Auditor at Page 204 which reads as under: "c) Since all the accounts of the company have been declared sub-standard over a period of time. Pursuant to receipt of notice dated 12.01.2016 under section 13(4) of The Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act, 2002). The banks have started recovery action under SARFAESI Act. In the absence of any information on interest on outstanding dues to the bank, the provision of interest has been made on the basis of assumptions which are not certain. Hence balances with banks are subject to confirmation." 35. Referring to such endorsement, the Appellant is arguing that even if the balance-sheet is to be looked into, the Corporate Debtor had admitted the a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e legislative policy and thus see date of default, simply calculate three years and hold the Application as time-barred unless there is Application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. The paragraph concerned from Judgment in the matter of "Swiss Ribbons" which is relied on may be reproduced as a whole. In Paragraph 37 of the said Judgment Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "37. The trigger for a financial creditor's application is non-payment of dues when they arise under loan agreements. It is for this reason that Section 433 (e) of the Companies Act, 1956 has been repealed by the Code and a change in approach has been brought about. Legislative policy now is to move away from the concept of "inability to pay debts" to "determination of default". The said shift enables the financial creditor to prove, based upon solid documentary evidence, that there was an obligation to pay the debt and that the debtor has failed in such obligation. Four policy reasons have been stated by the learned Solicitor General for this shift in legislative policy. First is predictability and certainty. Secondly, the paramount interest to be safeguarded is that of the corporate debtor and admission ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... led by the Financial Creditor/ Bank before the Adjudicating Authority in Form 1 of part -IV, Serial No.1 reflects multiple types of loans with multiple date of disbursement and at Serial No.2 the amount of default reflected is Rs. 132 Crore plus with date of default commencing from 01.01.2014. For One time Settlement ('OTS') the Corporate Debtor has requested the Bank vide its letter dated 20.01.2017 which also includes their earlier letters dated 12.04.2016 and 06.08.2016 regarding settlement / resolution of the account of the Company (This is available at Page 61 of the Respondent reply / Annexure R-1 Colly vide NCLAT Diary No. 22364 dated 28.09.2020). 2. Both the above issues supplement the coverage under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 particularly in view of the explanation (a) attached to the Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 3. However, Balance Sheet cannot be treated as acknowledgment of debt as held by this Tribunal in a larger Bench by a majority judgment in the case of V Padmakumar Vs. Stressed Assets Stabilization Fund (SASF) & Anr., Company Appeal (AT)(Ins) No. 57 of 2020 and the same was fortified by the judgment dated 22.12.2019 passed by a five member ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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