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TMI Blog2025 (1) TMI 783X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the Schedule of said Act, for the purposes of determining any period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application prescribed by such special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply, unless and to the extent they are expressly excluded by the language of such special or local law. In other words, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply [unlike under Section 29(2)(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908], unless expressly excluded by the language of the concerned special or local law. The question that remains is whether in the language used in Section 74 of the 2013 Act there is an express exclusion to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. On perusing the provisions of Section 74, it is clear that when the said section is read as a whole, the inescapable conclusion is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked for condoning the delay beyond the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 74(1) read with its proviso. If the legislature had in fact intended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to an a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Respondent No. 12. Ms. Snehal Bhoir, Sub Engineer, MCGM (DP) Department is present in Court. JUDGMENT PER B. P. COLABAWALLA, J. 1. Both the above appeals have been filed by the Appellant [ MCGM ] challenging the impugned orders/awards dated 13th February 2024 passed by the Presiding Officer of the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Authority, Nagpur [ the Reference Authority ] in two separate references preferred by some of the Respondents [the Original Claimants]. By the impugned orders/awards, the references filed by the Original Claimants [before the Reference Authority] under the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 [for short the 2013 Act ] were partly allowed and the compensation payable to them was enhanced. 2. Since both the above appeals were not filed within the time stipulated under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, the above Interim Applications are filed seeking condonation of delay in filing the above two appeals. 3. As mentioned earlier, the impugned orders were passed on 13th February 2024. The application for a certified copy was filed on the same date and was made available also ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r period not exceeding sixty days. In other words, once the further period of sixty days expires, the High Court has no power to condone the delay beyond the aforesaid period. In a nutshell, this is the opposition of the Respondents to the above Interim Applications. 7. Considering that this is the argument canvassed on behalf of the concerned Respondents, we have heard the parties on this preliminary issue. If we hold that we have the power to condone the delay, we will then examine if sufficient cause is made out to condone the same. On the other hand, if we come to the conclusion that beyond the total period of 120 days [initial period of sixty days and a further period of sixty days], we have no power to condone the delay, then the cause shown for condoning the delay by the Appellant would be wholly irrelevant. 8. To counter the objection raised by the concerned Respondents regarding the power of this Court to condone the delay beyond the period of 120 days, Mr. Godbole, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant, canvassed two basic submissions: (a) Since the 2013 Act is a general law, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply. This argument is canv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ions have clearly taken a view that the 1894 Act is a general law/enactment. The 2013 Act is basically a re-enactment of the 1894 Act and even the preamble of the 2013 Act makes it clear that it is a general law covering the entire subject of Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement and is applicable throughout India. Since the 1894 Act has been held to be a general law, the re-enacted 2013 Act would also be a general law/enactment and not a special law or a local law as contemplated under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. 11. To buttress this argument, Mr. Godbole submitted that in fact there is intrinsic evidence in the 2013 Act to show that the 2013 Act is a general law and not a special law or local law. In this regard, Mr. Godbole submitted that Section 105 of the 2013 Act read with the 4th Schedule thereof, clearly indicates what are the special enactments with reference to acquisition. Looking at all this material, Mr. Godbole therefore submitted that the 2013 Act being a general law, Section 29(2) would have no application, and the judgments relied upon by the Respondents either under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Electricity Act, 2003 or th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the nature of industrial disputes coming within its ambit. It creates an infrastructure for investigation into, solution of and adjudication upon industrial disputes. It also provides the necessary machinery for enforcement of awards and settlements. From alpha to omega the ID Act has one special mission the resolution of industrial disputes through specialised agencies according to specialised procedures and with special reference to the weaker categories of employees coming within the definition of workmen. Therefore, with reference to industrial disputes between employers and workmen, the ID Act is a special statute, and the LIC Act does not speak at all with specific reference to workmen. On the other hand, its powers relate to the general aspects of nationalisation, of management when private businesses are nationalised and a plurality of problems which, incidentally, involve transfer of service of existing employees of insurers. The workmen qua workmen and industrial disputes between workmen and the employer as such, are beyond the orbit of and have no specific or special place in the scheme of the LIC Act. And whenever there was a dispute between workmen and management the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that the Standing Orders Act should stand pro tanto repealed by Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. We are clearly of the view that the provisions of the Standing Orders Act must prevail over Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, in regard to matters to which the Standing Orders Act applies. I respectfully agree and apply the reasoning and the conclusion to the nearidentical situation before me and hold that the ID Act relates specially and specifically to industrial disputes between workmen and employers and the LIC Act, like the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, is a general statute which is silent on workmen's disputes, even though it may be a special legislation regulating the take over of private insurance business. ************ 57. What is special or general is wholly a creature of the subject and context and may vary with situation, circumstances and angle of vision. Law is no abstraction but realises itself in the living setting of actualities. Which is a special provision and which general, depends on the specific problem, the topic for decision, not the broad rubric nor any rule of thumb. The peaceful coexistence of both legislations is best achieved, i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al rules, yet, it may contain special provisions relating to limitation, in specified cases, different from the general law of limitation. Such a law would be a special law for the purpose of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the view that we take, we are supported by a decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Kaushalya Rani Vs. Gopal Singh [1963 SCC OnLine SC 41 : AIR 1964 SC 260]. In this decision, the only question for the determination of the Hon ble Supreme Court was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 applied to an application for special leave to appeal, from an order of acquittal, under sub-section (3) of Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. In this context, the Hon ble Supreme Court discussed as to what would be a special law as contemplated under Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Whilst on this subject, the Hon ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that though the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 is a general law regulating the procedure for trial of criminal cases generally, if it does lay down any bar of time in respect of special cases, in special circumstances, like those contempla ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing the procedure in criminal trials generally, but it may contain provisions specifying a bar of time for particular class of cases which are of a special character. For example, a Land Revenue Code may be a general law regulating the relationship between the revenue-payer and the revenue-receiver or the rent-payer and the rent-receiver. It is a general law in the sense that it lays down the general rule governing such relationship, but it may contain special provisions relating to bar of time, in specified cases different from the general law of limitation. Such a law will be a special law with reference to the law generally governing the subject-matter of that kind of relationship. A special law , therefore, means a law enacted for special cases, in special circumstances, in contradistinction to the general rules of the law laid down, as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals. In that sense, the Code is a general law regulating the procedure for the trial of criminal cases, generally; but if it lays down any bar of time in respect of special cases in special circumstances like those contemplated by Section 417(3) and (4), read together, it will be a s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sion. And for the purposes of determining any period of limitation prescribed by any special law, it has made the provisions of the Limitation Act, referred in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 29 applicable to such cases to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, and clause (b) of that sub-section expressly lays it down that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply to cases governed by any special or local law. In our opinion, therefore, the provisions of the Code supplemented by the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, make it clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to an application for special leave to appeal under Section 417(3) of the Code. (emphasis supplied). 14. We find that this decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court clearly answers the argument canvassed by Mr. Godbole. Though one may be able to say that the 2013 Act is a general law in relation to the subject of acquisition of land for public purposes, Section 74 which prescribes a different period of limitation for filing appeals from what is set out in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, would be a special law ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sequently, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would have no application at all, is misconceived and rejected. ASSUMING THAT THE 2013 ACT, AND MORE PARTICULARLY SECTION 74 THEREOF, IS A SPECIAL LAW, EVEN THEN SECTION 5 WOULD BE APPLICABLE AS THE SAME HAS NOT BEEN EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED BY THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 74 OF THE 2013 ACT. 17. The next argument canvassed by Mr. Godbole was that assuming that the 2013 Act, and more particularly Section 74 thereof, is a special law, even then, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable as the same has not been expressly excluded by the language of Section 74. In this regard, Mr. Godbole submitted that there is a marked difference in Section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and that of the Limitation Act, 1963. Mr. Godbole submitted that under the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, where any special or local law prescribed for any period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the First Schedule of the said Act, then, only the provisions contained in Sections 4, 9 to 18, and 22 applied, in so far as, and to the extent to which they were not expressly excluded by such special or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to Mr. Godbole, if the proviso to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act is interpreted in a restricted or narrow manner, it would be contrary to the beneficial intendment of the legislation and therefore such an interpretation ought to be avoided. 19. Mr. Godbole also relied upon Judgments of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of (i) Superintendent Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board (PW) Slapper and another Vs. Excise and Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar/Assessing Authority [(2020) 17 SCC 692]; (ii) Mangu Ram Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [1976 (1) SCC 392]; and (iii) Mohd. Abaad Ali and Another Vs. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence [(2024) 7 SCC 91]; to submit that when one reads Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act along with its proviso, there is no express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and therefore, we would certainly have the power to condone the delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 20. We have heard Mr. Godbole as well as Mr. Daver on this issue. Before we proceed to examine this issue, it would be apposite to set out the provisions of Section 74 of the 2013 Act as well as Sections 5 and 29 of the Limi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation. The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. 22. Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: 29. Savings. (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872). (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ibed by such special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply, unless and to the extent they are expressly excluded by the language of such special or local law. In other words, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply [unlike under Section 29(2)(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908], unless expressly excluded by the language of the concerned special or local law. 25. The question that remains is whether in the language used in Section 74 of the 2013 Act there is an express exclusion to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. We, after perusing the provisions of Section 74, are clearly of the view that when the said section is read as a whole, the inescapable conclusion is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked for condoning the delay beyond the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 74(1) read with its proviso. If the legislature had in fact intended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to an appeal to be filed under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, the legislature would not have inserted the proviso to Section 74(1) which [after the initial period of sixty days to file an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to ensure that if the appellate remedy is to be availed of, it should be done in a time bound manner, after which, the aggrieved party loses its right of appeal. This is also another factor which leads to the inescapable conclusion that Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act read with its proviso, expressly excludes the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 27. We are unable to agree with Mr. Godbole that an express exclusion only means that Section 74 ought to expressly mention the exclusion of Section 5. An express exclusion would mean that the language of the statute clearly indicates that Section 5 has been excluded. The words used in the proviso to Section 74(1) within a further period not exceeding sixty days clearly therefore excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. If we were to hold otherwise, as mentioned earlier, would render the said words otiose and would be against all principles of interpretation. 28. In the view that we take, we are supported by several decisions of the Hon ble Supreme Court. The first decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court is in the case of Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company [(2001) 1 SCC 470]. In this ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the 1996 Act. Section 29(2) provides that: 29. (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. 6. On an analysis of the section, it is clear that the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 will apply when: (i) there is a special or local law which prescribes a different period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application; and (ii) the special or local law does not expressly exclude those sections. 7. There is no dispute that the 1996 Act is a special law and that Section 34 provides for a period of limitation different from that prescribed under the Limitation Act. The question then is is such exclusion expressed in Section 34 of the 1996 Act? The relevant extract of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ere is no express exclusion in sub-section (3) of Section 116-A of the Act; secondly, the proviso from which an implied exclusion is sought to be drawn does not lead to any such necessary implication. 10. This decision recognises that it is not essential for the special or local law to, in terms, exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is sufficient if on a consideration of the language of its provisions relating to limitation, the intention to exclude can be necessarily implied. As has been said in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [(1974) 2 SCC 133] : (SCC p. 146, para 17) If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. 11. Thus, where the legislature prescribed a special limitation for the purpose of the appeal and the period of limitation of 60 days was to be computed after taking the aid of Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, the specific inclusion of these sections meant that to that extent only the provisions of the Limitation Act stood extended and the applicability of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he proviso to Section 125 would be rendered nugatory. The relevant portion of this decision reads thus: 25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression within a further period of not exceeding 60 days in the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days. 26. The object underlying establishment of a special adjudicatory forum i.e. the Tribunal to deal with the grievance of any pers ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. (emphasis supplied) 30. In Singh Enterprises v. CCE [(2008) 3 SCC 70] the Court interpreted Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which is pari materia to Section 125 of the Electricity Act and observed: (SCC p. 72, para 8) 8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the Limitation Act ) can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. *** 35. It was contended before us that the words expressly excluded would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f 71 days in view of the language of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and that the condonation of delay was done without notice to the 1st Respondent and deserves to be recalled. As a sequitur, the appeal be dismissed without adverting to the same on merits, was the contention. It is in these facts that the Supreme Court examined the provisions of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and found immense force in the preliminary objection raised by the 1st Respondent, accepted the same, and dismissed the appeal. Since the said decision affirms the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (supra), we are not burdening this Judgment by reproducing the relevant paragraphs. Suffice it to state that the decision rendered by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (supra) has been affirmed by a three-judge Bench of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd (supra). 31. The third decision which supports the view that we have taken is in the case of Bengal Chemist and Druggists Association Vs. Kalyan Choudhary [(2018) 3 SCC 41]. In this decision, the Hon ble Su ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ant because the provisions of the Limitation Act only apply as far as may be . In a case like the present, where there is a special provision contained in Section 421(3) proviso, Section 5 of the Limitation Act obviously cannot apply. 5. Another very important aspect of the case is that 45 days is the period of limitation, and a further period not exceeding 45 days is provided only if sufficient cause is made out for filing the appeal within the extended period. According to us, this is a peremptory provision, which will otherwise be rendered completely ineffective, if we were to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. If we were to accept such argument, it would mean that notwithstanding that the further period of 45 days had elapsed, the Appellate Tribunal may, if the facts so warrant, condone the delay. This would be to render otiose the second time-limit of 45 days, which, as has been pointed out by us above, is peremptory in nature. 6. We are fortified in this conclusion by the judgment of this Court in Chhattisgarh SEB v. CERC [Chhattisgarh SEB v. CERC, (2010) 5 SCC 23] . The language of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, which is similar to the l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o be impliedly excluded. 11. This case again is wholly distinguishable. It applies only to a period of limitation which is given beyond which nothing further is stated as to whether delay may be condoned beyond such period. In the present case, Section 421(3) does not merely contain the initial period of 45 days, in which case the aforesaid judgment would have applied. Section 421(3) goes on to state that another period of 45 days, being a grace period given by the legislature which cannot be exceeded, alone would apply, provided sufficient cause is made out within the aforesaid grace period. As has been held by us above, it is the second period, which is a special inbuilt kind of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the special statute, which lays down that beyond the second period of 45 days, there can be no further condonation of delay. On this ground therefore, the aforesaid judgment also stands distinguished. 12. One further thing remains and that is that the learned counsel for the appellant pointed out the difference between the expression used in the Arbitration Act as construed by Popular Construction [Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470] and its abs ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Section 74(1) read with its proviso, the Court has the power to condone the delay by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In fact, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 has not even been referred to in the aforesaid decision because the facts did not warrant the same, considering the exemption given by the Hon ble Supreme Court on the issue of limitation due to the corona pandemic. 34. The next decision relied upon by Mr. Godbole is a decision of the Tripura High Court at Agartala in the case Shikha Rani Das Sarkar Vs. The State of Tripura and others [decided on 15th July 2024]. This decision is really not a judgment which lays down any ratio. It is a one-page order which only notes that there is a delay of 310 days in preferring the appeal and on perusal of the application for condonation of delay, it is found that the explanations for the delay are satisfactory and convincing. Hence, the delay for filing the appeal was condoned. This order does not refer to Section 74 of the 2013 Act or the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. In fact, from this order, it is not even discernible whether this matter was under 1894 Act or the 2013 Act. Hence, ev ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the VAT Act, 2005, the Hon ble Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court by inter-alia holding that the language of Section 48 did not in any way exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. When one reads the provisions of Section 48, it is clear that that the Revision has to be filed before the High Court within 90 days of the communication of the order sought to revised, without stating anything further. This is clear from Section 48(1) of the VAT Act, 2005 which is reproduced by the Hon ble Supreme Court in paragraph 3 of its decision. If Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act did not have the proviso appended to it, which clearly stipulates that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented from sufficient cause from filing an appeal within the initial period of sixty days, allow it to be filed within further period not exceeding sixty days, the ratio of this Judgment would have certainly applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case. However, the distinguishing factor is the proviso appearing below Section 74(1), and which is conspicuously absent in Section 48 of the VAT Act, 2005. We, therefore ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5. It was in these circumstances that the Hon ble Supreme Court held that even beyond the period of sixty days, the High Court had the power to condone the delay by invoking the provisions of Section 5. We fail to see how this decision can be of any assistance to Mr Godbole. Section 417 only provides the initial period of limitation, and which is a period of sixty days from filing an application for special leave to appeal from an order to acquittal. It does not stipulate a further period thereafter within which the application for special leave to appeal may be filed with a condonation. It is looking at the language of Section 417 that the Hon ble Supreme Court came to a finding that the High Court had the power to condone the delay by invoking Section 5 of the limitation Act, 1963. We must note that this decision has not only been noticed by the Hon ble Supreme Court thereafter in Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company (supra) but also in the case of Bengal Chemists and Druggists Association (supra). In fact, in the case of Bengal Chemists and Druggists Association (supra), the Hon ble Sup ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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