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TMI Blog2025 (1) TMI 619X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot considered to be criminal in nature. The case of P. MOHANRAJ ORS. VERSUS M/S. SHAH BROTHERS ISPAT PVT. LTD. [ 2021 (3) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT ], is relevant in the present case, wherein the Supreme Court has observed 'The Section 138/141 proceedings in this case will continue both against the company as well as the appellants for the reason given as well as the fact that the insolvency resolution process does not involve a new management taking over.' The basic object of the IBC is to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms and individuals in a time bound manner for maximisation of value of assets of such persons, to promote entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance the interest of all the stakeholders including alteration in the order of priority of payment of Government dues and to establish an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Moreover, the objects of Section 14 of IBC is to ensure that the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) could proceed unhindered and without any action being taken against the c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... HON BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY DWIVEDI Shri Abhinav Malhotra Advocate for the petitioner Shri Rohit Mangal Advocate with Shri Anuj Agrawal Advocate for the respondent ORDER Pleadings are complete, therefore, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is heard finally. 2.This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, has been filed questioning the validity of order dated 23.09.2023 passed by the XXII Additional Sessions Judge, Indore, in Criminal Revision No.377/2023 filed under Section 397 r/w Section 399 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, preferred against the order dated 15.06.2023 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore, rejecting the application moved by the petitioner in a pending criminal case seeking stay on the proceedings pending before the trial Court on the basis of interim-moratorium declared by the National Company Law Tribunal, Indore [hereinafter referred to as the NCLT ] upon the application filed by the creditor-Bank of Baroda. 3.To decide the controversy involved in this case, it is apt to mention the facts of the case, which in nutshell, are:- (3.1)That, the petitioner and the respondent are the parties to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Sessions, which was registered as Criminal Revision No.377/2023 and the revisional Court finally dismissed the revision holding that the IBC does not contain any provision regarding stay on the proceedings of Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Hence, the petitioner preferred this petition challenging the order passed by the revisional Court on the ground that the revisional Court has wrongly interpreted the provisions of IBC and exceeded its jurisdiction while rejecting the revision holding that the order passed by the NCLT is not applicable so far as the proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, are concerned. 4.Learned counsel for the petitioner has attacked the impugned order mainly on the ground that the provisions of Section 96 of the IBC are very specific and cover any legal action or proceedings pending in respect of debts which include the proceedings of Section 138 of the N.I. Act. To give strength to his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon various judgments of the Supreme Court, viz. Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka Vs. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Limited reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 266; Charanbir Singh Sethi Vs. Poo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... BC would apply only to the corporate debtor, the natural persons mentioned in Section 141 continuing to be statutorily liable under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Conclusion 78. In conclusion, disagreeing with the Bombay High Court and the Calcutta High Court judgments in Tayal Cotton (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [Tayal Cotton (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2069 : (2019) 1 Mah LJ 312] and MBL Infrastructions Ltd. v. Manik Chand Somani [MBL Infrastructions Ltd. v. Manik Chand Somani, 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 9097], respectively, we hold that a Sections 138/141 proceeding against a corporate debtor is covered by Section 14(1)(a) IBC. Emphasis supplied 23. Thus, I am of the view that the judgment of P. Mohanraj (supra) is clear in this regard. Admittedly, in the present case, the petitioner had signed the cheque as the Managing Director of Respondent No. 2. The judgment of P. Mohanraj (supra) categorically states that the moratorium provisions u/s 14 IBC would apply only to the corporate debtor and the natural persons would continue to be liable. The petitioner is the natural person and merely because he has filed personal insolvency proceedings, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... primarily compensatory in nature and that the punitive element is incorporated only at enforcing the compensatory proceedings. The criminal liability and the fines are built on the principle of not honouring a negotiable instrument, which affects trade. This is apart from the principle of financial liability per se. To say that under a scheme which may be approved, a part amount will be recovered or if there is no scheme a person may stand in a queue to recover debt would absolve the consequences under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, is unacceptable. Emphasis supplied 25. In the present case as well, the petitioner is seemingly trying to escape his liability by trying to urge that his application u/s 94 of the IBC in his individual capacity would stay the complaint under section 138 NI Act against him. It is clear that the petitioner is facing criminal proceedings for being signatory to the cheque which has been dishonoured. He is covered under natural person under section 141 NI Act. 26. The debt in the present case is not of the petitioner but that of Respondent No. 2. Section 141 of the NI Act fastens liability on every officer of the company who was in management and control of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g debt. The proceedings are not considered to be criminal in nature. The case of P. Mohanraj Others Vs. Shah Brothers Ispat Private Limited reported in (2021) 6 SCC 258, is relevant in the present case, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as under:- 67. A conspectus of these judgments would show that the gravamen of a proceeding under Section 138, through couched in language making the act complained of an offence, is really in order to get back through a summary proceeding, the amount contained in the dishonoured cheque together with interest and costs, expeditiously and cheaply. We have already seen how it is the victim alone who can file the complaint which ordinarily culminates in the payment of fine as compensation which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque which would include the amount of the cheque and the interest and costs thereupon. Given our analysis of Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act together with the amendments made thereto and the case law cited hereinabove, it is clear that a quasi-criminal proceeding that is contained in Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act would, given the object and context of Section 14 IBC, amount to a procee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be seen that regard being had to the object sought to be achieved by the IBC in imposing this moratorium, a quasi-criminal proceeding which would result in the assets of the corporate debtor being depleted as a result of having of having to pay compensation which can amount to twice the amount of the cheque that has bounced would directly impact the corporate insolvency resolution process in the same manner as the institution, continuation, or execution of a decree in such suit in a civil court for the amount of debt or other liability. Judged from the point of view of this objective, it is impossible to discern any difference between the impact of a suit and a Section 138 proceeding, insofar as the corporate debtor is concerned, on its getting the necessary breathing space to get back on its feet during the corporate insolvency resolution process, Given this fact, it is difficult to accept that noscitur a sociis or ejusdem generis should be used to cut down the width of the expression proceedings so as to make such proceedings analogous to civil suits. 32. Viewed from another point of view, clause (b) of Section 14(1) also makes it clear that during the moratorium period, any tran ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rm, the interim-moratorium under sub-section (1) shall operate against all the partners of the firm as on the date of the application. (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to such transactions as may be notified by the Central Government in consultation with any financial sector regulator. *** 101. Moratorium. (1) When the application is admitted under Section 100, a moratorium shall commence in relation to all the debts and shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of one hundred and eighty days beginning with the date of admission of the application or on the date the adjudicating authority passes an order on the repayment plan under Section 114, whichever is earlier. (2) During the moratorium period (a) any pending legal action or proceeding in respect of any debt shall be deemed to have been stayed; (b) the creditors shall not initiate any legal action or legal proceedings in respect of any debt; and (c) the debtor shall not transfer, alienate, encumber or dispose of any of his assets or his legal rights or beneficial interest therein; (3) Where an order admitting the application under Section 96 has been made in relation to a firm, the moratorium und ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... debt or other liability barred by the law of limitation would be outside the scope of Section 138. This, coupled with fine that may extend to twice the amount of the cheque that is payable as compensation to the aggrieved party to cover both the amount of the cheque and the interest and costs thereupon, would show that it is really a hybrid provision to enforce payment under a bounced cheque if it is otherwise enforceable in civil law. Further, though the ingredients of the offence are contained in the first part of Section 138 when the cheque is returned by the bank unpaid for the reasons given in the section, the proviso gives an opportunity to the drawer of the cheque, stating that the drawer must fail to make payment of the amount within 15 days of the receipt of a notice, again making it clear that the real object of the provision is not to penalise the wrongdoer for an offence that is already made out, but to compensate the victim. 46. Likewise, under Section 139, a presumption is raised that the holder of a cheque received the cheque for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. To rebut this presumption, facts must be adduced which, on a prepondera ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h the debtor is given breathing space in which to pay back his/its debts, which would result in creditors getting more than they would in a bankruptcy proceeding against an individual or a firm. 48. Section 142 is important and is set out hereunder: 142. Cognizance of offences. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138: Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138. (2) The offence under Section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction (a) if t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... intly. (3) An application under sub-section (1) shall be submitted only in respect of debts which are not excluded debts. (4) A debtor shall not be entitled to make an application under sub-section (1) if he is- (a) an undischarged bankrupt; (b) undergoing a fresh start process; (c) undergoing an insolvency resolution process; or (d) undergoing a bankruptcy process. (5) A debtor shall not be eligible to apply under sub-section (1) if an application under this Chapter has been admitted in respect of the debtor during the period of twelve months preceding the date of submission of the application under this section. (6) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall be in such form and manner and accompanied with such fee as may be prescribed. 95. Application by creditor to initiate insolvency resolution process.- (1) A creditor may apply either by himself, or jointly with other creditors, or through a resolution professional to the Adjudicating Authority for initiating an insolvency resolution process under this section by submitting an application. (2) A creditor may apply under sub-section (1) in relation to any partnership debt owed to him for initiating an insolvency resol ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m and directing the respondent therein (present petitioner) to file a report with regard to corporate debtors within ten days. As submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner, when an application is filed under Section 94 of the IBC, then interim-moratorium applies to the debts of a company, but when the application is filed by the creditor under Section 95, the debts confine to the person who is before the NCLT. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, an application under Section 95 was moved by one of the creditors i.e. Bank of Baroda before the NCLT against one of the Directors of the company i.e. the petitioner and as such, interim-moratorium declared by the NCLT would be applicable in respect of any proceedings initiated against the petitioner including the proceedings under the N.I. Act. 10.As per the observation made by the revisional Court in its order holding that in view of the law laid-down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka (supra), the other cases relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner have no application and cannot be treated as precedent. According to the revisional Court, the transaction is a personal transaction ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... IRP) could proceed unhindered and without any action being taken against the corporate debtor or its assets; it is essentially designed to ensure that the assets and properties of the corporate debtor are duly preserved and no coercive steps are taken against them during the pendency of the CIRP. So far as the case of Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka (supra) is concerned, in the said case, the Court was dealing with the scope of Section 14 of the IBC and it s applicability over the corporate debtors under part-2 of the IBC, while in the case of P. Mohanraj (supra), the Court was dealing with the applicability and scope of Section 96 of the IBC, which is in respect of an individual/personal guarantor under part-3 of the IBC. 12.Learned counsel for the petitioner has also pointed-out that in the case of Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka (supra), the Supreme Court has followed the earlier decision passed in the case of P. Mohanraj (supra), but so far as the proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, are concerned, it is per incurium because the Supreme Court in the case of P. Mohanraj (supra) has observed otherwise in respect of the said proceedings. The revisional Court has also observe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 9 years prior to the petitioners' application under Section 94 and even about 6 years before the initiation of proceedings against the corporate debtor by the State Bank of India under Section 7 of the Code. 73. As regards the first question, there are two ways of interpreting the phrases all the debts and any legal actions or proceedings pending in respect of any debt as are referred to in Section 96 of the Code. 74. First, that as per a plain reading of the aforesaid phrases in the provision, once a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor has filed an application under Section 94(1) before the Adjudicating Authority, all legal proceedings in respect of any debt that the personal guarantor is facing, would be covered by the interim moratorium and consequently the proceedings in the complaint filed by the respondent herein under Section 138 of the Act also would remain stayed, such proceedings being in respect of a debt alleged to have been incurred by the petitioner qua the respondent, (with such interim moratorium to continue till the application under Section 94 is either rejected or accepted by the Adjudicating Authority. If the application is admitted, proceedings under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s. The intimate connection between such individuals and corporate entities to whom they stood guarantee, as well as the possibility of two separate processes being carried on in different forums, with its attendant uncertain outcomes, led to carving out personal guarantors as a separate species of individuals, for whom the Adjudicating Authority was common with the corporate debtor to whom they had stood guarantee. The fact that the process of insolvency in Part III is to be applied to individuals, whereas the process in relation to corporate debtors, set out in Part II is to be applied to such corporate persons, does not lead to incongruity. On the other hand, there appear to be sound reasons why the forum for adjudicating insolvency processes - the provisions of which are disparate-is to be common, i.e. through the NCLT. As was emphasized during the hearing, the NCLT would be able to consider the whole picture, as it were, about the nature of the assets available, either during the corporate debtor's insolvency process, or even later; this would facilitate the CoC in framing realistic plans, keeping in mind the prospect of realizing some part of the creditors' dues from p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onnected to the corporate debtor that the petitioner stood a personal guarantor for, nor to the corporate debt itself, would need to proceed independently so as not to make the complainant in such proceedings under Section 138 suffer further delays, especially when in the present case he has already suffered a delay of about 10 years since his complaint was initially filed, however, in the light of the aforesaid observations as also the fact that Section 96 of the Code does not specifically carve out any exception qua such a debt as is subject matter of an instrument in the context of which a complaint under Section 138 of the Act has been filed, this court would have to interpret the terms all the debts and any legal action or proceedings pending in respect of any debt as occur in Section 96 of the Code, to mean that it would cover all such debts including any debt not pertaining to a corporate debtor for whom the accused in such a complaint under Section 138 stood as a personal guarantor to, even in his capacity as a Director of such corporate debtor. 83. This would be further so in the opinion of this court, because a debt has been defined in the absolutely generic meaning of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Act, by virtue of the interim moratorium stipulated in Section 96 of the Code, there would seem to be no option with this court but to allow the petition and set aside the impugned order passed by the learned JMIC, Jalandhar, dated 25.05.2021. It is therefore ordered accordingly. 88. Hence, till a decision is taken by the Adjudicating Authority in terms of Sections 100 and 101 of the Code, on the application filed by the petitioner under Section 94(1) thereof, the proceedings before the learned trial court under Section 138 of the Act, would remain stayed. 15.Further, the Bombay High Court in the case of Sheetal Gupta Vs. National Spot Exchange Limited Others reported in Manu/MH/0706/2023 dealing with the same question as to whether Section 96 of the IBC has any application over the proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the N.I. Act or not, has observed as under:- 15. In the case of P. Mohanraj and Others vs. Shah Brothers Ispat Private Limited (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed thus- 35. When the language of Section 14 and Section 85 is contrasted, it becomes clear that though the language of Section 85 is only in respect of debts, the moratorium contained in S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the debtor are stayed. The difference in language between Sections 14 and 101 is for a reason. 16. As such, the proceedings under Section 138 read with 141 of NI Act get covered the term any legal action or proceeding pending in respect of any debt appearing Section 96(1) of IBC. 17. The contention of learned Advocate for the respondent-NSEL that NSEL 15 no party to the proceedings, will be of no consequence. Admittedly the SBI has filed to the cwill bey of and Board against the applicant hate the petition befores National Company Law Boessary to have a glancen Process releva Insolvency outonapter II of IBC speaks of Insolvency Resolusolvency 94 thereof pertains to the application by debtor to initiate the Insolvency Process. Under Section 95 of IBC, a creditor may initie an application to is Insolvency Resolution Process. For ready reference, Section 95(1) of IBC is reproduced which reads thus :- 95 - Application by creditor to initiate insolvency resolution process. - (1) A creditor may apply either by himself, or jointly with other creditors, or through a resolution professional to the Adjudicating Authority for initiating an Insolvency Resolution Process under this section by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to register their claims with the resolution professional by sending details of the claims by way of electronic communications or through courier, speed post or registered letter. 22. Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act speaks of a final judgment, order or decree of a Competent Court, in the exercise of insolvency jurisdiction, operates as a judgment in rem . 23. On going through the scheme of Insolvency Resolution Process contained in Chapter III of IBC, the contention of learned Advocate for respondent-NSEL thal proceeding under Section 95 of IBC and outcome thereof is a party specific (parties to the said proceeding only), can not be accepted. 24. Learned Magistrate ought to have allowed the application/s for stay of the proceedings pending before it. Since the same has not been done, interference with the order/s impugned herein is warranted. In the result, the applications succeed. Hence the following order is passed : - ORDER 1. Criminal Application Nos. 1151 to 1153 of 2022 and 1170 of 2022 are allowed. 2. The proceedings (C.C. Nos. 4185/SS/2017, 2218/SS/2017, 4186/SS/2017 2217/SS/2017) under Section 138 of NI Act pending before learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 33rd Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arned Advocates for the parties took me through the judgment and more particularly through paragraph Nos.101 and 102 of the decision. It would be profitable to re-produce paragraph Nos.101 and 102 of the judgment in the case of P. Mohanraj and Others (supra). It reads thus:- WHETHER NATURAL PERSONS ARE COVERED BY SECTION 14 IBC 101. As far as the Directors/persons in management or control of the corporate debtor are concerned, a Sections 138/141 proceeding against them cannot be initiated or continued without the corporate debtor - see Aneeta Hada V. Godfather Travels Tours (P) Ltd. reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661. This is because Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act speaks of persons in charge of, and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company. The Court, therefore, in Aneeta Hada (supra) held as under: (SCC pp.686-88, paras 51, 56 and 58-59) 51. We have already opined that the decision in Sheoratan Agarwal Vs. State of M.P. [(1984) 4 SCC 352 : runs counter to the ratio laid down in State of Madras Vs. C.V. Parekh (1970) 3 SCC 491 which is by a larger Bench and hence, is a binding precedent. On the aforesaid ratiocinatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ccused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh (supra) which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal (supra) does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada (supra) is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in U.P. Pollution Control Board Vs. Modi Distillery (1987) 3 SCC 684 has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove. 102. Since the corporate debtor would be covered by the moratorium provision contained in Section 14 IBC, by which continuation of Sections 138/141 proceedings against the corporate debtor and initiation of Sections 138/141 proceedings against the said debtor during the corporate insolvency resolution process are interdicted, what is stated in paragraphs 51 and 59 in Aneeta Hada (supra) would then become applicable. The legal impediment contained in Section 14 IBC would make it impossible for such proceed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hi directed the resolution professional to file report as required under Section 97(1) of the I.B. Code. It is to be noted that in view of this order Section 96 of the I.B. Code will come into operation. As per Section 96 (1)(b)(i) in case of imposition of interim moratorium, by deeming fiction, during the interim moratorium period, any legal action or proceeding pending in respect of any debt shall remain stayed. Therefore, the accused No.2 would also be entitled to exercise right and benefits conferred under Section 96 of the I.B. Code. In my view, therefore, during the pendency of the insolvency proceeding the complaint cannot be prosecuted against the accused No.1 and 2. 17.The Supreme Court also in the case of State Bank of India Vs. V. Ramakrishnan Another reported in (2018) 17 SCC 394, dealing with the issue as to whether provisions of Sections 14 and 96 would be applicable upon the personal guarantor of corporate debtor or not has observed as under:- 26. We are also of the opinion that Sections 96 and 101, when contrasted with Section 14, would show that Section 14 cannot possibly apply to a personal guarantor. When an application is filed under Part III, an interim-morator ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ate law no sooner it is made or enacted. We see no justification for inhibiting Parliament from repealing, amending or varying any State legislation, which has received the President's assent, overriding within the State's territory, an earlier parliamentary enactment in the concurrent sphere, before it is brought into force. Parliament can repeal, amend, or vary such State law no sooner it is assented to by the President and that it need not wait till such assented-to State law is brought into force. This view finds support in the judgment of this Court in Tulloch [State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch Co., AIR 1964 SC 1284 : (1964) 4 SCR 461] . 80. Lastly, the definitions of the expressions laws in force in Article 13(3)(b) and Article 372(3) Explanation I and existing law in Article 366(10) show that the laws in force include laws passed or made by a legislature before the commencement of the Constitution and not repealed, notwithstanding that any such law may not be in operation at all. Thus, the definition of the expression laws in force in Article 13(3)(b) and Article 372(3) Explanation I and the definition of the expression existing law in Article 366(10) demolish the argu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dings of Section 138 cannot be given to him whereas in the present case, one of the creditors has approached the NCLT by moving an application under Section 95 of the IBC. Considering the whole scenario of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the revisional Court has not properly considered the factual matrix of the case nor interpreted the provisions of IBC. As per Section 14 of the IBC, the moratorium is constituted with an object that once the proceedings have been initiated by the NCLT under the special enactment to assess the value of assets of the debtors so as to promote entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance to protect the interest of all the stakeholders including the alteration in the order on priority of payment of Government dues so as to avoid any type of discrimination and therefore, to avoid misuse of assets of any debtor, the moratorium is declared so as to avoid any other proceedings of recovery of debts against the debtor and if the application is moved under Section 94 of the IBC by the debtor or under Section 95 by the creditor, then the authority under the provisions of Section 96 of IBC, constitutes an interim-moratorium. 19.Here in this c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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