9911796707
TMI Blog2002 (3) TMI 44X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... but also by a non-prescribed period. The same can never be the legislative intent. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principle is clearly unacceptable. If the Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that the Legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case. The appeals are accordingly disposed of and the subsequent notifications containing declaration under section 6 of the Act are quashed. - CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2226 OF 1997 - - - Dated:- 13-3-2002 - Judge(s) : S. P. BHARUCHA., R. C. LAHOTI., N. SANTOSH HEGDE., MRS. RUMA PAL., ARIJIT PASAYAT JUDGMENT The judgment of the court was delivered by ARIJIT PASAYAT J.--Noticing the cleavage in views expressed in several decisi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed time period is not to be provided. Explanation 1 (appended to the section) specifically deals with exclusion of periods in certain specified cases. If the view expressed in Narasimhaiah's case [1996] 3 SCC 88 is accepted, it would mean reading something into the statute which is not there, and in effect would mean legislation by the court whereas it is within the absolute domain of the Legislature. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu submitted that the logic indicated in Narasimhaiah's case [1996] 3 SCC 88, is in line with the statutory intent. Placing reliance on the decision in Director of Inspection of Income-tax (Investigation) v. Pooran Mal and Sons [1974] 96 ITR 390 (SC); [1975] 2 SCR 104, it was submitted that extension of the time limit is permissible. Apart from Pooran Mall and Sons' case [1974] 96 ITR 390 (SC), reliance was placed on two decisions rendered in relation to proceedings under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short "the I.T. Act"), to contend that there is scope for extension of time though there was fixed statutory time prescription. The decisions relied on are CIT v. National Taj Traders [1980] 121 ITR 535 (SC); [1980] 1 SCC 370 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... year from the date of the publication of the notification: Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Explanation 1.--In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded." As the factual scenario shows, in the case at hand the notification under section 4(1) of the Act was issued and the declaration was made prior to the substitution of the existing proviso to section 6(1) by Act 68 of 1984 with effect from September 24, 1984. In other words, the notification under section 4(1) was issued before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, but after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (replaced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967 (Act 13 of 1967)). But the substituted proviso was in operation o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 132(5) within ninety days, the aggrieved person has got the right to approach the notified authority under section 132(11) within thirty days and that authority can direct the Income-tax Officer to pass a fresh order. That is the distinctive feature vis-a-vis section 6 of the Act. The court applied the principle of waiver and, inter alia, held that the period of limitation prescribed therein was one intended for the benefit of the person whose property has been seized and it was open to that person to waive that benefit. It was further observed that if the specified period is held to be mandatory, it would cause more injury to the citizens than to the Revenue. A distinction was made with statutes providing periods of limitation for assessment. It was noticed that section 132 does not deal with taxation of income. Considered in that background, the ratio of the decision in Pooran Mall and Sons' case [1974] 96 ITR 390 (SC), has no application to the case at hand. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... de." It may be pointed out that the stipulation regarding the urgency in terms of section 5A of the Act has no role to play when the period of limitation under section 6 is reckoned. The purpose of providing the period of limitation seems to be avoidance of inconvenience to a person whose land is sought to be acquired. Compensation gets pegged from the date of notification under section 4(1). Section 11 provides that the valuation of the land has to be done on the date of publication of the notification under section 4(1). Section 23 deals with matters to be considered in determining the compensation. It provides that the market value of the land is to be fixed with reference to the date of publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act. The prescription of time limit in that background is, therefore, peremptory in nature. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [1994] 1 SCC 44, it was held by this court that though no period was prescribed, action within a reasonable time was warranted. The said case related to a dispute which arose before prescription of specific periods. After the quashing of declaration, the same became non est and was effaced. It is fairly conceded by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... interpretative process. The language of sec tion 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah's case [1996] 3 SCC 88. In Nanjudaiah's case [1996] 10 SCC 619, the period was further stretched to have the time period run from the date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. The same can never be the legislative intent. Two principles of construction--one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole--appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four comers of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other cla ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
