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TMI Blog2022 (6) TMI 848X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ibed by Section 153 and that in the absence of any express time limits contemplated under the Act, the time limits under Section 153 for reassessment cannot be read into Section 144C more particularly when the provisions of Section 153 are excluded by the non-obstante clause in section 144C(13) and hence the proceedings are not barred by limitation HELD THAT:- As rightly contended by the learned senior counsels and affirmed by the Learned Judge, the DRP proceedings is a continuation of assessment proceedings. To put it further, it is a part of assessment proceedings, once the objections are filed and under section 144C (12) a period of 9 months is prescribed, within which, directions are to be issued by the DRP, failing which any directions are to be treated as otiose. As seen from the timeline discussed in the earlier paragraphs, the original assessment proceedings are to be completed within 21 months and the additional time of 12 months is granted when proceedings before TPO is pending. The TPO has to pass orders before 60 days prior to the last date. Then 30 days time is given to the assessee to file their objection before the DRP and the DRP is given 9 months time and therea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... usion of applicability of Section 153 or Section 153 B is for a limited purpose to ensure that dehors larger time is available, an order based on the directions of the DRP has to be passed within 30 days from the end of the month of receipt of such directions. The section and the sub-section have to be read as a whole with connected provisions to decipher the meaning and intentions The limitation prescribed under the statute is for the assessing officer and therefore, it is his duty to pass order in time irrespective of whether the directions are received from DRP or not. As held by us above, the DRP will have no authority to issue directions after nine months and a further period of one month as per section 144C (13) and three months under section 153 (2A) is available, within which period no orders have been passed in the present cases. The reference made by the learned senior counsels on the judgments in Nokia India Private Ltd ( 2017 (9) TMI 1298 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and Vedanta Ltd ( 2020 (1) TMI 168 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] is well founded. The timeline given under the Act is to be strictly followed. We conclude as under: (a) The provisions of Sections 144C and 153 are ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... p Bagmar in WA Nos. 1517, 1519, 1609 1610/2021, Mr. Kamal Sawhney, Senior Counsel for Mr. Arun Karthick Mohan in W.A. No. 1854 of 2021 COMMON JUDGMENT R. MAHADEVAN, J. The Revenue is the appellant(s) in all the appeals. WA.Nos.1517, 1519, 1609 and 1610 of 2021 have been filed against a common order dated 23.12.2020 passed by the learned Judge in the respective WP Nos.1068, 1070, 922 and 919 of 2020, whereas WA.No.1854 of 2021 arises from the order dated 16.02.2021 made in WP No.6202 of 2019. 2. The issues raised in all these writ appeals are identical and interrelated to each other as the order in one batch has been relied and followed in the other case. The learned counsel on either side have putforth common arguments in all the appeals. Therefore, all the writ appeals were taken up for hearing together and disposed of by this common judgment. 3. The respondent in these writ appeals namely WA Nos. 1517, 1519, 1609 1610 of 2021 / M/s. Roca Bathroom Products Private Limited is a private limited company incorporated during August 1983 and a subsidiary of Roca Sanitario S.A., Spain. They are engaged in the business of manufacturing and marketing of bathroom p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... years 2009-2010 and 2010-2011, the respondent approached the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal by filing appeals. By a common order dated 18.12.2015, the Tribunal allowed the appeals by setting aside the orders of the assessing officer and remanding the matter to the assessing officer to refer the same to the DRP for fresh examination, after giving sufficient opportunity to the assessee. In respect of the assessment year 2010-2011, the respondent/assessee filed Miscellaneous Petition No. 71/Mds/2016 stating that certain grounds raised by them have not been adjudicated. By order dated 10.08.2016, the Tribunal allowed the Miscellaneous Petition and reopened the appeal in respect of grounds 4 to 7 for fresh adjudication. Pursuant to the same, the Tribunal by order dated 23.09.2016, allowed the appeal and directed the assessing officer to reexamine the issue afresh, after providing reasonable opportunity to the assessee. 7. According to the respondent, they did not receive any notice, pursuant to the orders of the Tribunal and therefore, they sent a letter dated 21.08.2019 to the second appellant stating that the remand proceedings have become time barred under Section 153 of the Act a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ceedings and for refund of the amount collected from them by placing reliance on Section 153 of the Act. Thereafter, the respondent filed writ petition No. 6202 of 2019 to quash the final assessment order dated 29.10.2020 passed under Section 143 (3) read with Section 144-C (13) of the Act and consequently direct the appellants to grant refund of Rs.4,72,88,068/- along with interest. 9. Opposing the relief (s) sought for in the writ petitions, a counter affidavit was filed by the appellants contending that the writ petition was filed on misconception that the proceedings initiated by the department are barred by limitation in respect of the assessment year 2009-2010. It is well settled that the challenge made to show cause notice is not maintainable inasmuch as it is only a proposal to initiate action and it has not finally determined the rights and liabilities of the parties to the writ. The respondent/assessee ought to have submitted their objections to the show cause notice and it is for the appellants to decide as to whether the proceedings are barred by limitation or not. Therefore, it was submitted that the writ petitions have been filed hastily and the reliefs sought for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... thereafter taken proceedings up in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 144C. However, it was only after receipt of the petitioner's communication seeking a refund that the Department has woken up, with the DRP issuing notices to the petitioner for both years, though for AY 2010~11, the matter was remanded to the file of the Assessing Officer. .... 15. No doubt, Section 144C is a self contained code of assessment and time limits are inbuilt each stage of the procedure contemplated. Section 144C envisions a special assessment, one which includes the determination of Arms Length Price (ALP) of international transactions engaged in by the assessee. The DRP was constituted bearing in mind the necessity for an expert body to look into intricate matters concerning valuation and transfer pricing and it is for this reason that specific timelines have been drawn within the framework of Section 144C to ensure prompt and expeditious finalisation of this special assessment. 16. The purpose is to fast-track a specific type of assessment. This does not however lead to the conclusion that overall time limits have been eschewed in the process. In fact, the argume ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt held that where the matter had been remanded to be re~done, it would hardly make a difference as to whether the remand had been to the TPO or the DRP, thus indicating that the provisions of Section 144C were also governed by the limitation of time set out in Section 153 of the Act. 22. The issue before the Delhi High Court concerned the effect of Section 153(2A) in a matter where the Tribunal had remanded the assessment in respect of five out of seven issues to the Assessing Officer. Upon receipt of the order of the Tribunal, the Assessing Officer referred the transfer pricing issues to the TPO. The assessee took a stand that the TPO would be bound by the limitation prescribed under Section 153(2A) and requested the TPO to take the provision into consideration in the proceedings before him. The time limits under Section 153(2A) were however violated by the Department leading to Writ Petitions being filed by Nokia. In that context, the Court, while accepting the stand of the assessee that the time limits specified in Section 153(2A) would apply, states as follows: 25. In the present case, of the seven issues, the assessment in respect of five was set aside and the issu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 244A of the Act, within a period of four (4) weeks from today. 12.(i) Mrs. Hema Muralikrishnan, learned senior panel counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that the DRP is entirely governed by the provisions contained under Section 144-C of the Act. As per Section 144- C, the Assessing Officer shall forward a draft order of assessment to the eligible assessee, if he proposes to make any variation in the income or loss returned, which is prejudicial to the interest of such assessee. On receipt of such draft order, the assessee shall file his acceptance or objections and thereafter the Assessing Officer shall complete the assessment on the basis of such draft order, if no objections are filed and based on the directions issued by DRP, if objections are filed. The Assessing Officer, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 153 or Section 153B, shall pass assessment order under Section 144C(3) within a month from the end of the month in which the period for filing objections under sub-section (2) of Section 144C expires. Therefore, it is contended that Section 144-C has to be considered independently as far as DRP is concerned. Adding further, the learned counsel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ifferent circumstances i.e., time limit for completion of original assessment, completion of assessment on the basis of the order passed by the Commissioner under Section 263 or 264 of the Act or in compliance with the order of the Appellate Authorities or Tribunal or the Court. Section 153 of the Act is silent with respect to the period of limitation, within which time, the assessment has to be made by the assessing officer on the basis of the directions of the DRP. The time limit is specifically excluded because the proceedings before the DRP as well as the proceedings initiated on the basis of the directions issued by DRP are separate and distinct. In this context, reliance was placed on Section 144C (13) of the Act, which reads as follows:- Upon receipt of the directions issued under sub-section (5) the Assessing Officer shall, in conformity with the directions, complete, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Section 153 or Section 153B, the assessment without providing any further opportunity of being heard to the assessee, within one month from the end of the month in which such direction is received. (iii) By pointing out Section 144 C (13) of the A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ommissioner of Income Tax vs. Lion Bridge Technologies Private Limited [ 2019 (260) Taxman 273] has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case, the Bombay High Court did not consider the effect of Section 144C (13) which specifically uses the words notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Sec.153 or Sec.153B but the Court had an occasion to consider whether the Assessing Officer could, by issuance of a Corrigendum, convert a final assessment order into that of a draft assessment order. Similarly, the decision of the Delhi High Court in Nokia India Private Limited v. DCI [2018 (407) ITR 20] is not applicable to the case on hand, where the Court has not considered the effect of Section 144C (13). Therefore, the reliance placed by the learned Judge on the aforesaid two decisions is improper. In any event, when Section 153 of the Act does not apply to DRP and the Assessing Officer has no control over DRP, it has to be construed that there is no time limit prescribed in the Act for the DRP to complete the proceedings. Therefore, Section 153 of the Act cannot be interpreted as if it imposes limitation to the Assessing Officer to pass orders upon rem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by limitation. In other words, the 12 months period from the end of financial year 2013-2014 expired on 31.03.2015 within which date, a final order in the remand proceedings ought to have been passed. (ii) The learned Senior counsel for the respondent invited the attention of this court to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Nokia India Private Limited v. DCIT [(2018) 407 ITR 20] and submitted that the provisions contained under Section 152 (3A) of the Act are applicable even to a remand proceedings passed by the Tribunal, directing the DRP to adjudicate the issues afresh. In this case, pursuant to the order passed by the Tribunal, remand proceedings were initiated by the DRP, Chennai and subsequently, by notification dated 31.12.2014, the jurisdiction vested with DRP, Bengaluru. However, it cannot be said that DRP, Chennai which initiated the remand proceedings, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue or in the alternative, should have passed orders even earlier. While so, the appellants ought to have passed an order on or before 31.03.2015 and any order passed subsequent thereto is hit by Section 153 (2A) of the Act. (iii) The learned Senior counsel also submit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2011 was filed by the Department and the same was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 19.09.2021. The learned senior counsel also relied upon the Judgment in Vedanta Ltd v. DCIT [(2020) 114 taxman.com 686] to buttress the contention that the very object of DRP mechanism is to expedite the assessment proceedings involving transfer pricing and foreign companies. By placing reliance on the aforesaid decision and other decisions, which emphasize the strict adherence to the period of limitation for assessment or revision of assessment, it is submitted by the learned Senior counsel that there is enormous delay in passing a final order pursuant to the order of remand passed by the Tribunal on 24.01.2013. The learned Judge, on appreciation of the said aspects has rightly allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent and it calls for no interference by this court. 14. (i) Mr. Kamal Sawhney, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent in WA Nos. 1517, 1519, 1609 1610 of 2021 would contend that the appellants are not legally justified in not passing a final order in the remand proceedings within a reasonable time. According to him, the order passed by the TPO is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... edial measures would be arrived at by the expert body, but not to conduct its proceedings in a leisurely manner without any set of limitation. In the present case, for more than five years from the date of order of remand passed by the Tribunal, no order has been passed by the appellants, while so, the notice dated 06.01.2020 issued for continuing the remand proceedings is illegal and it is barred by limitation under Section 153(2A) of the Act. (iii) The learned Senior counsel also placed reliance on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Nokia India (P) Ltd case (supra) and contended that whether the remand was made to the TPO or the DRP would not make a difference as long as what results from the remand is a fresh assessment of the issue and therefore, the time limit for completing the exercise of assessment is governed by Section 153 (2A) of the Act. According to the learned Senior counsel, the legislature was cautious and well aware of the limitations, which are applicable for completing the assessment under Section 153 and even completing an assessment pursuant to an order of remand. The legislature has provided specific timelines under Section 144C within which the DR ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er : 30.03.2013 Final Assessment Order : 16.01.2014 Order of ITAT : 18.12.2015 First Notice issued by DRP : 06.01.2020 Roca Bathroom Products Private Ltd AY 2010-11 Filing of original Return : 30.09.2010 Order of TPO : 29.01.2014 Draft Assessment Order : 24.03.2014 Final Assessment Order : 17.02.2015 Order of ITAT : 18.12.2015 (With respect to one issue) Order of ITAT in MP : 23.09.2016 (With respect to other issues) First Notice issued by DRP : 06.01.2020 17. Before we venture into the rival contentions, it is but necessary to refer to the certain provisions under the Income Tax Act and the timeline ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o in sub-section (3) of section 92D and after considering such evidence as the Transfer Pricing Officer may require on any specified points and after taking into account all relevant materials which he has gathered, the Transfer Pricing Officer shall, by order in writing, determine the arm's length price in relation to the international transaction or specified domestic transaction in accordance with sub-section (3) of section 92C and send a copy of his order to the Assessing Officer and to the assessee. 3A. Where a reference was made under sub-section (1) before the 1st day of June 2007 but the order under sub-section (3) has not been made by the Transfer Pricing Officer before the said date, or a reference under subsection (1) is made on or after the 1st day of June, 2007, an order under sub-section (3) may be made at any time before sixty days prior to the date on which the period of limitation, referred to in section 153 or as the case may be, in section 153B for making the order of assessment or reassessment or recomputation or fresh assessment, as the case may be, expires. Provided that in the circumstances referred to in clause (ii) or clause (x) of Explanation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... with,- (i) the Dispute Resolution Panel; and (ii) the Assessing Officer. (3) The Assessing Officer shall complete the assessment on the basis of the draft order, if- (a) the assessee intimates to the Assessing Officer the acceptance of the variation; or (b) no objections are received within the period specified in subsection (2). (4) The Assessing Officer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in section 153, pass the assessment order under sub-section (3) within one month from the end of the month in which,- (a) the acceptance is received; or (b) the period of filing of objections under sub-section (2) expires. (5) The Dispute Resolution Panel shall, in a case where any objection is received under sub-section (2), issue such directions, as it thinks fit, for the guidance of the Assessing Officer to enable him to complete the assessment. (6) The Dispute Resolution Panel shall issue the directions referred to in sub-section (5), after considering the following, namely:- (a) draft order; (b) objections filed by the assessee; (c) evidence furnished by the assessee; (d) report, if any, of the Assessing Officer, V ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d to in sub-section (1) arises as a consequence of the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer passed under sub-section (3) of section 92CA; and (ii) any foreign company. . Relevant Provisions of Section 153 prior to amendment. 153. (1) No order of assessment shall be made under section 143 or section 144 at any time after the expiry of- (a) two years from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable ; or (b) one year from the end of the financial year in which a return or a revised return relating to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1988, or any earlier assessment year, is filed under sub-section (4) or subsection (5) of section 139, whichever is later. Provided that in case the assessment year in which the income was first assessable is the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 2004 but before the 1st day of April, 2010, the provisions of clause (a) shall have effect as if for the words two years , the words twenty-one months had been substituted : Provided further that in case the assessment year in which the income was first assessable is the assessment year comm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fore the 1st day of April, 2010 and during the course of the proceedings for the assessment or reassessment or re-computation of total income, a reference under sub-section (1) of section 92CA- (i) Was made before the 1st day of June, 2007 but an order under subsection (3) of that section has not been made before such date; or (ii) Is made on or after the 1st day of June, 2007, The provisions of this sub-section shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the second proviso, have effect as if for the words one year , the words twenty one months had been substituted: Provided also that where the notice under section 148 was served on or after the 1st day of April, 2010 and during the course of the proceeding for the assessment or reassessment or re-computation of total income, a reference under sub-section (1) of section 92CA is made, the provisions of this sub-section shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the second proviso, have effect as if for the words one year , the words two years had been substituted (2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) , (1A), (1B) and (2), in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r the assessment or reassessment, the period available for completion of assessment or reassessment, as the case may be, under the said sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) shall be extended by twelve months. (5) Where effect to an order under section 250 or section 254 or section 260 or section 262 or section 263 or section 264 is to be given by the Assessing Officer, wholly or partly, otherwise than by making a fresh assessment or reassessment, such effect shall be given within a period of three months from the end of the month in which order under section 250 or section 254 or section 260 or section 262 is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner: Provided that where it is not possible for the Assessing Officer to give effect to such order within the aforesaid period, for reasons beyond his control, the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner on receipt of such request in writing from the Assessing Officer, if satisfied, may allow an additional period of six months to give effect to the o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssment can be passed at any time after the expiry of 21 months. As per 92CA (4), the assessing officer has to pass an order in conformity with the order of the TPO. After the receipt of the order from the TPO determining ALP, the assessing officer is to forward a draft assessment order to the assessee, who has an option either to file his acceptance of the variation of the assessment or file his objection to any such variation with the Dispute Resolution Panel and also the Assessing Officer. Sub-Section (5) of Section 144C of the Act provides that if any objections are raised by the assessee before the Dispute Resolution Panel, the Panel consisting of top and expert functionaries of the department, is empowered to issue such direction as it thinks fit for the guidance of the Assessing Officer after considering various details provided in Clauses (A) to (G) thereof. As per sub-section (12), the DRP has no authority to issue any directions under subsection (5) from the end of the month in which the draft order is forwarded to the eligible assessee and not from the date when the assessee submits the objections. Sub-section (13) of section 144C of the Act provides that upon receipt of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 44C more particularly when the provisions of Section 153 are excluded by the non-obstante clause in section 144C(13) and hence the proceedings are not barred by limitation. Per contra, it has been contended by the learned senior counsels appearing for the respondent(s)/assessees that the outer time limit under Section 153 is applicable to every proceedings on remand and the department having slept over the issue for several years, cannot now redo the proceedings afresh, after certain rights have vested with the assessees. Even if specific provisions are not there to deal with this situation, the proceedings must be concluded within a reasonable time and hence the impugned proceedings are liable to be struck down and rightly done so by the learned Judge. 19. Admittedly, the facts including the dates are not under dispute. As regards the appeal in W.A.No.1854 of 2021, even though the remand was on 24.01.2013 and the assessee had received the order on 08.02.2013, the first notice by the DRP was issued on 19.02.2014 and the first hearing in the Chennai office was on 10.03.2014. Therefore, it is lucid that the DRP had the knowledge of the order before 19.02.2014. The matter was heard ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... when there is a reference, it has to be concluded within 33 months. In the additional 12 months, the draft order is to be passed, the objections have to be filed, the DRP has to issue the directions and the final order is to be passed. The provisions under section 144C and section 153 are not mutually exclusive as both contain provisions relating to Section 92CA and are inter-dependant and overlapping. On remand, prior to amendment as per Section 153 (2A), the Assessing officer is given 12 months to pass a fresh assessment order. Therefore, it is incumbent on him to do so, irrespective of the fact that DRP has completed the hearing and issued the directions or not. As rightly held by the learned judge, we are of the view that the DRP ought to have concluded the proceedings within 9 months from the date of receipt of the Tribunal s order, when it had issued a notice on 19.02.2014 and conducted the hearing as early as on 10.03.2014 and on several dates. The DRP at Chennai, in fact ought to have passed orders before 19.11.2014, even if the date of receipt of the notice is taken as 19.02.2014. In that event, the assessing officer ought to have passed the order before 31.12.2014 or at ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is the essence of the rule of harmonious construction . (4) The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a dead letter or useless lumber is not harmonious construction. (5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose. (ii) CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57 : 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1226: 16. The courts will have to reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. (See Salmon v. Duncombe [(1886) 11 AC 627 : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446 (PC)] AC at p. 634, Curtis v. Stovin [(1889) 22 QBD 513 : 58 LJQB 174 : 60 LT 772 (CA)] referred to in S. Teja Singh case [AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408]). 18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. 19. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ect is to conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible and the authority need not wait for the last date to pass the orders. The limitation prescribed under the statute is for the assessing officer and therefore, it is his duty to pass order in time irrespective of whether the directions are received from DRP or not. As held by us above, the DRP will have no authority to issue directions after nine months and a further period of one month as per section 144C (13) and three months under section 153 (2A) is available, within which period no orders have been passed in the present cases. The reference made by the learned senior counsels on the judgments in Nokia India Private Ltd (supra) and Vedanta Ltd (Supra) is well founded. The timeline given under the Act is to be strictly followed. 24. Insofar as the challenge to the show cause notice issued is concerned, though generally, the High Court will be circumspected to interfere at the stage of show cause notice, the law on the point is well settled with exceptions carved in the following cases; a. when the notice is issued beyond the period of limitation, b. when the notice is without authority, c. when not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for him to withhold the payment of the tax so collected. If a timely assessment is completed, the dues of the State can be conveniently ascertained and collected. Delay in completion of assessment often creates problems. The assessee would be required to keep up all the evidence in support of his transactions. Where evidence is necessary, with the lapse of time, there is scope for its being lost. Oral evidence as and when required to be produced by the assessing authority may not be available if a long period intervenes between the transactions and the consideration of the matter by the assessing authority. Long delay thus is not in the interest of either the assessee or the State. In view of the fact that a period of limitation has been prescribed for bringing the escaped turnover into the net of taxation, such an eventuality cannot be grappled with appropriately unless timely assessment is completed. In several taxing statutes, even in a situation like this, where assessment under Section 11(3) or 28(3) of the respective Acts is contemplated, a period of limitation is provided. Until by statute, such a limitation is provided, it is proper for the State Governments to require, by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated hereinbefore, maximum period of limitation provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is five years. 21. In S.B. Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India [(1976) 2 SCC 181 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 177 : (1976) 37 STC 425] Untwalia, J., speaking for the Bench, opined : (SCC p. 188, para 15) 15. Apropos the fourth and the last submission of the appellant, suffice it to say that even assuming that the revisional power cannot be exercised suo motu after an unduly long delay, on the facts of this case it is plain that it was not so done. Within a few months of the passing of the appellate order by the Assistant Commissioner, the Commissioner proceeded to revise and revised the said order. There was no undue or unreasonable delay made by the Commissioner. It may be stated here that an appeal has to be filed by an a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 9 months, the Assessing officer is to pass orders within the stipulated time, (d) In matter involving transfer pricing, upon remand to DRP, the Assessing officer is to pass a denova draft order and the entire proceedings as in the original assessment, would have to be completed within 12 months, as the very purpose of extension is to ensure that orders are passed within the extended period, as otherwise the extension becomes meaningless. (e) The outer time limit of 33 months in case of reference to TPO under Section 153, would not refer to draft order, but only to final order and hence, the entire proceedings would have to be concluded within the time limits prescribed, (f) The non-obstante clause would not exclude the operation of Section 153 as a whole. It only implies that irrespective of availability of larger time to conclude the proceedings, final orders are to be passed within one month in line with the scheme of the Act, (g) When no period of limitation is prescribed, orders are to be passed within a reasonable time, which in any case cannot be beyond 3 years. However, when the statute prescribes a particular period within which orders are to be passed, then suc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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