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TMI Blog2021 (4) TMI 681X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ening order of the High Court in writ and stay of proceedings on 08.03.2002 and subsequent disposal of said Writ Petition on 14.12.2018 (communicated to O/o.PCIT on 13.02.2019), the period covered under operation of stay shall be excluded while computing period of limitation, as per Explanation 1(ii) to section 153 of the Act and if such period is excluded, then the Assessing Officer will get 60 days clear time for completion of assessment, in view of explanation referred to in section 153 of the Act, because balance time available as on date of interim order passed by High Court was 23 days, which is less than 60 days. Since the order of Hon ble High Court in Writ Petition was received in the Office of PCIT on 13.02.2019 and the Assessing Officer has sixty days clear time to pass order giving effect order and if such 60 days is considered for limitation period, then the Assessing Officer ought to have passed assessment order on 14.04.2019. In this case, the impugned order was passed on 31.12.2019. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the assessment order passed u/s. 158BC r.w.s 143(3) / 254 dated 31.12.2019 is barred by limitation and liable to be quashed. Accordingly, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 5. The DCIT failed to appreciate that having not conducted the effect giving proceedings as per the order of the Jurisdictional Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and having not shared the materials gathered while passing original block assessment order (first round), the completion of the block assessment order in giving effect to the order of the Jurisdictional Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in such circumstances should be reckoned as bad in law. 6. The DCIT failed to appreciate that the findings recorded in this regard in para 2.2 of the impugned order were perverse Findings of facts and ought to have appreciated that the repeated request for sharing the information/ details relevant for the purpose of completing the block assessment was wrongly rejected, thereby vitiating the initiation, continuation and completion of the said block assessment on various facets. 7. The DCIT failed to appreciate that in any event the materials gathered which were admittedly received beyond the date of conclusion of the search should not form part of the present block assessment proceedings for making additions and ought to have appreciated that the misconstructi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the assessment year 1990- 91 comprised in the block period under consideration in para 10 of the impugned order on various facets was wrong, erroneous, unjustified, incorrect, invalid and not sustainable both on facts and in law. 15. The DCIT failed to appreciate that the computation of the assessable income for the assessment year 1991- 92 comprised in the block period under consideration in para 11.1 para 11.2 of the impugned order on various facets was wrong, erroneous, unjustified, incorrect, invalid and not sustainable both on facts and in law. 16.The DCIT failed to appreciate that the computation of the assessable income for the assessment year 1992-93 comprised in the block period under consideration from para 12 of the impugned order on various Facets was wrong, erroneous, unjustified, incorrect, invalid and not sustainable both on facts and in law. 17. The DCIT failed to appreciate that the assessment of three cash credits aggregating to ₹ 1,61,132/- in applying the provisions of section 68 of the Act in the computation of undisclosed income for the assessment year 1992-93 comprised in the block assessment period in recording perverse findings of fac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mpugned order in the computation of undisclosed income for the assessment year 1993-94 comprised in the block period under consideration without assigning proper reasons and justification. 24. The DCIT erred in computing the undisclosed income for the assessment year 1994-95 in para 14.8 of the impugned order comprised in the block period under consideration without assigning proper reasons and justification. 25. The DCIT erred in bringing to tax ₹ 175,000/- being the cash credit appearing in the current account of the appellant with T.C.V. Packers as unexplained cash credit in para 14.2 of the impugned order on the application of section 68 of the Act for the assessment year 1994-95 comprised in the block period under consideration without assigning proper reasons and justification. 26. The DCIT erred in bringing to tax ₹ 4,00,000/- being the presumed investment in purchase of shares of M/s T.C.V.Engineering Co. P Ltd. as unexplained investment presumably u/s 69 of the Act in para 14.3 for the assessment year 1994-95 comprised in the block period under consideration without assigning proper reasons and justification. 27. The DCIT erred in bringing t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... para 16.3 of the impugned order without assigning proper reasons and justification. 33.The DCIT erred in adding back ₹ 149,39,600/- as unexplained investment u/s 69 of the Act on the presumption of investment in M/s Micam Leathers at para 17.4 of the impugned order in the computation of undisclosed income for the assessment year 1995-96 comprised in the block period under consideration without assigning proper reasons and justification. 34. The DCIT failed to appreciate that having brought on record certain sequence of events without any seized materials, the presumption of investment in shares made by the appellant should be reckoned as bad in law and ought to have appreciated that the presumption of investment in shares by the appellant was wholly unjustified and erroneous, thereby vitiating the related findings. 35. The DCII erred in adding back ₹ 53,12,038/- as unexplained expenditure on foreign travel within the scope of section 69C of the Act in recording the findings from para 18.1 to para 18.14 of the impugned order in the computation of undisclosed income for the assessment year 1995-96 comprised in the block period under consideration without as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... igning proper reasons and justification. 43. The DCIT erred in adding back ₹ 1,86,500/- on the ground of in not establishing the loan transaction discussed in para 22 of the impugned order as part of the computation of undisclosed income pertaining to the assessment year 1995-96 comprised in the block period under consideration without assigning proper reasons and justification. 44. The DCIT erred in estimating income/interest on investment in UK at the rate of 8% and consequently erred in adding back ₹ 3,80,32884/- at para 23 of the impugned order in the computation of undisclosed income pertaining to the assessment year 1996-97 comprised in the block period under consideration without assigning proper reasons and justification. 45. The DCIT erred in estimating income/interest on investment in UK at the rate of 8% and consequently erred in adding back ₹ 1,19,80,429/- in the computation of undisclosed income pertaining to the assessment year 1997- 98 (for 3 months) in para 24 of the impugned order comprised in the block period under consideration without assigning proper reasons and justification. 46.The DCIT failed to appreciate that having ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rectorate has caused certain inquiries at abroad and particularly in U.K and Singapore with certain banks and certain persons associated with the assessee and gathered particulars and details in connection with alleged violation of FERA by the assessee. In addition, certain details were collected through Additional Chief Judicial Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Economic Offence, Egmore, Chennai-11, by issue of letter to the Competent Authority in U.K. During the course of investigation, statements were recorded from associates of assessee such as Mr. N.C.Rangesh (professional consultant for the assessee), Mr.K.Ramachandran and Mr.S.Rajoo. Consequent to the Enforcement Directorate proceedings, Income tax Department, Chennai i.e., Director of Income Tax (Investigation) has requisitioned books of account and documents seized from the Enforcement Directorate by issue of warrant of authorization dated 12.07.1996. The books of account were obtained from the Enforcement Directorate on 15.07.1996 and requisitioned u/s.132A of the Act, 1961. 4. Thereafter, the assessee was served with notice u/s.158BC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on 21.11.1996 to file return of income for the block period ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... assessee has filed a Writ Petition before the Hon ble Madras High Court in W.P No.7623 of 2002and challenged block assessment proceedings conducted in pursuance to first round of proceedings. The Hon ble Madras High Court on 08.03.2002 has passed interim order and stayed second round block assessment proceedings, till further orders and said stay has been extended vide order dated 11.04.2002. Finally, the Hon ble Madras High Court on 14.12.2018 has disposed off Writ Petition filed by the assessee on the ground that they are devoid of merits and further observed that petitioner would co-operate for early completion of all the proceedings and the department to initiate steps to conclude all these proceedings by providing opportunity to the petitioner as contemplated under the Act without any further lapse of time. The said order of the Hon ble Single Judge in W.P No.7623 of 2002 was received by O/o.the PCIT on 13.02.2019. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer had issued notice u/s 143(2) on 20.02.2019 and called for various details. Further, the Assessing Officer had issued notice u/s 142(1) on 17.09.2019 along with detailed questionnaire, as directed by the Hon ble High Court and also ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that no merit in the arguments taken by the learned AR for the assessee that proceedings are barred by limitation. The Assessing Officer has also analyzed provisions of section 153(2A) and 153(ii) and observed that the assessee is under impression that block assessment order in question is being passed in pursuant to order of ITAT u/s.254, but said proceedings is continued in pursuant to the directions of the Hon ble High Court and hence, order passed under the jurisdiction of writ is not covered by sub-section (2A) to section 153 of the Act. Therefore, he opined that provisions of subsection (3) of section 153 is applicable to the present case, because the present proceedings are taken as per direction of the Hon ble High Court in Writ, as per which, there is no time limit for completion of assessment. Accordingly, he has rejected the arguments of the assessee taken in light of provisions of section 153(2A) of the Act. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer has completed the block assessment u/s.153BCr.w.s 254 of the Act on 31.12.2019 and determined total income at ₹ 57,43,79,390/- which is same as determined in the first round of proceedings vide order dated 30.07.1997. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... -sections (1) and (2) shall not apply to the following classes of assessments, reassessments and recomputations which may, [subject to the provisions of subsection (2A),] be completed at any time- (i) where a fresh assessment is made under section 146; (ii) where the assessment, reassessment or recomputation is made on the assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under sections 250, 254, 260, 262, 263, or 264 [or in an order of any court in a proceeding otherwise than by way of appeal or reference under this Act); (iii) where, in the case of a firm, an assessment is made on a partner of the firm in consequence of an assessment made on the firm under section 147. Analysis of provision of sub-section (2A) Taking recourse to provisions of sub-section (2A) to 153, the assessee is of mistaken belief that the assessment got time barred a ready. Here it is very important to analyse the chronology of various events leading to completion of assessments by the Assessing Officer. 1. Date of original assessment: 30.7.1997 2. Date of order of ITAT: 04.10.2000. 3. Date of receipt of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lysis of provision of sub-section (3) This subsection covers any finding or direction or an order passed by any court in a proceeding otherwise than by way of appeal or reference under the Act apart from various other orders. The order before me is the order not an order by way of Reference or by way of an appeal, but an order passed by Hon ble HC under a Writ. In fact, the provisions sub-section (3) of 153 is squarely applicable to the facts of the assessee s case. No doubt the High court has remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer and it s a case of full set-aside, but because the order was passed consequent to Writ, the provisions of rather the assesse s case falls under the ambit of sub-section(3) of Section 153. For passing an order U/s.153(3), there is no time limit prescribed under the Act. Therefore there is no question of the assessment getting time-barred in this case. It is interesting to note the recent decision of HC of Delhi in the case or Nokia India (P) Ltd. Vs Dy. CIT (Delhi High Court), where some issues have been partly set-aside and remanded back to the AO. The observation of the court and the finding on the applicability of subsection2A and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ue raised by the assessee vide ground no.2 to 4 is with regard to validity of assessment order passed u/s.158BC, r.w.s. 143(3), r.w.s 254 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 31.12.2019 in light of provisions of section 153(2A) of the Act. The learned A.R for the assessee submitted that block assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer is without jurisdiction and out of time, because time limit for completion of assessment in pursuant to an order u/s.254 of the Act by the ITAT is one year from the end of the financial year in which such order is received by the O/o.CIT / PCIT and if such date is considered, then order passed by the Assessing Officer on 31.12.2019 is clearly barred by limitation and not sustainable both on facts and in law. The ld. AR for the assessee referring to relevant dates and events submitted that block assessment in the normal course ought to have been completed by the Assessing Officer within one year from the end of the month in which requisition u/s.132A was executed. However, in the present case, proceeding of block assessment was taken up after the order of the Tribunal in setting aside block assessment order dated 30.07.1997 for fresh consideration / ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on or before 31.03.2003, as assumed by the Assessing Officer. Because of the intervening order of the Hon ble High Court in writ and disposal of said writ on 14.12.2018 ( communicated to PCIT on 13.02.2019), the Assessing Officer would get clear 60 days time in view of the Explanation referred to in para (1) to section 153 of the Act, because balance time limit as on date of interim order passed by Hon ble High Court was 23 days which was less than 60 days. The said 60 days would expire on 14.04.2019 and hence, the order passed by the Assessing Officer in the present case on 31.12.2019 is clearly barred by limitation and unsustainable in law. 9. The learned A.R for the assessee further referring to provisions of sub-section (3) of section 153 of the Act, argued that another fundamental mistake committed by the Assessing Officer in applying sub-section (3) to section 153 of the Act, and according to him, effect giving order passed is in consequent to direction of the Hon ble Madras High Court in disposal of Writ Petition. The above perception of the Assessing Officer is completely erroneous and the Hon ble High Court in disposing of writ has only permitted the parties to complet ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... .02.2019. The order passed under writ jurisdiction is not covered by sub-section (2A) of section 153 of the Act. If provisions of sub-section (2A) is analyzed carefully, then it makes clear that it covers orders passed by the Assessing Officer u/s .146 or orders passed by Appellate Tribunal or Commissioner or Chief Commissioner u/s.250 / 254 / 263 or 264 of the Act. Therefore, if provisions of section 153(3) is considered, then time limit available for completion of assessment is ending by February, 2020 and hence, assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer on 31.12.2019 is clearly within time prescribed under the Act and hence, there is no merit in the arguments taken by the learned A.R for the assessee. The DR further submitted that case laws relied upon by the learned A.R for the assessee are not applicable to the facts of the present case, because in those cases order was passed by Assessing Officer in pursuant to order of Appellate Tribunal, whereas in the present case, assessment has been completed in pursuant to the direction of the Hon ble Madras High Court under writ jurisdiction. Therefore, under those facts, courts held that when set aside proceedings is taken u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e; or (ii) is made on or after the 1st day of June, 2007, the provisions of clause (a) shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the first proviso, have effect as if for the words two years , the words thirty-three months had been substituted: Provided also that in case the assessment year in which the income was first assessable is the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 2009 or any subsequent assessment year and during the course of the proceeding for the assessment of to income, a reference under sub-section (1) of section 92CA is made, the provisions of clause (a) shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the first proviso, have effect as if for the words two years , the words three years had been substituted. (1A) No order of assessment shall be made under section I15WE or section 11 5WF at any time after the expiry of twenty-one months from the end of the assessment year in which the fringe benefits were first assessable. (IB) No order of assessment or reassessment shall be made under section 11 5WG after the expiry of nine months from the end of the financial year in which the notice under section 1 15WH was served. (2) No ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner: Provided that where the order under section 250 or section 254 is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, on or after the 1st day of April, 1999 but before the 1st day of April, 2000, such an order of fresh assessment may be made at any time up to the 31st day of March, 2002: Provided further that where the order under section 254 is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or, as ,the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner on or after the 1st day of April, 2005 but before the 1st day of April, 2011, the provi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... firm under section 147. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, subsection (2) of section 153A and sub-section (1) of section 153B, the order of assessment or reassessment, relating to any assessment year, which stands revived under sub-section (2) of section 153A, shall be made within one year from the end of the month of such revival or within the period specified in this section or sub-section (1) of section 153B, whichever is later. Explanation 1.-In computing the period of limitation for the purposes of this section- (i) the time taken in reopening the whole or any part of the proceeding or in giving an opportunity to the assessee to be reheard under the proviso to section 129, or (ii) the period during which the assessment proceeding is stayed by an order or injunction of any court, or (iia) the period commencing from the date on which the Assessing Officer intimates the Central Government or the prescribed authority, the contravention of the provisions of clause (21) or clause (22B) or clause (23A) or clause (23B) or sub-clause (iv) or sub-clause (v) or sub-clause (v or sub-clause (via) of clause (230 of se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... commencing from the date on which a reference or first of the references - for exchange of information is made by an authority competent under an agreement referred to in section 90 or section 90A and ending with the date on which the information requested is last received by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or a period of one year, whichever is less, or (ix) the period commencing from the date on which a reference for declaration of an arrangement to be an impermissible avoidance arrangement is received by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner under sub-section (1) of section l44BA and ending on the date on which a direction under sub-section (3) or sub-section (6) or an order under subsection (5) of the said section is received by the Assessing Officer, shall be excluded: Provided that where immediately after the exclusion of the aforesaid time or period, the period of limitation referred to in sub-sections (1), (1A), (1B), (2), (2A) and (4) available to the Assessing Officer for making an order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation, as the case may be, is less than sixty days, such remaining period shall be extended to sixty days and the aforesai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on 254 or section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment, may be made at any time before the expiry of nine months from the end of the financial year in which the order under section 254 is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner: 46 [Provided that where the order under section 254 is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner on or after the 1st day of April, 2019, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words nine months , the words twelve months had been substituted.] (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), where a reference under sub-section (1) of section 92CA is made during the course of the proceeding for the assessment or reassessment, the period available for completion of assessment or reassessment ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ter 01.04.1999, but before 01.4.2000, such an order of fresh assessment may be made at any time upto 31.03.2002. A plain reading of sub-section 153(2A) along with proviso thereunder, it is very clear that revised time limit of one year is made applicable for those orders which were received by Commissioner /Chief Commissioner on or after 01.4.2000. The meaning thereby is that any orders passed by appellate commissioner or appellate tribunal is received by Commissioner /Chief Commissioner between 01.04.1999 to 31.03.2000, then those orders are covered under pre-amended provisions of section 153(2A), as per which, time limit available for the Assessing Officer to complete the assessment is two years from the end of the financial year in which such order was received by O/o. Commissioner. In other words, any order of Appellate Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal is received by the CIT/PCIT on or after 01.04.2000, then amended provisions of section 153(2A) is applicable, as per which one year time limit is applicable for completion of assessment. 13. In this legal background, if you examine facts of the present case, we find that the order of the Tribunal was passed on 04.10.2000 (re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... imit, the completion of pending effect giving orders in view of the transitional provisions by virtue of simultaneous insertion of the proviso should fall in new regime thereby giving harmonious interpretation of the combined reading of the amended subsection and the proviso inserted simultaneously, it is very clear that the proviso takes care of orders received from 01.04.1999 to 31.03.2000 which are pending for passing effect giving orders on the effective date of amendment being 01.06.2001 by granting time limit of two years to pass orders on or before 31.03.2002. Hence, there cannot be any additional protection required as well not intended by the legislature for the orders received after 31.03.2000 for which the time limit intended to be restricted as one year instead of two years. The approach of the Assessing Officer in assuming time limit for two years on the facts of the case could be legally acceptable only in the absence of proviso and however, by insertion of the express proviso simultaneously, the understanding of the Assessing Officer is fully negated. Since, the Appellate Tribunal order under consideration being passed / received on 10.11.2000, the restricted time li ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted in pursuant to the order of Appellate Tribunal in setting aside the assessment order . We further noted that Tribunal has set aside the order passed by Assessing Officer for de novo consideration in accordance with material available on record and after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. We further noted that Tribunal has considered fundamental issue raised by the assessee in light of principles of natural justice and has not gone into discuss various additions made by the Assessing Officer in the assessment order. From the above it is clear that assessment order is set aside in total for fresh consideration by the assessing officer. Therefore, when the order is set aside for de novo assessment, then it is as good as afresh assessment is made in accordance with law and the earlier assessment made by the Assessing Officer is either cancelled or non-est in the eyes of law. Therefore, in our considered view above perception of the Assessing Officer in applying provisions of sub-section (3) of section 153 of the Act is completely erroneous, because the Hon ble High Court in disposing of writ has only permitted the parties to complete pending proceedings ar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... le Madras High Court has only permitted to pass effect giving order in pursuant to the order of Tribunal referred hereinabove, and thus, question of application of sub-section (3) to section 153 is totally incorrect. We, further ourselves unable to agree with the contention of the Assessing Officer that when the order of assessment is completed in pursuant to the order of High Court in writ jurisdiction, the provisions of section 153 is come into operation, because the Assessing Officer himself has admitted that impugned assessment order was passed in pursuant to direction of the Tribunal passed u/s.254 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which is evident from fact that in First page of assessment order, he has mentioned that said order is passed u/s.143(3) r.w.s 254 of the Act. Therefore, application of subsection (3) of section 153 in the given facts and circumstances of the case is completely misplaced, when there is specific provision by way of sub-section (2A) of section 153 for completing the order passed u/s.250 or 254 or 263 or 264 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The object behind introduction of sub- section (2A) was to prescribe time limit for completing assessment proceedings u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n which the Assessing Officer was required to comply with, it was limitation u/s. 153(2A) which was applicable and not limitation u/s.153(3)(ii) of the Act. The Hon ble High Court, while confirming order of the Tribunal quashed impugned order passed by the Assessing Officer by holding that the provisions of section 153(3) has no application, where order of the Assessing Officer has been set aside by the Appellate Tribunal or Appellate Commissioner. In the said decision, the Revenue has opted to challenge only applicability of section 153(3) of the Act and apparently not objected to decision of the Appellate Tribunal in applying amended provisions incorporating restricted time limit for completing the effect giving proceedings pertaining to the proceedings as on 01.06.2001, consequent to the appellate order received by the O/o. Commissioner or PCIT after 01.04.2000. In this case, facts are identical to facts considered by the Hon ble Delhi High Court and hence, this case is squarely covered by the decision of Hon ble Delhi High Court. 19. The assessee has also relied upon the decision of ITAT, Delhi Benches in the case of Awanindra Singh Vs. DCIT (2019) 104 taxmann.com 171, where ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ch proceedings, the Act has amended sub-sections (2) and (2A) of section 153 to reduce the timelimit for making such orders of assessment, reassessment or recomputation to one year. Thus, the legislature has taken a conscious decision to reduce the period of two years for making reassessment of set aside matters to one year. They have also consciously provided that the old provisions of two years would be applicable where such order of set aside was passed or received on or before 1st April, 2000. Thus, to our mind, there is no doubt that where the order of set aside is passed by the CIT(A) under Section 250 after 1 st day of April, 2000, the new provision of Section 153(2A) providing the time limit of one year would be applicable. 46. We find that Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court has also considered the applicability of limitation under Section 153(2A) in the case of Bhan Textile P.Ltd. (supra). The facts of the said case are that the assessment in respect of the assessee was completed under Section 144 on 31st March, 1999. The assessee, aggrieved by the assessment 29 ITA-300/Del/2001 5 others order, preferred an appeal before the CIT(A) who passed an order dated ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssment to be barred by limitation under Section 153(2A). Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court upheld the order of the ITAT. 48. We find that the precise dispute before the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court was whether in respect of such an order of set aside, Section 153(2A) was applicable or Section 153(3)(iii) was applicable and Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court held that Section 153(2A) was applicable. However, the facts are identical. That in the said case also, the order of set aside was received on 12th May, 2000 i.e., after the 1st day of April, 2000 but before 1st June, 2001 and notice under Section 143(2) issued on 24th February, 2003 which was held to be barred by limitation. Thus, this decision also supports the case of the assessee. In any case, after considering the proviso to Section 153(2A) as well as the memorandum explaining the provisions of Finance Act, 2001, we are clearly of the opinion that the amended provisions would be applicable where the appellate order is passed or received after 1st April, 2000. As per amended provision, the set aside assessment is to be completed within one year from the end of the financial year in which appellate order ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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