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TMI Blog2002 (3) TMI 44X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he "Act"), a fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another notification under section 6. In the case at hand such a notification issued under section 6 was questioned before the Madras High Court which relied on the decision of a three judge Bench in N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka [1996] 3 SCC 88, and held that the same was validly issued. Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on an unreported decision of this court in A.S. Naidu v. State of Tamil Nadu (S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 11353 to 11355 of 1988), wherein a Bench of three judges held that once a declaration under section 6 of the Act has been quashed, fresh declaration under section 6 cannot be issued beyond the prescribed period of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Act. It has to be noted that there is another judgment of two learned judges in Oxford English School v. Government of Tamil Nadu [1995] 5 SCC 206, which takes a view similar to that expressed in A.S. Naidu v. State of Tamil Nadu (S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 11353 to 11355 of 1988). However, in State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah [1996] 10 SCC 619, the view in Narasimhaiah's case [1996] 3 SCC 88 wa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... der v, Government of Tamil Nadu [1980] AIR 1980 Mad 251, to contend that the view in the said case has held the field since long and the principles of stare decisis are applicable. Residually, it was submitted that many acquisitions have become final and if the matters are directed to be reopened, in case a different view is taken, it would cause hardship. Section 6(1) of the Act so far as it relevant reads as follows "Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.--Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under section 5A, sub-section (2): Provided tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (ii) such notification was issued after the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. In the former case, the period is three years whereas in the latter case it is one year. Undoubtedly, the notification under section 6(1) was made and published in the official gazette within the period of three years prescribed under the proviso thereto, and undisputedly, the same had been quashed by the High Court in an earlier proceeding. It has to be noted that Explanation 1 appended to section 6(1) provides that in computing the period of three years, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification under section 4(1), is stayed by an order of the court, shall be excluded. Under the Tamil Nadu Act 41 of 1980, with effect from January 20, 1967, the expression used is "action or proceeding ... is held up on account of stay or injunction", which is contextually similar. Learned counsel for the respondents referred to some observations in Pooran Mall and Sons' case [1974] 96 ITR 390 (SC), which form the foundation for decisions relied upon by him. It has to be noted that Pooran Mall and Sons' case [1974] 96 ITR 390 (SC), was decided on entirely differe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onstruction as put up by the learned counsel for the appel lants is given acceptance, i.e., it should be within one year from the last of the dates of publication under section 4(1), the public purpose would always be frustrated. It may be illustrated thus: In a given case where the notification under section 4(1) was published, dispensing with the enquiry under section 5A and declaration was published within one month and as the urgency in the opinion of the Government was such that it did not brook the delay of 30 days and immediate possession was necessary, but possession was not taken due to dilatory tactics of the interested person and the court ultimately finds after two years that the exercise of urgency power was not warranted and so it was neither valid nor proper and directed the Government to give an opportunity to the interested person and the State to conduct an enquiry under section 5A, then the exercise of the power pursuant to the direction of the court will be fruitless as it would take time to conduct the enquiry. If the enquiry is dragged for obvious reasons, declaration under section 6(1) cannot be published within the limitation from the original date of the pu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rival pleas regarding re-writing of statute and casus omissus need careful consideration. It is well settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them" (see Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage (218 FR 547)). The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago de Gama of Vedem Vasco de Gama, AIR 1990 SC 981. In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Deputy Transport Commissioner, AIR 1977 SC 842, it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction (per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC [1964] 54 ITR 692; [1963] AC 557 where at page 577, he also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges"). The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principle is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K. Chinnathambi Gounder, AIR 1980 Mad 251 [FB], was rendered on June 22, 1979, i.e., much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that the Legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case. The view expressed in Narasimhaiah's case [1996] 3 SCC 88 and Nanjudaiah's case [1996 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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