9911796707
TMI Blog1967 (7) TMI 137X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or possession of the premises from the petitioner-tenant on the ground that the premises are required for purposes of the trust. The petitioner, contested the character of the opponents as his landlords and also disputed the claim of the opponents for possession. The learned trial Judge found in favour of the opponents about their requirement of the premises for the purposes of the trust. The learned trial Judge observed that the question of comparative hardship mentioned in Section 13 (2) of the Rent Act need not be considered in such a case. He accordingly passed a decree evicting the defendant from the suit premises. (2) In the appeal filed by the petitioner, the appellate Court upheld the finding of the trial Judge, that the plaintiffs required the suit premises for the purposes of the trust. That Court also held that question of application of the provisions of Section 13 (2) of the Rent Act relating to comparative hardship did not arise for decision in this case. Accordingly, the appellate Court confirmed the decree for possession passed by the trial Court against the petitioner. (3) In this revision application by the petitioner the only point raised before us was that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... if the decree for possession is not passed and the hardship of the tenant in case the decree for possession is passed against him. The answer to this argument on behalf of the components is that by the amendment in 1953, the legislature intended to relieve the trustees of a public charitable trust from the burden of showing that their requirement was reasonable and bona fide and that the application of the provisions of Section 13 (2) of the Rent Act to a claim for possession by a trustee of a public charitable trust would be contrary to the presumed intention of the legislature that the trustees of a public charitable trust should be enabled to get the possession of the premises immediately upon proof that the premises are required for the purposes of the trust. It was also urged that if there is a casual omission by the legislature in making necessary amendment in Section 13 (2) of the Rent Act to exempt the trustees of a public charitable trust from its operation, the Court should so construe the language of Section 13 (2) of the Act as to supply that casual omission by the legislature. Finally, the learned advocate for the opponents urged that the language used in Section 13 ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on when the Court comes to the conclusion that a decree for eviction should be passed on the ground specified in Clause (g) of sub section (1) of Section 13 of the Rent Act. If the ground mentioned in Clause (g) of Section 13 (1) is satisfied then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Rent Act, 1947, a landlord is entitled to recover possession of the premises. This means that if the conditions specified in Clause (g) are satisfied, a decree for eviction would be normally passed in favour of the landlord. Section 13 (2) however, says that no such decree shall be passed on the ground specified in Clause (g) of Section 13 (1), if the Court is satisfied that greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Section 13 (2) would therefore, come into play as soon as a decree is sought to be passed by the Court on the ground specified in Clause (G). Now, Clause (g) consists of two parts, the first part refers to the case of landlords who require the properties for the occupation by themselves or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held, provided their requirement is both reasonable and bona fide, Clause (g) also refers separately to the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re, urged that if Section 13 (2) were to be made applicable to such landlords who are trustees of public charitable trusts, a further hindrance would be put in the way of such trustees because they would be then required to show that greater hardship would be caused to them if a decree is not passed, and this would be against the expressed intention of the legislature. It is on the strength of this argument that the learned advocate for the opponents has contended that in construing the term 'landlord' as used in Section 13 (2) of Rent Act, the Court should construe that term of 'landlord' as excepting this category of landlords who are the trustees of a public charitable trust. In our opinion, this argument cannot be accepted. It may be, as urged by the learned advocate for the opponents, though it may not be taken that we accept it, that the legislature intended to exempt the trustees of public charitable trusts from the burden of proving the reasonableness and bona fide nature of their requirement when the legislature amended Clause (G) by introducing therein the second part of that clause. It would at the most, manifest an intention of the legislature that the t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cree were passed. It is then required to weigh the hardship of the one against the hardship of the other and come to a conclusion as to which party will have to bear greater hardship. If the landlord has to bear greater hardship, the Court will relieve him by passing a decree; if the tenant were to feel greater hardship, the Court will decline to pass a decree; if the tenant were to feel greater hardship, the Court will decline to pass a decree for possession, even though the requirement is proved by the landlord. The question which is considered under Section 13 (2) of the Rent Act is quite distinct and different from the question that is considered in Clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the said Act. The legislature, by amending Clause (g) of Section 13 (1) may be taken, if the argument on behalf of the opponents were accepted, to have shown some favour to the landlords in the categories of trustees of public charitable trusts. But since the question to be considered in Section 13 (2) of the Act is distinct and different from the question to be considered in Clause (g), it cannot be said that the legislature by the said amendment has also manifested an intention to sho ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y the tenants, it would certainly have proceeded to suitably amend Section 13 (2) of the Act also. Obviously the legislature has not done so and since the legislature, though it had an opportunity to amend Section 13 (2) of the Rent Act, has chosen not to do so, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature though it wanted to show favour to a landlord who is a trustee of a public charitable trust in so far as the conditions specified in Clause (g) are concerned, had no intention to absolve him from the operation of the Section 13 (2) of the Rent Act. (13) The last argument on behalf of the opponents is that on a construction of the language employed in Section 13 (2) of the Act, landlords in the category of trustees of public charitable trusts are not included in the term 'landlord' used in Section 13 (2) of the Act and therefore the question of comparative hardship adumbrated in Section 13 (2) of the Rent Act does not arise for decision in their case. In support of this argument, the learned advocate for the opponents relied upon a decision in 1963 4 Guj LR 279, referred to in the commencement of this judgment. That is a decision by our learned brother Raju, J., si ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... operty is nothing but the subject matter of the trust that is, a property which is impressed with the obligation giving rise to a trust. When we speak of a trust, we speak merely of the requisite obligation which is annexed to the ownership of a property. This obligation is not a legal entity in any sense; as for example, the trust cannot own any property - the property is owned by the trustee who is an entity by himself different from the trust; a trust cannot sue and a trust cannot be sued; it is only a trustee who can sue and who can be sued. It is only a trustee who can hold properties. A 'trust' cannot be a landlord since the trust properties vest in the legal ownership of the trustees. It is the trustee alone who can be a landlord. Since the trust is not a legal entity, no question of hardship suffered by the trust or accommodation required by the trust can arise for consideration. It is the trustee who administers the trust, who may suffer hardship or who may require accommodation. The learned Judge has also considered that the requirement of reasonableness and bona fide nature which is essential under the first part of Clause (g) is not at all necessary under the s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ve no hesitation in rejecting the same. (14) The learned advocate for the opponents relied upon two cases in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 830 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Finance Co., AIR 1967 SC 276. These cases were cited by the learned advocate for the opponents on the basis that his argument that there is manifested or indicated an intention of the legislature to absolve opponents from the operation of Section 13 (2) of the Act, is accepted by us. Since we have not accepted that argument of the learned advocate for the opponents, it is not necessary for us to refer to these two cases. The learned advocate for the opponents also referred to a decision in the case of Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, AIR 1952 SC 324. He referred to the Head Note (b) which says that:- when a subsequent Act reads an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed in such a way that there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all . In our opinion, this case has no relevance here. The Supreme Court was there dealing with an Act which was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
