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TMI Blog1973 (9) TMI 112X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Section 12(3)(a)." 2. Since a pure question of law, and not the entire petition, has been referred, it is unnecessary to consider the case on facts. However, with a view to understand the question that has been referred, we will briefly set out the facts giving rise to this petition. 3. Since prior to 1958, one Aher was a tenant of the open plot of land in dispute at the rent of ₹ 12/- per month. He put up a flour mill. On February 14, 1958, by a deed of assignment, he had assigned his tenancy rights together with the running business of the flour mill to the petitioners. The Petitioners fell in arrears for more than six months, and, therefore, by notice dated January 27, 1965, the landlord called upon them to vacate the premises on the ground of non-payment of rent for over six months. By a reply the petitioners challenged the quantum of rent as well as the period from which they were liable. Nothing, however, was paid by them towards the arrears of rent, and, therefore, the respondent-landlord filed the instant suit on August 25, 1965, for recovery of possession of the suit premises as also for arrears of rent. The petitioners filed their written-statement contending ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ood law in view of the recent division of Full bench of this Court in Dattu Subhana v. Gajanan Vithoba, AIR1971Bom396 (FB). It was under these circumstances that Wagle, J. has referred this matter to a Division Bench. 5. There are other two Special Civil Applications viz. Nos. 89 of 1968 and 693 of 1969 which have been ordered to be placed for hearing with this Special Civil Application No. 2353 of 1968, as the question referred to by Wagle, J, is also involved in those two petitions. 6. With a view to facilitate the understanding of the rival points of view, it would be necessary to consider the scheme of the Rent Act of 1947 with a particular reference to the rights of the landlord to evict the tenant. The preamble shows that one of the objects in enacting the law is to control rents of premises and eviction of tenants. With the object of preventing the landlords from charging excessive rent, provisions have been made for fixation of stand are rent in relation to the premises. Section 5(10) defines "standard rent". According to this definition contained in Section 5(10)(a), the standard-rent that may have been fixed by the Court and the Controller respectively under t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... creases, in respect of the same premises have been duly fixed by a competent Court on the merits of the case, without any fraud or collusion or an error of the facts, and there has been no structural alterations or change in the amenities or in respect of any other factors which are relevant to the fixation of the standard rent, or change in such increases thereafter in the premises". would, therefore, appear that a new application for fixation of standard rent or permitted increases is not permissible except in certain special circumstances such as the fixation was made as a result of fraud or collusion or an error of the facts, or any structural alterations or change in amenities or change in such increase after the original fixation of standard rent and permitted increases by the Court. Section 11A is thus nothing but an extension of the principle of res judicata to fixation of the standard rent and permitted increases. Subject to the provisions of Section 11A. Section 11(1) enumerates the cases where the Court has the power to fix the amount of standard rent of any premises. Section 11(2) relates to the powers of the Court to fix the amount of permitted increases in cases ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e instituted until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent and permitted increases has been served on the tenant. Section 12(3)(a) gives a right to the landlord to obtain possession from the tenant provided the conditions laid down in that subsection are satisfied. If all or anyone of the conditions laid down in Section 12(3)(a) do not exist, or are not satisfied, a further protection from eviction is given to the tenant by Section 12(3)(b), provided he pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due on the first day of the hearing of the suit, or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. The grounds other than the ground of non-payment of rent, which entitle the landlord to recover possession of the premises, are contained in Sections 13 and 13A, and if the landlord satisfies anyone of the grounds enumerated in the said sections, he gets a right to recover possession of the premises. 9. Section 14, 15 and 15A give protection to certain sub-tenants and licenses. We may observe that the original Section 14 and 15 dealt with the rights of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ection 12, the Court shall forthwith specify the amount of rent or permitted increases which are to be deposited in Court by the tenant and make an order directing the tenant to deposit such amount in Court or at the option of the tenant make an order to pay to the landlord such amount thereof as the Court may specify, pending the final decision of the application. A copy of the order shall be served upon the landlord . Out of any amount deposited in Court the Court may make an order for payment of such reasonable such to the landlord towards payment of rent or increases due to him as it thinks fit. If the tenant fails to deposit such amount or, as the case may be to pay such amount thereof to the landlord his application shall be dismissed. (4) Where at any stage of a suit for recovery of rent, whether with or with out a claim for possession of the premises, the Court is satisfied that the tenant is withholding the rent on the ground that the rent is excessive and standard rent should be fixed, the Court shall and in any other case if it appears to the Court that it is just and proper to make such an order the Court may make an order directing the tenant to deposit in Court fort ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. (4). Pending the disposal of any such suit, the Court may out of any amount paid or tendered by the tenant pay to the landlord such amount towards payment of rent or permitted increases due to him as the Court thinks fit. Explanation I. In any case where there is a dispute as to the amount of standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under this Act the tenant shall be deemed to be ready and willing to pay such amount if, before the expiry of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), he makes an application to the Court under sub-section (3) of section 11 and thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted increases specified in the order made by the Court. Explanation II. - For the purposes of sub-section (2), reference to 'standard rent' and to 'permitted increase' shall include reference to 'interim standard rent&# ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o establish that the dispute about the standard rent raised by him in his written statement was a "bona fide" dispute and as in that case the dispute was not bona fide, the landlord was entitled to possession of the premises. This contention was not decided by the Division Bench on the Group that the question Bench on the ground that the questions raised by the landlord were questions of fact and were not considered by the Appellate Court. The Court, therefore, set aside the order of the Appellate Court and remanded the case for a fresh decision after considering the issues raised on behalf of the landlord. If the Division Bench was of the opinion that a mere raising of a dispute, whether bona fide or otherwise, in a written statement by the tenant was sufficient to give protection to the landlord, and the provisions of Section 12(3)(a) were not applicable it was not necessary to remand the matter for fresh decision. It would, therefore, appear that the Division Bench proceeded on the basis that it was of the view that the word "dispute" in Section 12(3)(a) implies a "bona fide" dispute . 17. In Civil Revn. Appn. No. 1569 of 1964 (Bom.) Smt. Mohini M. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f standard rent, and therefore, his case would fall under Section 12(3)(b). The Division Bench held on facts that the contention raised by the tenant was not bona fide. It appears from the judgment of the Division Bench that the aforesaid decisions of Tarkunde, J. in Civil Revn. Appln. No. 1822 of 1957 , D/- 12-11-1959 (Bom.) and that of Tambe, Acting C. J. and Abhyankar J. in (Spl. C.A. No. 459 of 1965 decided on 14/15-12-1965 (Bom.)) were relied on by the tenant in support of his contention that the dispute about the standard rent could be raised for the first time in the written statement and if the dispute is bona fide and genuine, the tenant was entitled to protection. However, relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in Dhansukhlal Chhaganlal v. Dalichand Virchand, [1968]3SCR346 , the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the said two decisions of Tarkunde, J, and Tambe, Ag. C. J. and Abhyankar, , were no longer good law. The Division Bench was of the view that the tenant can claim protection from the tenant can claim protection from eviction only it before the expiry of one month after notice referred to in section 12(2), he makes an application under Section 11(3) an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pute, which entitled the tenant to take his case out of the clutches of Section 12(3)(a) must be a "bona fide" dispute is of Bal, J, in Special Civil Appln. No. 781 of 1968 Dattu Subhana v. Gajanan Vithoba decided on 5.8.1968 (Bom), by which judgment, he referred the matter to a Division Bench, which in its turn, made a reference to the Full Bench for deciding the question "whether in a proceeding to which Section 12(3)(a) of the Act would otherwise apply, the tenant-defendant can prove that a dispute k about standard rent exists without following the procedure laid down in Explanation I to Section 12? and "whether he can also take a defence that Section 12(3)(a) does not apply and Section 12(3)(b) applies?' This reference was decided by the Full Bench in AIR1971Bom396 (FB)., It appears from the referring judgment of Bal, J. that he was unable to agree with the view expressed No. 512 of 1966 decided on 2.4.1968 = ILR (1970) Bom 1335 that the decisions of Tarkunde J., in C. R. A. No. 1822 of 1957 (Bom.) and of Tambe, Ag. C. J. and 1965 (Bom) were no longer good law. Bal, J. was of view that if the dispute about the standard of rent and/or permitted increases, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the category of cases which have consistently taken the view that when the tenant chooses to raise a dispute about the standard rent or permitted increases for the first time in his written statement, it is necessary that such a dispute about the standard rent or permitted increases for the first time in his written statement, it is necessary that such a dispute must be bona fide to enable him to claim the protection under Section 12(3)(b) of the Act, Mr. Diwan, the learned counsel for the tenant, however, contends that these decisions have no binding force as precedents, and this Division Bench is entitled to take a contrary view. Mr. Diwan's objections to the decided cases being considered as having binding cases are these. Firstly, according to him, these judgments are per incuriam as they were rendered ignoring the plain statutory provision of Section 12(3)(a) which only uses the word 'dispute' and not the words "bona fide dispute'. Secondly, these judgments are sub silentio in the sense that the particular point of law involved in the decision was not perceived by the court or present to its mind while deciding these cases and also because the point in is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this description are examples of decisions given per incuriam. We do not think that it would be right to say that there may not be other cases of decisions given per incuriam in which this court might properly consider itself entitled not to follow an earlier decision of its own. Such cases would obviously be of the rarest occurrence and must be dealt with in accordance with their special facts ..." "On a careful examination of the whole matter we have come to the clear conclusion that this court is bound to follow previous decisions of its own as well as those of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The only exceptions to this rule (two of them apparent only) are those already mentioned which for convenience we here summarise: (1) The court is entitled and bound to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow. (2) The court is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which, though not expressly overruled, cannot in its opinion, stand with a decision of the House of Lords. (3) The court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if it is satisfied that the decision was given per incuriam." 29. The counsel contends that all the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aid to pass sub silentio. A good illustration is Gerard v. Worth of Paris Ltd., (1936) 2 All ER 905. There, a discharged employee of a company, who had obtained damages against the company for wrongful dismissal, applied for a garnishee order on a bank account standing in the name of the liquidator of the company. The only point argued was on the question of the priority of the claimant's debt, and, on this argument being heard, the Court of Appeal granted the order. No consideration was given to the question whether a garnishee order could properly be made on an account standing in the name of the liquidator. When therefore, this very point was argued in a subsequent case before the Court of Appeal, Lancaster Motor Co. v. Bremith Ltd., (1941) 1 KB 675 - the court held itself not bound by its previous decision. Sir Wilfrid Greene, M. R., said that he could not help thinking that the point now raised had been deliberately passed sub silentio by counsel in order that the point of substance might be decided. He went on to say that the point had to be decided by the earlier court before it could make the order which it did; never the less, since it was decided without argument, w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to protect himself from eviction must be a bona fide dispute, and this question of fact was not considered by the Appellate Court. However, the question of law as to whether the word 'dispute" should be interpreted is mean "a bona fide dispute" was not argued or decided. 34. With regard to the decision of Palekar and Nathwani, JJ. in Civil Revn. Appln. No. 1569 of 1964, decided on 17-4-1968 (Bom.), again it would appear that the question of law raised before us was not considered by the Bench, nor were any arguments advanced. Here too, the Division Bench proceeded on the assumption that the word "dispute" in Section 12(3)(a) must mean a "bona fide dispute" and not merely a 'dispute". 35. Mr. Kotwal submits that the observations and the view taken in the various decisions relied on by him has been consistently expressed over number of years, and even if technically, they cannot be considered as binding precedents on the Division Benches, they are entitled to weight. He says that it is not likely that this view would not be consistently taken without due consideration to the language of the section and the meaning to be given to the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding; but, if it is not clear, it is not part of a tribunal's duty to spell out with difficulty a ratio decidendi in order to be bound by it, and it is always dangerous to take one or two observations out of a long judgment and treat them as if they gave the ratio decidendi of the case. If more reasons than one are given by a tribunal for its judgment all are taken as forming the ratio decidendi". It would be clear from the above quoted passage that it is the enunciation of the reason or principle or the process of reasoning on which a question before a Court has been decided can be said to be binding as a precedent. A mere logical decoction or corollary on the ratio of a decision cannot be binding as a precedent; for, generally, the exposition of law in the judgment must be qualified by the particular facts of the case. The ratio of the case must mean a decision on issue which is a live issue between the parties, and the law should result from being applied to live issues raised between actual p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ded that the agreed rent and permitted increases of the premises. The landlord thereafter filed an ejectment suit on all the three counts including- non-payment of rent for over six months. The tenant had not filed any application for fixation of standard rent before the filing of the suit by the landlord. By his written statement, however, he raised a dispute about the standard rent and also requested the court to fix the same. He applied for fixation of interim rent pending fixation of the standard rent, and the interim rent was accordingly fixed by the court. The trial court, in view of the contention taken up in the written statement, raised an issue about the standard rent. Ultimately, the trial court held that the standard rent of the premises was ₹ 26 p. m. In view of the deposit of the arrears of rent and costs of suit, the trial court dismissed the landlord's suit for possession. The landlord's allegation about waste and nuisance was rejected by the trial court. The appeal filed by the landlord relating to the recovery of possession was dismissed. This was again challenged by the landlord by a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. When the matt ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a) does not apply and Section 12(3)(v) applies to his case. In short, the question raised was whether a tenant can take his case out of Section 12(3)(a) and seek relief under Section 12(3)(b). In his referring judgment, bal J. specifically observed that the dispute must be a "bona fide" dispute, because a dispute which is "not bona fide" is nt a dispute at all. We, however, find that the Full bench has not said anything to show that this view was wrong. It seems to be so because the Full Bench was to called upon to consider the question as to whether the dispute must be a "bona fide" dispute and not any dispute. The two questions, viz., whether the dispute could be raised for the first time in the written statement and whether such a dispute should necessarily be a "bona fide" dispute are different. The Full Bench was concerned only with the first one. If the Full Bench had in its mind the question of "bona fide", it would certainly have referred to that question and expressed their view one way or the other. The absence of any such consideration of the question by the Full Bench in the case shows that they did not apply their mind ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n make an application for fixation of standard rent and permitted increases under Section 11 irrespective of the provisions of Section 12, and such an application need not necessarily be "bona fide". He also points out that it is immaterial to find out whether a dispute raised under Explanation I to Section 12 is bona fide or not. Relying on the observation of the Full Bench to the effect that the word 'dispute' in both the sub-sections fixes the nature of the dispute referred to in sub-section (3) (a) and in Explanation I of S. 12, Mr. Diwan contends that the Full Bench by necessary implication has come to the conclusion that it is immaterial whether the 'dispute' under Section 12(3)(a) is bona fide or not. According to him, the ratio of the Full Bench expressed in the above referred to passages is that the nature of the dispute in Section 12(3)(a) cannot be different from the one contemplated in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 11. If the bona fides or otherwise of the tenant in making an application under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 11 are irrelevant, they would be equally irrelevant in the case of a dispute referred to in sub-section (3) (a) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dispute regarding the standard rent and permitted increases; (3) the standard rent shooed be in arrears for a period of six months or more; and (4) the tenant has neglected to pay the same until the expiration of one month from the notice under sub-section (2), which are required to be fulfilled for the applicability of Section 12(3)(a), the Full Bench goes on to observe- "Now if all the conditions are to be fulfilled there is no doubt that in the present case there was a dispute raised. The two Courts below actually fixed the standard rent at the rate of ₹ 26 per month when the contractual rent agreed upon was ₹ 28 per month. Such a case cannot fall under Section 12(3)(a)". These observations tend to indicate that even the Full Bench assumed for the purposes of the reference before them that the dispute raised by the tenant was "bona fide". Taking into consideration all the aspects of the matter, we are unable to accept Mr. Diwan's contention that the ratio decidendi of the Full bench decision binds us to the conclusion that the word "dispute" in Section 12(3)(a) means any dispute, whether "bona fide" or otherwise. It wou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... st be a "bona fide" dispute, and what is mala fide can have no existence in law. He further contends that the word "dispute" used in different places in Section 11 and 12 has different meanings. 42. Mr. Diwan, on the other hand, has made the following submissions; He firstly contends that the ordinary rule of construction of a statutory provision is that the words used must be given their plain and grammatical meaning, and it is not the function of the Court to go on a voyage of discovery as in that case the Court would be usurping the legislative function of the Legislature. His next submission is that it is not permissible for a Court to read words in the Act not found there unless strong and compelling reasons are found within the four corners of the Act itself. he further submits that the only possible way of construing the word "dispute" in Section 12(3)(a) is merely to find out whether "there is a dispute" or there is no dispute": and there is no justification whatsoever to add the word "bona fide" in the sub-section which is not there. He further submits that there is intrinsic evidence in the Act itself that whenever t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e" in Section 12(3)(a) should be given its plain, literal and grammatical meaning, or whether it is permissible to construe it as meaning only "a bona fide dispute". The relevant well established principles for interpretation of a statutory provision of this nature that emerge on a consideration of the law relating to interpretation of statutes are these: 44. Normally, the words used in a statute have to be construed in their ordinary meaning. In the absence of adequate grounds, it is wrong to add or subtract words. But in many cases, judicial approach finds that the simple device of adopting the ordinary meaning of words does not meet the ends of fair and reasonable construction. Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of the words sometimes may not necessarily assess a proper construction of a statuary provision in which the words occur. often enough, it becomes necessary to have regard to the subject-matter of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve. The words should be construed in the light of their context rather than what may be either their strict etymological sense or their popular meaning apart from their context ..... (See She ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... case of S. V. Parulekar .v Dist. Magistrate Thana). Maxwell (Interpretation of Statutes, twelfth edition, page 279) observes that the presumption as to identical meaning is, however, not of much weight, and the same word may be used in different sense in the same statute, and even in the same section. It is also an important rule of construction that if a strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity or inconsistency, such an interpretation should be discarded and an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose the Legislature may reasonably be considered to have had will be put on the words, if necessary even by modification of the language.........(See [1960]3SCR578 . Similarly in construing an enactment and determining its true scope, it is permissible to have regard to all such factors as can legitimately be taken into account to ascertain the intention of the legislature such as the history of the Act, the reason which led to its being passed the mischief which had to be cured as well as the cure as also the other provision of the statute.........(See S. C. Prashar v. Vasantsen, [1963]49ITR1(SC) . 45. Having regard to the rules of construction referred ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e is a further protection given to the tenant by sub-section (2) of Section 12 which disentitles the landlord from filing a suit for recovery of possession until the expiration of one month after notice in writing of the demand of standard rent or permitted in creases and further makes an application to the Court under sub-section (3) of Section 11 within the period of one month laid down in Section 12(2) and thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted increases specified in the order made by the Court. In effect, the compliance of the requirements of the provisions of Explanation I by the tenant creates a statutory presumption, or as is often called, a conclusive evidence of the tenant's readiness and willingness to pay. Thus, Explanation I gives a further protection to the tenant. It would appears from the provisions of sub-section (1) that the Legislature intended to give protection to a bona fide tenant who actually wanted to pay or was ready and willing to pay. These provisions of sub-section (2) and Explanation I have been enacted with a view to give a further chance to honest tenants to make payment by clearing off the arrears or resorting to the machiner ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ested right in the land lord on his fulfilling the four conditions laid down in Section 12(3)(a). It would be clear that sub-section (3)9a) and sub-section (3) (b) are complementary to each other and have k to be read together. Both these sub-sections deal with a case where the tenant has defaulted to pay rent or permitted increases; the notice contemplated in sub-section (2) is already served upon him; the one month's period mentioned in the notice has expired; and the tenant has failed to take advantage of the enabling provision of Explanation I. It would appear that sub-section (3) (b) is couched in negative language in contrast to the wording of Section 3(a) which makes if mandatory upon the Court to pass decree for eviction if the conditions laid down therein are fulfilled. We may now assume that the landlord has been able to establish the three conditions laid down in sub-section (3) (a), viz., (i) the rent is payable monthly; (ii) the rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months; and (iii) the tenant neglects to make the payment until expiration of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), The bone of contention between the parties relates to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion 12(3)(a). The landlord will be able to show that the dispute raised by the tenant is nt at all bona fide or a genuine dispute. To hold that the word "dispute" should be given its plain and grammatical meaning would mean that the tenant can with impunity with hold payment of rent and increases even till the filing of the suit by the landlord and then by merely taking a plea about the standard rent in the written statement he can protect himself from eviction. In our opinion, such an interpretation of the word "dispute: in Section 12(3)(a) would in most of the cases render the effect of the provisions of S. 12(3)(a) nugatory, Even though the tenant may now full well that what is charged by the landlord is nothing but the standard rent and permitted increases, still what was required of him to defect the vested right of the landlord is only to raise a plea about the standard rent in his written statement. It would be unreasonable to hold that such was the intention contemplated by the Legislature. The scheme of Section 12 would show that the protection is extended to honest tenants. We find that there are other indications as well to support the view that we are in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ded that the right given to the landlord under Section 12(3)(a) could be frustrated by allowing a tenant to raise k a false, frivolous, or mala fide dispute about the standard rent and permitted increases. We cannot forget that the Legislature has given full protection to the tenant who pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of standard rent as contemplated by Section 12(1). The Legislature seems to have given sufficient protection to honest tenant who on account of certain difficulties could nt pay the rent in time and has a dispute about the standard rent and permitted increases by enacting sub-section (2)and Explanation I. The tenant is given one month's period after he receives a notice from the landlord during which he can pay off the asrrears. By inserting Explanation I, a fictional case of readiness and willingness in favour of the tenant has been introduced giving protection to him where he has a dispute about standard rent and permitted increases. The very fact that the tenant resorts to the machinery provided by Explanation I read with Section II within the prescribed period would prima facie show that he was ready and willing to pay rent but had a genuine rea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e prescribed time. The provision was obviously beneficial to the tenant, inasmuch as, mere payment of standard rent and permitted increases and costs of the suit at the date of the hearing of the suit at the date of the hearing of the suit was sufficient compliance to claim protection from eviction. The amendment of 1953, however, made a substantial departure from the original provision by making it mandatory on the Court to pass a decree for eviction on the proof of the four conditions laid down in Section 12(3)(a) by the k landlord. It is only in cases which are not covered by Section 12(3)(a) that Section 12(3)(b), which is in pari materia with the original Section 12(3), would be attracted .it may incidentally be noted that Section 12(3)(a) as amended by Act 61 of 1953 provided that "the Court may pass a decree for eviction" in the circumstances mentioned in the section. The word "may" has been substituted by the word "shall" by Maharastra Act 14 of 1963; but this change has not made any change in the legal position. Even when the word "may" found place in Section 12(3)(a), it was construed to mean "shall". It would, therefore, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n Section 12(3)(a), to give an enlarged meaning to the word "dispute" would amount to frustrating that intention. The tenant has simply to raise a contention in his written statements howsoever false or frivolous it may be about the standard rent and permitted increases, and the case would be taken out of Section 12(3)(a). Such a construction would be nothing but to reduce the amended Section 12(3)(a) and Section 12(3)(a) to the original Section 12(3) for all practical purposes. 52. It is true that the normal rule of construction of a statutory provisions is to give to the words and expressions used therein their plain, grammatical meaning. However, this presumption would be very slight. One must have regard to the intention of the Legislature which can be gathered from the scheme of the relevant provision, and its setting in the scheme of the Act. We have already indicated that not only that there is internal evidence of the intention of the Legislature to give a restricted meaning to the word "dispute" but giving an enlarged or plain or grammatical meaning to the word "dispute" would lead to absurd results, and it is also likely to render the provis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (e) and Section 11(2) are concerned, the Court is not called upon to consider the question as to whether the dispute, which gives rise to the application for fixation of standard rent or permitted in creases, is "bona fide" or not. Whether the dispute raised in the application for fixation of standard rent or permitted increases is bona fide or not , the Court has to decide and fix the same. Even if the Court finds that the dispute raised in the application is fraise and vexatious, the Court would declare the agreed rent or increases to he the standard rent or permitted increases. The Court will not reject the application as not main taint ail on the ground that the dispute raised is not bona fide. Similarly, so far as Explanation I to Section 12 is concerned, the Court is not called upon to consider the question as to whether the dispute raised by the tenant is bona fide or not. Under the provisions of Explanation I to Section 12 as well as Section 11(1)(e) and 11(2) a dispute about the standard rent and permitted increases is initiated by making an application. In fact, Explanation I specifically refers to the making of an application by the tenant under Section 11(3). ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... #39;dispute", the rules of interpretation require that the construction should go in favour of the tenant. We have shown above on an analysis of the provisions of Section 12 and the scheme of the Act that the legislative intent of a restrictive meaning being given to the word 'dispute" in Section 12(3)(a) is clear and that the construction suggested by the Counsel would lead to absurd and ambiguous results. By incorporating Section 12(3)(a) in the Act, the Legislature has created vested right in the landlord on fulfilment of the four conditions deducible from the said provisions. To entitle himself to a decree for eviction, the landlord has to prove that there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increase. This can be proved not only by showing that the tenant has not taken up a plea about standard rent and permitted increase, but also by the landlord by showing that the so-called dispute raised k by the regnant is not genuine or bona fide. Of course, the burden of proving that the dispute raised by the tenant is not bona fide would be on the landlord. 56. The other contention is that Section 12(3)(a) is an exception to the general rule la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... irst time in the written statement is a bona fide dispute or not, sand they have found no difficulty to decide the question on evidence led before them. Ordinarily, a "bona fide dispute" would mean a dispute which cannot be said to be false, vexations, mala fide, fraudulent or dishonest. As stated earlier, the question has to e decided on evidence led by the parties in the suit. 58. The last submission of mr. Diwan is that Section 12(3)(a) does not specifically state whether the dispute referred to is by the tenant or by the landlord, and, therefore a question may arise as to whose bona fides are required to be considered. Section 12(3)(a) deals with the rights of a landlord to eject a tenant on fulfilment of certain conditions. Theoretically, Mr. Diwan is right that even a landlord is entitled to raises such a dispute, there would be no question of his bona fides being considered, because, by his own volition, he takes the case out of Section 12(3)(a). Such a contingency, however, cannot arise when a landlord seeks possession of the premises from a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent. By making out a case that the rent charged by the landlord is not the standard ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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