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TMI Blog1955 (11) TMI 51X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Justice for constituting a larger Bench. Orby Howell Mootham, C.J. 3. The question which has been referred to this Bench is whether the time required for obtaining copies of the judgment and decree appealed from should be excluded in computing the period .of limitation for preferring an appeal fixed by the Rules of this Court under the Letters Patent. The relevant facts are that judgment in two connected second appeals was delivered by Brij Mohan Lall J. on 3-10-1950, the learned Judge granting leave to the present appellants to file a further appeal under the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent ceased to have effect from the date upon which the U.P. High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 came into force, but by virtue of Clause 9 of that Order and Article 225 of the Constitution rules with respect to the practice and procedure of the former High Court are applicable to the present Court, and, although not strictly accurate, it is convenient to refer to the Rules which we have to consider as made under the Letters Patent. On 11-10-1950, an application was made for a certified copy of the judgment and decree. The copy of the judgment was ready on 22-1-1951, and delivery was taken on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ons of this Act shall not apply . It is not in dispute that the first schedule to the Limitation Act does not provide a period of limitation for an appeal under the Letters Patent, and (assuming that the Rules made by this Court are a special or local law, the first question is whether the provisions of Section 29(2) have any application when a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation for an appeal for which BO period is prescribed in the first schedule . 7. The answer to this question depends upon the construction to be placed upon Section 29(2), a matter which is by no means free from difficulty. 8. This sub-section in my opinion falls Into two parts and makes provision for two different but connected matters. The first part provides that Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period off limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefore in that schedule..... The purpose of this part of the sub-section is, I think, sufficiently clear; it is, to resolve the difficulty which would otherwise arise where there is a d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eriod of limitation is prescribed by the special or local law. 10. I am further of opinion that the second part of the sub-section has not been made a separate sub-section but has been connected to the first part of the existing sub-section by the word and -- I venture to think that possibly the more appropriate word would have been but in order to make it clear that the provisions of the second part apply also to the suits, appeals and applications to which the first part refers, and so to remove the anomaly which would otherwise arise when applying Section 3 which is itself made subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 25 of the Act. 11. The conclusion which I have reached on the interpretation of this sub-section is I think supported by the course of legislation culminating in the present Section 29(2). 12. Prior to its amendment in 1922 by the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act of that year, Sub-section (1) (b) of Section 29 of the present Act provided that Nothing in this Act shall -- (b) affect or alter any period of limitation specially prescribed for in a suit, appeal or application by any special or local law now or hereinafter in force in British India . This provision w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uits, appeals and applications for which a period of limitation is prescribed which differs from that provided therefore in the first schedule -- the consequences will be highly inconvenient; for in that case the sub-section will make no provision for what is to occur when either the special or local law prescribes for a suit, appeal or application- a period which is the same as the period prescribed for such suit, appeal or application in the first schedule, or when the schedule omits -- as in the case before us -- to provide a period of limitation. Moreover a very anomalous position arises if the special or local law prescribes, as in the case of certain suits under the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act, three periods of limitation one of which is the same as the period prescribed in the first schedule and the two others are different. Such, in my opinion, cannot have been the intention of the Legislature. 16. The meaning and effect of Section 29(2) appears to have been considered only in two reported cases; 'Mst. Lalit Kuari v. Maha Prasad Na-rain Singh' (SB) (G) and the 'Canara Bank Ltd. v. Warden Insurance Co AIR1953Bom35 . In the former of these cases a special Bench of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n 29(2) only comes into operation when two different periods of limitation are prescribed by Schedule 1 and the special or local law respectively, but, for the reasons I have endeavoured to state, the provisions of the second part of the sub-section are of general application for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law for any suit, appeal or application. 19. I do not entertain any doubt that the rules made by the former High Court at Allahabad under its Letters Patent and continued in force by the virtue of Clause 7, U.P. High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, are special or local laws within the meaning of the Limitation Act. It has not been contended that they are not law; but they are a law of restricted local application as they concern only the jurisdiction of this Court the territorial extent of which is confined to the limits of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Whether they constitute a local law or special law or partake of the nature of both is not necessary to determine in the present case. 20. Rule 7 enacts that the memorandum of appeal shall be presented within 60 days and not more from the date of the judgment , it has been ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce accordingly. Balram Upadhya, J. 25. The question referred to this Bench is as to whether in computing the period of limitation fixed by the rules of this Court for preferring a Letters Patent Appeal the time requisite for obtaining copies of the judgment and the decree should be excluded. I have had the advantage of reading the judgments of my Lord the Chief Justice, and my brothers Raghubar Dayal, Agarwala and Bhargava, JJ. The arguments advanced by Mr. Kirty, learned counsel for the appellant, are that the rules framed by this Court under the Letters Patent are 'special' or 'Local' law within the meaning of Section 29(2), Limitation Act, 1908, and, therefore, the provisions of Section 12 of the Act would apply for the purpose of determining the period of limitation. The second argument advanced is that the provisions of Section 12, Limitation Act are of general application and would apply to appeals under the Letters Patent 'proprio vigore'. 26. Under the common law in England there is no limit of time provided for the enforcing of rights and it is the various statutes of limitation that prescribed the periods within which actions may be brought or with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct. In the third class of cases, where a special or local law prescribes a period which Schedule I, of the Indian Limitation Act has omitted entirely to prescribe, the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 shall be applicable by virtue of the second part of Section 29(2) as observed by my Lord the Chief Justice. I respectfully adopt the reasons given by him for the view that 'the provisions of the second part of the sub-section' laid down a rule to general application in the case of all suits, appeals and applications for which a period of limitation is prescribed by the special or local law. 27. Chagla C. J. in AIR1953Bom35 considered Section 29(2), Limitation Act to be applicable even when a particular special law prescribes a period which is not provided for in the first schedule of the Limitation Act at all. At p. 36 he observed: The period of limitation may be different under two different circumstances. It may be different if it modifies or alters a period of limitation filed by the first schedule to the Limitation Act. It may also be different, in the sense that it departs from the period of limitation fixed for various appeals under the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... local law is to be determined, is independent of the earlier part of Section 29(2) which deals with the applicability of Section 3, Limitation Act only. The provision is consistent with the object of the Limitation Act to be a statute consolidating the law relating to limitation. As mentioned before, all possible remedies were thought of and provided for in the Articles, and this provision further provides that if any special or local law lays down some period of limitation which may or may not have been prescribed in the first schedule of the Act, the general rules which govern the determination of the period of limitation and are applicable to the periods prescribed in the first schedule have been made to govern those periods also which are so prescribed under the special or local law. 29. To my mind, it is not essential to decide in the present case as to whether the Rules of the Court under the Letters Patent providing for special appeals are 'special law' or 'local law' or not. If they constitute special or local law, the provisions of Section 29(2) would make Section 12(2) of the Act applicable. If the above mentioned rules do not constitute special or local ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the sections makes this clear. Section 4 lays down that where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that the court reopens. The provisions of this section are very general. When a period is prescribed for instituting a suit or preferring an appeal, the suitor concerned is required to file a suit or appeal within that period. If the Court itself is closed and the suitor concerned is unable to file the suit or appeal within the specified period he cannot justly be said to be at fault, and this section only provides that he will have an opportunity of filing the suit or appeal on the date that the Court reopens, after the expiry of the period during which he had to act. There can be no doubt that all courts and authorities called upon to adjudicate on the question of limitation should take this reasonable rule into consideration when adjudicating a suit or appeal or application to be barred by time. When the Legislature attempted to codify the law of limitation, it hardly seems proper to hold that in all cases which were not dea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lar date and that all Instruments shall be deemed to be made with reference to the Gregorian Calendar for the purposes of the Act. These rules are general in nature and having regard to the fact that the Limitation Act is a Code dealing with the law of Limitation, it does not appear correct to hold that these general rules are intended to be made applicable only to the periods prescribed in the schedule and not to the periods prescribed under other enactments. A different view has, however, been taken by Chagla, C. J., in the 'Kanara Ban's case (A)' referred to above. At p. 37 he observes' When a statute speaks of period of limitation prescribed it can only mean prescribed by that statute itself. Two reasons appear to have been stated as justifying this view. The first is, in the words of the learned Chief Justice-- If the intention of the Legislature was to refer to the period of limitation prescribed by other laws, the Legislature would have expressly so mentioned; and the other reason is that when we turn to Section 4, it also speaks of 'limitation prescribed' and not 'limitation prescribed by the schedule' and yet under Section 29 the Legislature ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stify such a view. The object for which the Act was framed, the scheme which is apparent from the provisions made in the various sections, and the arrangement, do not appear to support this construction. The Legislature wanted to codify the law of limitation and a glance at the schedules indicates the comprehensiveness of the attempt made. Yet the Legislature must have been alive and Sections 5 and 29 do indicate that it was so alive, that periods of limitation not provided for in the schedules may be prescribed by other enactments and that periods of limitation different from those prescribed in the schedules might be prescribed by certain other enactments. It hardly seems fair to assume that while attempting to codify the law of limitation the Legislature left the general principles to be enacted every time a period of limitation not provided for in the schedules or different therefrom was prescribed though these principles appear to be of a general nature which may be of universal application without sacrificing the peculiar requirements of those enactments. Usually the Legislature does not sacrifice clarity and preciseness of expression to brevity or convenience. The two expres ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... le in respect of any part of U. P. by either of the existing High Courts (which term included the erstwhile Allahabad High Court and the Chief Court in Avadh). Reference has to be made to the Letters Patent of the High Court in Allahabad in order to interpret the jurisdiction conferred by Clause 7 of the Amalgamation, Order and, in this case, the appeal to the Division Bench lies from the judgment of a learned Single Judge in the two connected second appeals as to result of the continuance of the power to entertain such appeals which: was granted by Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The rules of Court applicable to these special appeals were the rules in force in the years 1950-and 1951. The judgment of the learned Single Judge was delivered on 3-10-1950, and, at the same time, leave was granted to the appellant to file the special appeal. On 11-10-1950, applications were made for certified copies of the judgment and decree. The copy of the judgment was ready on 22-1-1951 and was delivered the next day. The copy of the decree was not ready until 5-3-1951, and was delivered on 7-3-1951. This appeal was presented on 21-2-1951, unaccompanied by the certified copies of the judgment and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ch regulate the computation of the period of limitation are applicable to cases where the period of limitation to be computed has been prescribed by a general law which may be in 'pari materia' with the Limitation Act such as the Code of Civil Procedure. In -- 'Kandaswami Filial v. Kannappa Chetty AIR1952Mad186 , Rajamannar C. J., held: It is well established that the Limitation Act and the Code are to be read together, because both are statutes relating to procedure and they are in 'pari materia' and therefore to be taken and construed together as one system as explanatory of each other. He went on to add: It followed that if there was a general provision in the Limitation Act, it would govern also provisions as to limitation contained in the Civil Procedure Code. This was authoritatively laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in -- Thoolbas Koonwur v. Lalla Jogesnur' 3 Ind App 7 (PC) (N). While reserving my opinion on this question, I have, however, no hesitation in holding, in agreement with my brother Dayal J., that where the period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law which is not in 'pari materia' with the Limit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fit one for appeal. This right of appeal from a judgment of a Single Judge granted to the Allahabad High Court under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent was continued by Clause 7 of the Amalgamation Order referred to above when the new High Court of Judicature at Allahabad was constituted by amalgamating the Allahabad High Court and the Chief Court in Avadh. The power of making rules to regulate the manner for the exercise of such jurisdiction granted by Section 13 of the Act of 1861 (24 25 Vict. Cap. 104) was also continued by Section 106 of the Government of India Act, 1919, which repealed the Act of 1861. In fact, Section 106 of the Government of India Act, 1919, was more explicit and clearly laid down that the several High Courts were to be Courts of record and were to have such Jurisdiction as was vested in them by the Letters. Patent including the power to make rules for regulating the practice of the Court. The same power to make rules was subsequently continued in the High Courts by Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and by Article 225 of the Constitution which clearly mentioned that the powers of the High Courts include the power to make rules of Court. It is cl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ecision, he was of the view that Even if it is held that the High Court Rules have the force of special law although, strictly speaking, they cannot be classed as such, the provisions of Section 29 (2), Limitation Act, cannot be said to apply to an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court. With all respect, I have to differ from Manohar Lall J., inasmuch as I consider that the question whether the Letters Patent of a High Court are a special or local law does not arise at all where the point for decision is whether Section 12 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the determination of the period of limitation prescribed by the rules of Court for presentation of a memorandum of appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The question that has to be considered is whether the rules of Court, which prescribe the period of limitation for presentation of such a memorandum of appeal, are a special or local law. Considering the body by which the rules are framed, the nature and purpose of the rules, the authority under which those rules are made and the limited scope of applicability of the rules, I am convinced that the rules of Court are certainly a local or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her the rules of computation contained in other sections of the Limitation Act did or did not affect or alter the period of Limitation prescribed by the special or local law. As has been pointed out by my brother Dayal J., some of the Courts took the view that a special Act was not controlled by the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act only when it was of a very special 'kind, complete in itself, and when it did not admit of the several provisions of the Indian Limitation Act being imported into it without incongruity and without defeating the intention of the Legislature. Put briefly, the view was that if a special Act was not a complete code in itself, the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act were applicable in computing the period of limitation prescribed by that Act. In my opinion, Sub-section (2) of Section 29 was specifically designed to do away with this conflict of opinion and uncertainty about the law. This sub-section itself is divisible into two parts: The first part of this sub-section is to the effect that Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... apply. This part of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 appears to me to lay down a complete rule for determining the question of applicability of the general provisions of the Limitation Act for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed toy any special or local law. A view has been expressed that this second part of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 only comes into operation in those limited cases which are also covered by the first part of ,Sub-section (2) of Section 29, viz., cases where the special or local law prescribes for a suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from a period prescribed therefore by the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. I cannot see any justification for this view on the interpretation of the language used in Sub-section (2) of Section 29. In the second part of Sub-section (2) of Section 29, the Legislature has used the word 'any' three times. This word 'any' has been introduced before the words 'period of limitation', suit, appeal or application' and 'special or local law'. The purpose of using the word 'any' before all these expressions can only be that the Legislature ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stify an interpretation which would take away all effect of the words used in the second part of this sub-section. If this second part is limited to the cases which are covered by the first part, it would not apply for the purpose of determining 'any' period of limitation prescribed for 'any' suit, appeal or application by 'any' special or local law but only for the purpose of determining those periods .of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law which happen to be different from the period of limitation prescribed therefore by the first schedule to the Limitation Act. Such restriction on the meaning of the word 'any' used before the expression 'period of limitation prescribed' in this second part cannot be justified merely on the ground that this second part has been linked with the first part by the conjunction 'and'. On the language of Sub-section (2) of Section 29, therefore, it appears to me that the correct interpretation would be to hold that this second part of this sub-section is applicable for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ts: One aspect arises on the view that, even apart from Section 29 (2), all the general provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to the determination of the period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law, when the period so prescribed is not different from the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule. The other aspect arises on the view that those general provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply at all, if the period prescribed by the special or local law is not different from the period prescribed by the first schedule. If the effect of these views is considered in some specific case under a special or local law, the anomaly, that arises as a result of these views becomes clear. An example may be taken of a suit under Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act which is clearly a special law. For purposes of convenience I would refer to the provisions of the u._ P. Tenancy Act, 1939, as they were originally enacted in that Act and before that Act was at all amended. Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act provided for a suit for ejectment of a person occupying agricultural land without title. In effect, It was a suit for possession of immovable property. The p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 0 of the U. P. Tenancy Act is 12 years and is, therefore, not different from the period prescribed for the corresponding suit under the Limitation Act, two different positions would arise. According to one view not only would Sections 4, 9, to 18 and 22 apply for the determination of the period of limitation in such cases but even other sections, such as Sections 6 and 19, would also apply. The anomaly, that arises, is that, in determining the period of limitation for suits, under Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, the general sections of the Limitation Act applicable would differ depending on whether the particular suit, in respect of which the period of limitation has to be determined, is governed by the 12 year, the 6 year or the three year period prescribed in the Fourth Schedule to the U. P. Tenancy Act. There may be a case in which a suit is instituted under Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act beyond the period of limitation prescribed therefore in the Fourth Schedule but within that period computed from the date of an acknowledgment of his liability to ejectment by the person occupying the land, which acknowledgment was made before the expiry of the period of limitation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... three cases. On the other hand, if the second part is made dependent on the first part, then Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 would apply to applications for execution of a money decree mentioned at serial No. 7 and, on the two different views mentioned above, in one case even Section 19 would apply and in the other case not even Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 would apply in determining the period of limitation for execution of decrees falling under serial Nos. 5 and 6. These anomalies have to be kept in view when interpreting Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act and, in this case, must be given due weight because, as I have indicated above the language of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 is not so clear as to compel the Courts to hold that the second part of that sub-section is dependent upon and is applicable only when the first part of that sub-section becomes applicable. This conclusion is sought to be drawn because of the use of the conjunction 'and' linking the two parts and ignores the plain meaning of the language used in the second part and the use of the word 'any' before the expression 'period of limitation prescribed' in the second part. I, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an extension of the period in the Indian Limitation Act itself. The provi sion for extension of time is made in S, 5, Limitation Act. Sections 19 and 20, Limitation Act, may also possibly be held to be examples of cases where the period of limitation prescribed is ex tended inasmuch as they lay down that fresh periods of limitation shall be computed under special circumstances. Sections 12, 13, 14 and 15, which deal with exclusion of time only, cannot be held to be provisions extending the period of limitation prescribed, Sub-section (1) of Section 12, Limitation Act, lays down: 12(1) -- In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckon ed shall be excluded . Under Rule 7 of Chapter III of the Rules of Court, the period of 60 days has to be reckoned from the date of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. If Section 12(1), which lays down the exclusion of the date from which the period is to be reckoned, is held to be a provision for extending time and thus excluded from application to the determination of the period of limitation under Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the question would arise whethe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or decree. 43. For the reason's given by me above, I agree with answer to the reference proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice. Raghubar Dayal, J. 44. The question to be decided is whether in a Letters Patent appeal the time requisite for obtaining copies of the judgment. and decree should be excluded in computing the period of limitation fixed by the Rules of the Court for preferring a Letters Patent appeal. 45. The relevant rule is Rule 7, Chapter III, Rules of Court in force in 1951 : An application for leave to appeal under Section 10 of the Letters Patent against an appellate judgment of a single Judge of this Court shall be made in writing or orally to the Judge deciding the appeal immediately after the judgment is delivered. No other application for such leave to appeal shall be entertained. In all appeals under the Letters Patent, a duly stamped memorandum of appeal shall be presented to the Registrar within 60 days and not more from the date of the Judgment, unless a Judge in his discretion, on good cause shown, shall grant further time for its presentation. The memorandum of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy of the judgment or decree appealed from. The appeal, s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion Act of 1877 was in force. Paragraph 2 of Section 12 of that Act is: In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal as a pauper, and an application for review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed against or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded . Section 6 of the Act of 1877 is: When, by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India, a period of limitation is specially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, nothing herein contained shall affect or alter the period so prescribed . 49. In 1928 : AIR 1928 PC 103 (I) the Privy Council had to consider the question whether the provisions of Section 12, Sub-section (2), Limitation Act, 1908, applied to the case of such appeals for which the period of limitation was prescribed in the Limitation Act and for whose presentation the memorandum of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy of the decree or judgment appealed from. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that the language of Sub-section (2) of Section 12 was general a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng law even though without considering the question of the applicability of the provisions of Section 12, Limitation Act, their Lordships would have pointed it out. It seems that the submission of Mr. Kenworthy Brown, which had been conceded by Sir George Lowndes, was considered to be the correct way of looking at the question, that is to say, it was considered that the provisions of Section 12, Limitation Act of 1877, operated only where the Act itself prescribed a period of limitation and as that Act did not prescribe any period of limitation in the case of a Letters Patent appeal in Allahabad the provisions of that section could not be applied to the presentation of an appeal under the Letters Patent. In fact, their Lordships themselves used the significant expression: a rule fixed the period for appeal and there was no provision like that in the Limitation Act for excluding the period of time required for getting copies of the judgment and decree . Nothing could be clearer than this for indicating that, in the absence of a corresponding provision in the rule framed by the High Court, the appellant could not have obtained the advantage of the provisions of Section 12, Limitation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Section 48 C.P.C. were controlled by those of Section 15, Limitation Act. I do not agree with the views expressed in these cases regarding the applicability of the general provisions of the Limitation Act to periods of limitation prescribed by any other law. I am not prepared to extend the application of other general provisions of the Limitation Act to periods, of limitation prescribed by special or local laws or other rules of procedure having the force of law without examining the reasons for the view that Section 15, Limitation Act, controls Section 48, C.P.C. I may refer to the observations of Lord Goddarct in ' Carmarthenshire County Council v. Lewis' 1955 AC 549(S) in this connection: Now, once a doctrine has become a rule of law it is the duty of the courts to apply and follow it without regard to its origin, taut if to follow it would be to extend it, in my opinion it is not only legitimate but essential to examine the-origin and reason for it if it be known . 56. Before dealing with these cases I would discuss the various provisions of the Limitation Act of 1877 and of 1908 in order to determine the interpretation of the expression in computing the period of li ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot with a view to make the provisions of those sections applicable to the computation of limitation prescribed by any law but was due to avoid unnecessary repetition is also clear from the language of the two Illustrations to Section 4. In these illustrations the expression used is after the prescribed period without any reference to the period being prescribed by the second schedule annexed to the Act or without using any such expression which would have clearly pointed out that the prescribed period of limitation was meant to be the period of limitation prescribed by the second schedule of the Limitation Act. Section 4 did refer to the period of limitation prescribed therefore by the second schedule hereto annexed and, therefore, the illustrations to make the meaning of the main section clear must refer to the period of limitation prescribed by the second schedule hereto annexed and not to period of limitation prescribed by any law. 59. The provisions of the Limitation Act of 1908 follow very closely the provisions of the Limitation Act of 1877. Section 3 of this Act corresponds to Section 4 of the earlier Act and is : Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25 (incl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... w and not only that period of limitation which was prescribed by the first schedule of the Limitation Act. 63. Sections 7, 8, 10, 21, 22 and 23 do not use the word prescribed in any connection. 64. The proviso to Section 9 refers to the running of the time prescribed for a suit to recover the debt. 65. Sub-s. (2) of Section 11 is: No foreign rule of limitation shall be a defence to a suit instituted in the Provinces on a contract entered into in a foreign country, unless the rule has extinguished the contract and the parties were domiciled in such country during the period prescribed by such rule . It was necessary here to qualify the word prescribed by using the expression by such rule referring to the foreign rule of limitation. 66. Sections 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 use the expression in computing the period of limitation prescribed and provide for the exclusion of certain periods. The result of such exclusion naturally is that the outer limit for the institution of the suit, appeal or application is extended to the extent of the period excluded. It is in view of this effect that Sections 28 and 29 of the Act use the expressions at the determination of the period hereby limited and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law -- (a) the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply. (3) Nothing in this Act shall apply to suits under the Divorce Act (4 of 1869). (4) Sections 26 and 27 and the definition of 'easement' in Section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in territories to which the Easements Act, 1882, (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend . 73. Sub-section (2) (a) does contemplate that a special or local law may provide for the non-application of all or any of the sections mentioned therein for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law. This is reasonable because special or local laws deal with special subjects and special local conditions and there may be reasons for making the period of limitation prescribed more inelastic than they are in view of the general provisions of the Limitation Act. 74. If the general provisions of the Limitat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... son, he is not under a legal disability, no time shall be allowed on account of any subsequent disability of such person or of the legal disability of any person claiming through him. 12. The following persons shall be A deemed to be under legal disability within the meaning of the last preceding section -- married women in cases to be decided by English law, minors, idiots, and lunatics. 79. It will be noticed that neither Section 11 nor Section 12 uses the expression in computing the period of limitation prescribed , which is the expression for us to interpret and which was the expression in Section 15, Limitation Act of 1908, that was for interpretation in the aforesaid Allahabad case. 80. Further, I may quote Section 1, Sub-section (5) and Section 3, Limitation Act (Act No. 14 of 1859). Sub-section (5) of Section 1 is : To suits to alter or set aside summary decisions and orders of any of the Civil Courts not established by Royal Charter, when such suit to maintainable -- the period of one year from the date of the final decision, award, or order in the case. Section 3 is : When, by any law now or hereafter to be in force, a shorter period of limitation than that prescribed by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... all be the following, that is to say: Further, Section 11 had no such expression which would have restricted the applicability of its provisions to those cases alone for which limitation was prescribed under the Limitation Act. This was the basis for the view expressed in -- 'Huro Soonduree Chowdhrain v. Anundnath Roy Chowdhry' 3 Suth WR 8 (T). It was observed at page 9, col. 1 : It is contended, indeed, by the other side, that Section 246 of Act 8 cannot be referred to Act a 4 of 1859, Section 11; but this appears to us a mistake. There is nothing prohibitory in the wording of the law itself; I have already mentioned that Section 11 does not use the words period of limitation prescribed. It simply provides that the period of limitation in case of legal disability of a person will commence from the time when that legal disability ceases. The period of limitation may have been prescribed by any law. I am, therefore, of opinion that it cannot be said, merely on the basis of these observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, that the expression in computing the period of limitation prescribed in Section 15, Limitation Act of 1908 or in other sections of Chapter I ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on 29 to the limitation prescribed by the Special Acts. That section too lays down an equitable principle for condoning delays. The learned Chief Justice then observed at page 405 : Whether these general provisions apply to Acts which are Codes complete in themselves and which contain no express exclusion thereof is a matter upon which I do not consider it necessary, in answering the question referred, to pronounce. The only question with which we are concerned in the present reference is as to whether these general provisions and in particular Section 15 of the Act govern Section 48, Civil P. C. This indicates that the scope of the first question formulated by him was narrowed down to the simple question whether Section 15, Limitation Act, governed Section 48, Civil P. C. Limiting the question thus the learned Chief Justice observed : Now the Code of Civil Procedure is not a special or local Act but there is high authority for the proposition that the provisions of the Code are subject to the provisions of the Limitation Act. He then referred to the case of 3 Ind App 7 (PC) (N). I have already referred to this case. It does' not lay down such a wide proposition that the provis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on prescribed , and the change of language indicates that the Legislature considered that the exclusion of certain periods in the computation of limitation really enlarged the period of limitation leading to a later date for determining the period of limitation for the institution of any suit, appeal or application. Such a consideration implies that the provisions for the exclusion of those periods did affect or alter the period of limitation as it tended to extend it. 85. Iqbal Ahmad, J. observed at page 408: In Section 11 (Limitation Act, 14 of 1859) there was nothing to limit the application of that section to suits with respect to which periods of limitation were provided for by the various clauses of Section 1 of the Act and accordingly Section 11 was of general application and applied even to suits not dealt with by the Act. He then compared its provisions with those of Section 7, Limitation Acts of 1871 and 1877 and observed that by the use of the expression prescribed therefore in the third column of the first schedule hereto annexed in Section 7 of the later Acts, the Legislature confined the operation of that section only to suits with respect to which limitation was prov ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... us decisions: It is well established that the Limitation Act and the Code are to be read together, because both are statutes relating to procedure and they are in 'pari materia' and therefore to be taken and construed together as one system as explanatory of each other. On the same page he observed later in para 15: It followed that if there was a general provision in the Limitation Act, it would govern also provisions as to limitation contained in the Civil Procedure Code. This was authoritatively laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in 3 Ind App 7 (PC) (N). Again, he observed in para 20 at page 191: It appears to me from the course of legislation to which I have adverted above that the provisions of the Limitation Act must be read with those provisions of the Civil Procedure Code which are intimately connected therewith. He observes in para 22 at page 192: On a careful consideration of the decided cases on the point and the course of legislation I have arrived at the following conclusions: The expression prescribed in Section 15 (1), Limitation Act, does not mean prescribed by the first schedule to the Act. It would include a case where a period of limit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India . It was held by the Full Bench that he could get such a benefit. The learned Judges first referred to the various cases having a bearing on the question and observed at p. 502: There is therefore authority for the proposition that the general provisions of the Limitation Act, 1877, are applicable to suits and other proceedings under other Acts which prescribe special periods of limitation, but which are not intended to be complete Codes in themselves, and that the words 'affect or alter' in Section 6, Limitation Act of 1877 relate only to the period prescribed and not to the way in which that period is to be computed. The same words appear in Section 29 of the present Limitation Act . It appears to me inconsistent and not based on any good reason that the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act 'should be interpreted to apply to all periods of limitation prescribed by any law and then be not applied to periods of limitation provided by any law which is held to be a complete Code in itself. The general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act nowhere refer to any such restriction. Either they apply t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... omplete Code in itself having no bearing on the question whether the general provisions for the computation of the period of limitation in the Indian Limitation Act apply for computing the period of limitation prescribed by other Acts. 96. Strachey C. J. and Banerji J. had to consider in 23 All 277 (B) the question whether Section 5, Limitation Act of 1877 applied to a suit under Section 93(a), North-Western Provinces Rent Act, 1881. Section 5, Limitation Act of 1877 corresponds to present Sections 4 and 5, Limitation Act of 1908. It was observed at p. 279: Section 5 does not extend any period of limitation. It assumes that the period prescribed for a suit has expired, .and provides that nevertheless the suit may be instituted if the period expired on a day when the Court was closed. This construction of Section 6 is in accordance with the cases which are collected in the note to Section 6 in Mr. Starling's edition of the Limitation Act. The general effect of those cases is, that the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings under special or local laws, except so far as they affect or alter the periods prescribed by those special or local laws, unless the s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mitation Act of 1877 and Section 3, Limitation Act of 1859. In the former case, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed at p. 176: Another contention, which seems to have been the only one urged in the High Court, as far as it appears from the judgment, is that a saving with respect to parties under disabilities must be taken to be by equitable construction implied in this clause*. Their Lordships, however think it impossible that any Court can add to the statute that which the Legislature has not done. The limitation is enacted in plain and absolute terms. The Legislature has not thought fit to extend the period which it has prescribed to persons under disability. Where such enlargements have been intended, they are found in the Acts containing the limitation, as In the general Act. This Act contains no such saving and their Lordships would be legislating and not interpreting the statute if they were to introduce it. It was said that the clauses in the general statute, Act 14 of 1859 (The Indian Limitation Act) relating to disabilities might be imported into this Act, but this cannot properly be done. Act 14 is a Code of limitation of general application. This Act is of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... shall affect such law . Section 6, Limitation Act of 1877 may again be quoted for easy reference. It is; When, by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India, a period of limitation is specially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, nothing herein contained shall affect or alter the period so prescribed . What is not to be affected by the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act of 1871 was the law laying down the period of limitation differing from that prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act. The law which laid down different periods of limitation and which had been considered in various cases did not lay down any particular rules for computation of the period of limitation. If such rules had been laid down, there might have been much to say in support of the view that the change in language made real difference and that such special rules of computation could be affected or altered by the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act of 1877, though such could not have been affected or altered by the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act of 1871 in view of its Section 6. 100. I am, therefore, with respect, not in agreement with the vi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... od as in that case no such suit, appeal or application could be filed. If it be infinite period, that really means no fixed period of limitation and obviously Section 3 contemplated definite periods of limitation. Non-prescribing a period of limitation cannot amount to prescribing such a period. I, therefore, do not agree with the observations of Chagla, C. J., in AIR1953Bom35 . It may also be different in the sense that it departs from the period of limitation fixed for various appeals under the Limitation Act. If the first schedule to the Limitation Act omits laying down any period of limitation for a particular appeal and the special law provides a period of limitation, then to that 'extent the special law is different from the Limitation Act . 102A. If the period prescribed for such suit, appeal or application by the special or local law be the same as provided by the first schedule of the Indian Limitation Act, naturally the provisions of Section 3, Limitation Act will apply as such it proceeding would be covered by the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act and the party concerned should get the advantage of more beneficial provisions which happen to exist in the Indian ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he earlier part of the subsection and not to lay down certain law of general application to suits, appeals or applications for which periods of limitation were fixed by special or local law. If the latter part of Sub-section (2) is to apply to the computation of the period of limitation, it creates difficulties in application. In case of difference or identity of the periods of limitation . prescribed by special or local law and the Indian' Limitation Act, provisions of Sections 4 to 25, Indian Limitation Act, apply in view of the first part of Sub-section (2) yet provisions of Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24 and 25 do not apply in view of its latter part. Such inconsistency could not have been contemplated by the Legislature. 106. It has also been contended that if the latter part had application to those cases only which were covered by the first part, the word such would have been used for the word any before the expression suit, appeal or application by any special or local law . I do not think that even in such a contingency the word such would have been so used. It could have been then used in place of the word any preceding the expression period of limitation as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t . The provisions of the Act of 1859 were repealed by the Limitation Act 9 of 1871. Section 6 of this Act dealt with special periods of limitation prescribed by particular laws. The section was in these terms: When, by any law not mentioned in the schedule hereto annexed, and now or hereafter to be in force in any part of British India; a period of limitation differing from that prescribed by this Act is especially prescribed for any suits, appeals or applications, nothing herein contained shall affect such law . 113. The Limitation Act of 1871 was replaced by Act 15 of 1877. Section 6 of this Act provided : When, by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India, a period of limitation is specially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, nothing herein contained shall affect or alter the period so prescribed . This very same provision was contained in Section 29 of the present Limitation Act 9 of 1908 before it was amended in the year 1922. 114. Thus in every Limitation Act from 1859 to 1908 an attempt was made to exclude the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act to periods of limitation prescribed by special or local laws. 115. Before t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion Act were general in their character and were applicable to all other laws which prescribed their own periods of limitation and that the application of those general provisions did not 'affect or alter the period of limitation prescribed by such laws because these provisions were merely intended to lay down the manner in which the periods of limitation were to be computed and did not 'affect' or 'alter' the periods themselves unless the special or local law was a complete code for the purposes of limitation. This was the view held by this Court in 23 All 277 (B), 'Suraj Ball Prasad v. Thomas' 28 All 48 (X) : 34 All 496 (U), The same view was taken by the Madras, Calcutta and Bombay Courts in some earlier decisions, see 5 Cal 110 (C) : 8 Bom 593 (D) and 12 Mad 1 (E). 119. In this state of affairs the Legislature intervened and amended Section 29 with the ostensible object of setting the conflict at rest. The section after amendment stands as follows: Where any special or local law prescribed for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore ,by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f it was intended that the second part should apply to only those special or local laws which lay down a period different from that prescribed in the first schedule to the Limitation Act, and not to laws which prescribe a period of limitation when no period of limitation is prescribed in the Limitation Act, the word such would have been used in the place of any in the phrase any period of limitation or in the phrase any special or local law . It follows therefore, that the provisions of Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 apply to all periods of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law except when they are 'expressly excluded' by such special or local law. 121. The provisions of the Letters Patent or of the Rules of this Court relating to Letters Patent appeals or special appeals as they are now called, must be treated as a special law inasmuch as they prescribe the rules for a particular kind of appeal in a particular Court. This view is in accord with the view expressed in 'Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. Lahore v. Punjab Cotton Press Co. Ltd.' AIR 1941 Lah 257 (Y), 'Harbanssingh v. Karamchand' AIR 1949 EP ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s be said that the provisions of the Rules of the Court prescribing a period of limitation for Letters Patent appeal are a complete code by themselves and admit of no variation by the provisions of the Limitation Act. 124. There is no set formula for Express Exclusion . One idea may be expressed in a hundred different ways. The most obvious form is to say such and such sections of the Limitation Act will not apply to the period of limitation prescribed hereby. But where everything by which the period of limitation may be extended is to be excluded, it may be enough to say the period of limitation prescribed hereby shall not be extended in any manner whatever. Where everything else except the provisions of Section 5, Limitation Act, is to be excluded, it might be said, the period of limitation prescribed hereby shall not be extended in any manner except under Section 5, Limitation Act . Even this may be differently expressed and I think the language employed in Rule 7 of Chap. III as quoted above is tantamount to saying that. I have no doubt in my mind that the framers of the rule intended that the period of limitation of 60 days shall not be altered or extended by any mode of compu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h period is to be reckoned shall be excluded. This section also embodies a principle of general application and is also embodied in Section 9, General Clauses Act (10 of 1897) and the same remarks apply as have been stated above with regard to Section 4. 130. In any case these considerations cannot affect the interpretation of Rule 7 of Chap. III of the Rules of this Court read with Section 29 (2), Limitation Act. 131. In my opinion the case in 2 All 192 (A)', which was decided when the rule prescribing the period of limitation for Letters Patent appeals was the same as mentioned in Rule 7 of Chap. III of the Rules of the Court in force in 1951, was correctly decided and this also seems to be the view of the Privy Council as expressed in AIR 1928 PC 103 (I)', where their Lordships observed: It appeared at one time during the course of the argument that an earlier decision of a Full Bench of the High Court of Allahabad when Sir Robert Stewart was Chief Justice -- 'Fazal Muhammad v. Phul Kuar', (A), was to the contrary effect; but after closer examination it was discovered by their Lordships that the case was not a decision on the Limitation Act, but upon what is know ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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