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TMI Blog2025 (1) TMI 783X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 024 passed by the Presiding Officer of the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Authority, Nagpur ["the Reference Authority"] in two separate references preferred by some of the Respondents [the Original Claimants]. By the impugned orders/awards, the references filed by the Original Claimants [before the Reference Authority] under the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 [for short the "2013 Act"] were partly allowed and the compensation payable to them was enhanced. 2. Since both the above appeals were not filed within the time stipulated under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, the above Interim Applications are filed seeking condonation of delay in filing the above two appeals. 3. As mentioned earlier, the impugned orders were passed on 13th February 2024. The application for a certified copy was filed on the same date and was made available also on the same day. Hence limitation to file the above appeals commenced from 14th February 2024. The provision for filing an appeal to the High Court from the order/award passed by the Reference Authority is provided under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the Respondents to the above Interim Applications. 7. Considering that this is the argument canvassed on behalf of the concerned Respondents, we have heard the parties on this preliminary issue. If we hold that we have the power to condone the delay, we will then examine if sufficient cause is made out to condone the same. On the other hand, if we come to the conclusion that beyond the total period of 120 days [initial period of sixty days and a further period of sixty days], we have no power to condone the delay, then the cause shown for condoning the delay by the Appellant would be wholly irrelevant. 8. To counter the objection raised by the concerned Respondents regarding the power of this Court to condone the delay beyond the period of 120 days, Mr. Godbole, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant, canvassed two basic submissions: (a) Since the 2013 Act is a general law, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply. This argument is canvassed on the basis that Section 29(2) provides that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963, then the provisions of Secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... neral law covering the entire subject of Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement and is applicable throughout India. Since the 1894 Act has been held to be a general law, the re-enacted 2013 Act would also be a general law/enactment and not a special law or a local law as contemplated under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. 11. To buttress this argument, Mr. Godbole submitted that in fact there is intrinsic evidence in the 2013 Act to show that the 2013 Act is a general law and not a special law or local law. In this regard, Mr. Godbole submitted that Section 105 of the 2013 Act read with the 4th Schedule thereof, clearly indicates what are the special enactments with reference to acquisition. Looking at all this material, Mr. Godbole therefore submitted that the 2013 Act being a general law, Section 29(2) would have no application, and the judgments relied upon by the Respondents either under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Electricity Act, 2003 or the Companies Act, 2013, would be wholly inapplicable in the present case. In other words, since the 2013 Act is a general law, and there is no provision in the said Act for the exclusion of the applicab ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cessary machinery for enforcement of awards and settlements. From alpha to omega the ID Act has one special mission - the resolution of industrial disputes through specialised agencies according to specialised procedures and with special reference to the weaker categories of employees coming within the definition of workmen. Therefore, with reference to industrial disputes between employers and workmen, the ID Act is a special statute, and the LIC Act does not speak at all with specific reference to workmen. On the other hand, its powers relate to the general aspects of nationalisation, of management when private businesses are nationalised and a plurality of problems which, incidentally, involve transfer of service of existing employees of insurers. The workmen qua workmen and industrial disputes between workmen and the employer as such, are beyond the orbit of and have no specific or special place in the scheme of the LIC Act. And whenever there was a dispute between workmen and management the ID Act mechanism was resorted to. 53. What are we confronted with in the present case, so that I may determine as between the two enactments which is the special? The only subject which ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng Orders Act must prevail over Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, in regard to matters to which the Standing Orders Act applies." I respectfully agree and apply the reasoning and the conclusion to the nearidentical situation before me and hold that the ID Act relates specially and specifically to industrial disputes between workmen and employers and the LIC Act, like the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, is a general statute which is silent on workmen's disputes, even though it may be a special legislation regulating the take over of private insurance business. ************ 57. What is special or general is wholly a creature of the subject and context and may vary with situation, circumstances and angle of vision. Law is no abstraction but realises itself in the living setting of actualities. Which is a special provision and which general, depends on the specific problem, the topic for decision, not the broad rubric nor any rule of thumb. The peaceful coexistence of both legislations is best achieved, if that be feasible, by allowing to each its allotted field for play. Sense and sensibility, not mechanical rigidity gives the flexible solution. It is difficult ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... law would be a special law for the purpose of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the view that we take, we are supported by a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kaushalya Rani Vs. Gopal Singh [1963 SCC OnLine SC 41 : AIR 1964 SC 260]. In this decision, the only question for the determination of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 applied to an application for special leave to appeal, from an order of acquittal, under sub-section (3) of Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. In this context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed as to what would be a "special law" as contemplated under Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Whilst on this subject, the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that though the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 is a general law regulating the procedure for trial of criminal cases generally, if it does lay down any bar of time in respect of special cases, in special circumstances, like those contemplated by Section 417(3) and 417(4) read together, the same would be a special law contained within the general law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court opi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich are of a special character. For example, a Land Revenue Code may be a general law regulating the relationship between the revenue-payer and the revenue-receiver or the rent-payer and the rent-receiver. It is a general law in the sense that it lays down the general rule governing such relationship, but it may contain special provisions relating to bar of time, in specified cases different from the general law of limitation. Such a law will be a "special law" with reference to the law generally governing the subject-matter of that kind of relationship. A "special law", therefore, means a law enacted for special cases, in special circumstances, in contradistinction to the general rules of the law laid down, as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals. In that sense, the Code is a general law regulating the procedure for the trial of criminal cases, generally; but if it lays down any bar of time in respect of special cases in special circumstances like those contemplated by Section 417(3) and (4), read together, it will be a special law contained within the general law. As the Limitation Act has not defined "special law", it is neither necessary nor exped ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the Limitation Act, referred in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 29 applicable to such cases to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, and clause (b) of that sub-section expressly lays it down that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply to cases governed by any special or local law. In our opinion, therefore, the provisions of the Code supplemented by the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, make it clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to an application for special leave to appeal under Section 417(3) of the Code." (emphasis supplied). 14. We find that this decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly answers the argument canvassed by Mr. Godbole. Though one may be able to say that the 2013 Act is a general law in relation to the subject of acquisition of land for public purposes, Section 74 which prescribes a different period of limitation for filing appeals from what is set out in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, would be a special law in relation to the subject of limitation. In other words, though the 2013 Act may be classified as a general law regulat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted. ASSUMING THAT THE 2013 ACT, AND MORE PARTICULARLY SECTION 74 THEREOF, IS A SPECIAL LAW, EVEN THEN SECTION 5 WOULD BE APPLICABLE AS THE SAME HAS NOT BEEN EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED BY THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 74 OF THE 2013 ACT. 17. The next argument canvassed by Mr. Godbole was that assuming that the 2013 Act, and more particularly Section 74 thereof, is a special law, even then, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable as the same has not been expressly excluded by the language of Section 74. In this regard, Mr. Godbole submitted that there is a marked difference in Section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and that of the Limitation Act, 1963. Mr. Godbole submitted that under the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, where any special or local law prescribed for any period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the First Schedule of the said Act, then, only the provisions contained in Sections 4, 9 to 18, and 22 applied, in so far as, and to the extent to which they were not expressly excluded by such special or local law. In other words, he submitted that under Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the appl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... w manner, it would be contrary to the beneficial intendment of the legislation and therefore such an interpretation ought to be avoided. 19. Mr. Godbole also relied upon Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (i) Superintendent Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board (PW) Slapper and another Vs. Excise and Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar/Assessing Authority [(2020) 17 SCC 692]; (ii) Mangu Ram Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [1976 (1) SCC 392]; and (iii) Mohd. Abaad Ali and Another Vs. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence [(2024) 7 SCC 91]; to submit that when one reads Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act along with its proviso, there is no express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and therefore, we would certainly have the power to condone the delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 20. We have heard Mr. Godbole as well as Mr. Daver on this issue. Before we proceed to examine this issue, it would be apposite to set out the provisions of Section 74 of the 2013 Act as well as Sections 5 and 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 74 of the 2013 Act reads as under: "74. Appeal to High Court.-(1) The Req ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ocedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.-The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." 22. Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: "29. Savings.-(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872). (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply, unless and to the extent they are expressly excluded by the language of such special or local law. In other words, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply [unlike under Section 29(2)(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908], unless expressly excluded by the language of the concerned special or local law. 25. The question that remains is whether in the language used in Section 74 of the 2013 Act there is an express exclusion to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. We, after perusing the provisions of Section 74, are clearly of the view that when the said section is read as a whole, the inescapable conclusion is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked for condoning the delay beyond the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 74(1) read with its proviso. If the legislature had in fact intended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to an appeal to be filed under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, the legislature would not have inserted the proviso to Section 74(1) which [after the initial period of sixty days to file an appeal under Section 74(1)], gives power to the Hig ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... availed of, it should be done in a time bound manner, after which, the aggrieved party loses its right of appeal. This is also another factor which leads to the inescapable conclusion that Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act read with its proviso, expressly excludes the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 27. We are unable to agree with Mr. Godbole that an express exclusion only means that Section 74 ought to expressly mention the exclusion of Section 5. An express exclusion would mean that the language of the statute clearly indicates that Section 5 has been excluded. The words used in the proviso to Section 74(1) "within a further period not exceeding sixty days" clearly therefore excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. If we were to hold otherwise, as mentioned earlier, would render the said words otiose and would be against all principles of interpretation. 28. In the view that we take, we are supported by several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The first decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is in the case of Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company [(2001) 1 SCC 470]. In this decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was cons ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ovides that: "29. (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." 6. On an analysis of the section, it is clear that the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 will apply when: (i) there is a special or local law which prescribes a different period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application; and (ii) the special or local law does not expressly exclude those sections. 7. There is no dispute that the 1996 Act is a "special law" and that Section 34 provides for a period of limitation different from that prescribed under the Limitation Act. The question then is - is such exclusion expressed in Section 34 of the 1996 Act? The relevant extract of Section 34 r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... express exclusion but there is no express exclusion in sub-section (3) of Section 116-A of the Act; secondly, the proviso from which an implied exclusion is sought to be drawn does not lead to any such necessary implication." 10. This decision recognises that it is not essential for the special or local law to, in terms, exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is sufficient if on a consideration of the language of its provisions relating to limitation, the intention to exclude can be necessarily implied. As has been said in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [(1974) 2 SCC 133] : (SCC p. 146, para 17) "If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act." 11. Thus, where the legislature prescribed a special limitation for the purpose of the appeal and the period of limitation of 60 days was to be computed after taking the aid of Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, the specific inclusion of these sections meant that to that extent only the provisions of the Limitation Act sto ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cision or order of the Appellate Tribunal and the proviso to Section 125 would be rendered nugatory. The relevant portion of this decision reads thus: "25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression "within a further period of not exceeding 60 days" in the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days. 26. The object underlying establishment of a special adjudicatory forum i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation." (emphasis supplied) 30. In Singh Enterprises v. CCE [(2008) 3 SCC 70] the Court interpreted Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which is pari materia to Section 125 of the Electricity Act and observed: (SCC p. 72, para 8) "8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short 'the Limitation Act') can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... riod for filing an appeal and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act. *** 32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. *** 35. It was contended before us that the words 'expressly excluded' would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... up for hearing, an objection was raised by the 1st Respondent that the Supreme Court could not have condoned the delay of 71 days in view of the language of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and that the condonation of delay was done without notice to the 1st Respondent and deserves to be recalled. As a sequitur, the appeal be dismissed without adverting to the same on merits, was the contention. It is in these facts that the Supreme Court examined the provisions of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and found immense force in the preliminary objection raised by the 1st Respondent, accepted the same, and dismissed the appeal. Since the said decision affirms the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (supra), we are not burdening this Judgment by reproducing the relevant paragraphs. Suffice it to state that the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (supra) has been affirmed by a three-judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd (supra). 31. The third decision which supports the view that we have taken is in the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within that period. Section 433 obviously cannot come to the aid of the appellant because the provisions of the Limitation Act only apply "as far as may be". In a case like the present, where there is a special provision contained in Section 421(3) proviso, Section 5 of the Limitation Act obviously cannot apply. 5. Another very important aspect of the case is that 45 days is the period of limitation, and a further period not exceeding 45 days is provided only if sufficient cause is made out for filing the appeal within the extended period. According to us, this is a peremptory provision, which will otherwise be rendered completely ineffective, if we were to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. If we were to accept such argument, it would mean that notwithstanding that the further period of 45 days had elapsed, the Appellate Tribunal may, if the facts so warrant, condone the delay. This would be to render otiose the second time-limit of 45 days, which, as has been pointed out by us above, is peremptory in nature. 6. We are fortified in this conclusion by the judgment of this Court in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d in Section 417(4) CrPC. This Court held that all periods of limitation are cast in such mandatory and peremptory language and, therefore, Section 5 could not be said to be impliedly excluded. 11. This case again is wholly distinguishable. It applies only to a period of limitation which is given beyond which nothing further is stated as to whether delay may be condoned beyond such period. In the present case, Section 421(3) does not merely contain the initial period of 45 days, in which case the aforesaid judgment would have applied. Section 421(3) goes on to state that another period of 45 days, being a grace period given by the legislature which cannot be exceeded, alone would apply, provided sufficient cause is made out within the aforesaid grace period. As has been held by us above, it is the second period, which is a special inbuilt kind of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the special statute, which lays down that beyond the second period of 45 days, there can be no further condonation of delay. On this ground therefore, the aforesaid judgment also stands distinguished. 12. One further thing remains - and that is that the learned counsel for the appellant pointed out ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ndoned on the basis of the factual situation before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. This Judgment does not lay down any proposition that even beyond maximum period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 74(1) read with its proviso, the Court has the power to condone the delay by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In fact, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 has not even been referred to in the aforesaid decision because the facts did not warrant the same, considering the exemption given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issue of limitation due to the corona pandemic. 34. The next decision relied upon by Mr. Godbole is a decision of the Tripura High Court at Agartala in the case Shikha Rani Das Sarkar Vs. The State of Tripura and others [decided on 15th July 2024]. This decision is really not a judgment which lays down any ratio. It is a one-page order which only notes that there is a delay of 310 days in preferring the appeal and on perusal of the application for condonation of delay, it is found that the explanations for the delay are satisfactory and convincing. Hence, the delay for filing the appeal was condoned. This order does not refer to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n, the Revision had to be filed before the High Court within 90 days and beyond the said period the High Court had no power to condone the delay. Whilst construing the provisions of Section 48 of the VAT Act, 2005, the Hon'ble Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court by inter-alia holding that the language of Section 48 did not in any way exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. When one reads the provisions of Section 48, it is clear that that the Revision has to be filed before the High Court within 90 days of the communication of the order sought to revised, without stating anything further. This is clear from Section 48(1) of the VAT Act, 2005 which is reproduced by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 3 of its decision. If Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act did not have the proviso appended to it, which clearly stipulates that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented from sufficient cause from filing an appeal within the initial period of sixty days, allow it to be filed within further period not exceeding sixty days, the ratio of this Judgment would have certainly applied to the facts and cir ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oke the aid of Section 5 in order that the application may be entertained despite such bar. The Hon'ble Supreme Court opined that a mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory and imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5. It was in these circumstances that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even beyond the period of sixty days, the High Court had the power to condone the delay by invoking the provisions of Section 5. We fail to see how this decision can be of any assistance to Mr Godbole. Section 417 only provides the initial period of limitation, and which is a period of sixty days from filing an application for special leave to appeal from an order to acquittal. It does not stipulate a further period thereafter within which the application for special leave to appeal may be filed with a condonation. It is looking at the language of Section 417 that the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to a finding that the High Court had the power to condone the delay by invoking Section 5 of the limitation Act, 1963. We must note that this decision has not only been noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court thereafter in Union of India vs. Popul ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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