9911796707
TMI Blog2024 (2) TMI 341X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be pragmatic rather than pedantic; realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than precedential. [Per Mukharji, C.J. in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [ 1989 (12) TMI 349 - SUPREME COURT ] Thus we are of the view that the decision in Union of India (UOI) and Ors. v. Jesus Sales Corporation [ 1996 (3) TMI 194 - SUPREME COURT ] that is relied upon by the appellant and which interpreted a statuary provision that did not provide for an opportunity of being heard to an applicant seeking the benefit of a duty exemption scheme, cannot come to the aid of the appellant herein in his attempt to show that the provisions of Section 148A should be interpreted in a like manner. As is apparent from a reading of that judgment, the court came to the conclusion that it did on finding that the statutory provision concerned did not provide for the grant of a personal hearing. It was under those circumstances that the court found that the statutory appellate authority in that case was not legally obliged to grant a personal hearing when the same was not envisaged in the statutory provision. As already noted above, the express provisions of Secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it to show cause as to why a notice under Section 148 should not be issued, and the petitioner had, by Ext. P4 reply, re-iterated that it had no taxable income and was therefore advised not to file a return of income as there was no income that had escaped assessment, the appellant herein proceeded to pass Ext. P5 order without affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard as mandated under Section 148A(b) of the IT Act. It was therefore contended that Ext. P5 order was vitiated on account of the non-compliance with the rules of natural justice, and consequently, Ext. P6 notice too was vitiated in law. 4. The learned Single Judge found that inasmuch as Section 148A of the IT Act contemplated the provision of an opportunity of being heard to the assessee, the non-providing of a personal hearing to the assessee vitiated the impugned order and consequential notice. The said order and notice were therefore quashed, and the writ petitioner directed to appear before the appellant herein on or before 27.10.2023 with all relevant documents in its possession for being heard. It was further made clear that if the petitioner did not appear on 27.10.2023, no further opportunity nee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the reply of assessee furnished, if any, in response to the show-cause notice referred to in clause (b); (d) decide, on the basis of material available on record including reply of the assessee, whether or not it is a fit case to issue a notice under section 148, by passing an order, with the prior approval of specified authority, within one month from the end of the month in which the reply referred to in clause (c) is received by him, or where no such reply is furnished, within one month from the end of the month in which time or extended time allowed to furnish a reply as per clause (b) expires; Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply in a case where,- (a) a search is initiated under section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets are requisitioned under section 132A in the case of the assessee on or after the 1st day of April, 2021; or (b) the Assessing Officer is satisfied, with the prior approval of the Principal commissioner or Commissioner that any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing, seized in a search under section 132 or requisitioned under section 132A, in the case of any other person ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l hearing where the assessee would be in a position to do so. In other words, a personal hearing would be required for an assessee to try and convince the Income Tax Officer of his point of view in regard to the issue flagged in the show cause notice. 11. The merit of an oral hearing lies in that the assessee can discern on what aspects of the controversy more light is needed. Thus, if an oral hearing can complement and perfect the written submissions in a case that can be decided in a myriad ways depending on the perspective that the adjudicator chooses to adopt, then it should not be dispensed with. It may be profitable in this context to refer to the off-quoted passage from the judgment of Tucker L.J. in Russel v. Duke of Nortfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109 (CA)] where it was observed that: There are, in my view, no words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth. Accordingly, I do not derive much assistance ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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