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TMI Blog2009 (5) TMI 1007X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (in short the `Explosive Act'). They were acquitted of the rest of the charges except under Section 120B and Section 148 IPC. 2. Prosecution case during trial is essentially as follows: I A-1, A-2, A-5 and A-19 are brothers and A-19 is the Chairman of the Agricultural Market Yard, Pulivendula. The other accused are followers of A-19 and supporters of Telugu Desam Party. The deceased Y.S. Raja Reddy was an Ex-Sarpanch of Pulivendula. PW-1 is the Driver, PW-2 is the Private Body Guard., PWs. 3 and 4 are Carpenters, PWs.5 and 6 are residents of Gondipalli Village of Vemula Mandal and PWs.7 and 8 are residents of Vemula village. In January, 1996, deceased and his followers attacked A-19 and caused grievous injuries to him. Since then A-19 and his associates had decided to do away with the deceased. On 23-05-1998 the deceased along with PWs.1 to 4 went to his Estate situated at Gandi village in a car. When he was returning to Pulivendula and when the car reached Vemula village, they found stagnation of water on the road near MDO Office. PW-1 slowed down the car to cross the water. At that moment A-1 to A-13, A-16, and A-17 surrounded the car. Whe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the occurrence while A-8 died during the pendency of the trial. In other words, there are 13 accused persons whose case remains to be considered. The High Court acquitted A-16 and A-17 from all the charges and convicted the rest of the accused as noted above. 4. There were four injured eye witnesses PWs 1, 2, 3 and 4. A complaint was given by PW-1 the driver, wherein the names of A-1 to A-13, A-14 and A-19 were mentioned. The same was recorded by PW-25 in the presence of PW-22 the doctor in the Government Hospital. Exh.P-4 is the inquest report which was witnessed by PWs 2 to 4. PW-1 was the driver of the deceased working for nearly four years and PW-2 was the Personal Assistant of the deceased. PWs 3 and 4 were carpenters working near the place of occurrence. The eye witnesses apart from PWs 1 to 4 were PWs 5 and 6 of Gondipalli village and PWs 7 and 8 of Vemula village. Learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the view taken by the trial Court was a possible view and the High Court should not have interfered with the finding. There was considerable delay in lodging the FIR. The accused belong to different villages and it could not be possible for all of them to assemb ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code, the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), to the High Court from the order of acquittal. (3) No appeal under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. (4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. (5) No application under Sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal. (6) If, in any case, the application under Sub-section (4) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... trial court and the local Government directed the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal under Section 417 of the old Code (similar to Section 378 of the present Code). At the time of hearing of appeal before the High Court, it was contended on behalf of the accused that in an appeal from an order of acquittal, it was not open to the appellate court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the trial Judge unless such findings could not have been reached by him had there not been some perversity or incompetence on his part. The High Court, however, declined to accept the said view. It held that no condition was imposed on the High Court in such appeal. It accordingly reviewed all the evidence in the case and having formed an opinion of its weight and reliability different from that of the trial Judge, recorded an order of conviction. A petition was presented to His Majesty in Council for leave to appeal on the ground that conflicting views had been expressed by the High Courts in different parts of India upon the question whether in an appeal from an order of acquittal, an appellate court had the power to interfere with the find ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice. 16. In Nur Mohd. v. Emperor AIR1945PC151, the Committee reiterated the above view in Sheo Swarup (Supra) and held that in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court has full powers to review and to reverse acquittal. 17. So far as this Court is concerned, probably the first decision on the point was Prandas v. State AIR 1954 SC 36 (though the case was decided on 14-3-1950, it was reported only in 1954). In that case, the accused was acquitted by the trial court. The Provincial Government preferred an appeal which was allowed and the accused was convicted for offences punishable under Sections 302 and 323 IPC. The High Court, for convicting the accused, placed reliance on certain eyewitnesses. 18. Upholding the decision of the High Court and following the proposition of law in Sheo Swarup ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ellate court in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keepin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... w in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified. 25. Again, in M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra [1963] 2 SCR 405 , the point was raised before a Constitution Bench of this Court. Taking note of earlier decisions, it was observed as follows: 17. In some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however, in emphasising the importance of adopting a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was observed that the presumption of innocence is reinforced by the order of acquittal and so, `the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons': vide Surajpal Singh v. State 1952 CriLJ 331. Similarly in Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab 1953 CriLJ 521 , it was observed that the interference of the High Court in an appeal against the order of acquittal would be justified only if there are `very substantial and compelling reasons to do so'. In some other decisions, it has been stated that an order ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then breakdown and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light-heartedly, as a learned author (Glanville Williams in Proof of Guilt) has saliently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion. In some cases (Ramaphupala Reddy v. State of A.P. 1971 CriLJ 422) Bhim Singh Rup Singh v. State of Maharashtra 1974 CriLJ 337, it has been said that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh case may be added the further principle that `if two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the trial court'. This, of course, is not a new principle. It stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... taken by the trial court was not proper. On the basis of the pronouncements of this Court, the settled position of law regarding the powers of the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal is that the Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based and generally it will not interfere with the order of acquittal because by passing an order of acquittal the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction limitation on the appellate court but judge-made guidelines for circumspection. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial court has taken a view ignoring the admissible evidence, a duty is cast upo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ppeal against acquittal, the power of the appellate court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court. 35. From the above decisions, in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka 2007 CriLJ 2136, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal were culled out: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... generally dependent. A junior may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions, and guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the other. 37. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overemotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. 38. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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