2025 (1) TMI 783 - HC - Indian Laws

Power of Bombay High Court to condone the delay in filing appeals beyond the period stipulated under Section 74(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 - interpretation of Section 74 of the 2013 Act - express exclusion to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - HELD THAT - As per the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 if there was any delay in filing an appeal under a special or local law, one could not take the aid of Section 5 to condone the delay. Under the Limitation Act, 1963, there is a complete departure from this position. Under the Limitation Act, 1963, where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the Schedule of said Act, for the purposes of determining any period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application prescribed by such special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply, unless and to the extent they are expressly excluded by the language of such special or local law. In other words, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply unlike under Section 29(2)(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 , unless expressly excluded by the language of the concerned special or local law. The question that remains is whether in the language used in Section 74 of the 2013 Act there is an express exclusion to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. On perusing the provisions of Section 74, it is clear that when the said section is read as a whole, the inescapable conclusion is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked for condoning the delay beyond the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 74(1) read with its proviso. If the legislature had in fact intended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to an appeal to be filed under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, the legislature would not have inserted the proviso to Section 74(1) which after the initial period of sixty days to file an appeal under Section 74(1) , gives power to the High Court to condone the delay for a further period not exceeding sixty days. The proviso to Section 74(1) specifically stipulates that the High Court shall have the power to condone the delay, after the initial period of sixty days, for a further period not exceeding sixty days. This would most definitely amount to an express exclusion to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to an appeal to be filed under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act. To hold that the High Court can entertain an appeal even beyond the extended period as stipulated in the proviso to Section 74(1) would render the words not exceeding sixty days wholly otiose. On reading the proviso to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, and which is not only almost identical to the provisions of 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, but also similar to the provisions of Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, the inescapable conclusion is that the proviso to Section 74 (1) expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Once this is the case, there are no power to condone the delay beyond the maximum period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 74(1) read with its proviso, by resorting to the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Conclusion - There are no hesitation in holding that beyond the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 74(1) read with its proviso of the 2013 Act, this Court has no power to condone the delay. Since, admittedly in the facts of the present case, both the applications seeking condonation of delay filed by the Appellant are beyond the total period of 120 days. Both the applications seeking a condonation of delay are hereby dismissed.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:

Whether the Bombay High Court has the power to condone the delay in filing appeals beyond the period stipulated under Section 74(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ("2013 Act").
Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked to condone delays beyond the maximum period allowed under the 2013 Act.
Whether the 2013 Act is a general law or a special law in the context of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Power to Condon Delay Beyond 120 Days

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act stipulates a 60-day period to file an appeal, with a proviso allowing a further 60 days for condonation of delay. The Limitation Act, 1963, particularly Section 5, allows for condonation of delay unless expressly excluded by special law.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court interpreted that the language of Section 74(1) and its proviso expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, beyond the total period of 120 days.
Key Evidence and Findings: The Court relied on the language of the proviso, which limits the High Court's power to condone delay to a further period not exceeding 60 days beyond the initial 60-day period.
Application of Law to Facts: The appeals were filed beyond the total period of 120 days, and thus, the Court found itself without jurisdiction to condone the delay.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Court rejected the appellant's argument that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies, citing precedents that support the exclusion of Section 5 where special laws specify a distinct limitation period.
Conclusions: The Court concluded that it lacks the power to condone delays beyond the period specified in Section 74(1) and its proviso.

Issue 2: Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and its interpretation regarding the applicability of Sections 4 to 24, including Section 5, to special or local laws.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court held that the specific language of Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, especially the words "not exceeding sixty days," constitutes an express exclusion of Section 5.
Key Evidence and Findings: The Court referenced similar statutory provisions and case law, such as the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the Electricity Act, 2003, where similar language was interpreted as excluding Section 5.
Application of Law to Facts: The Court determined that the legislative intent was to create a self-contained limitation period within the 2013 Act, excluding the application of Section 5.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Court dismissed the appellant's argument that the absence of an explicit mention of Section 5's exclusion in Section 74 implies its applicability.
Conclusions: The Court concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to appeals under Section 74 of the 2013 Act.

Issue 3: Classification of the 2013 Act as General or Special Law

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The distinction between general and special laws under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and relevant case law.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that while the 2013 Act may be a general law in the context of land acquisition, Section 74 constitutes a special law regarding limitation.
Key Evidence and Findings: The Court cited Supreme Court precedents that distinguish between general and special laws based on the context and subject matter.
Application of Law to Facts: The Court applied the principle that a special limitation period in a general law can render it a special law for that purpose.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Court rejected the appellant's reliance on precedents that deemed the 1894 Act a general law, noting the specific context of limitation under the 2013 Act.
Conclusions: The Court concluded that Section 74 of the 2013 Act is a special law regarding limitation, thus invoking Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning: "The words used in the proviso to Section 74(1) 'within a further period not exceeding sixty days' clearly therefore excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963."
Core Principles Established: The Court established that the specific language of a statute can expressly exclude the applicability of general provisions of the Limitation Act, such as Section 5.
Final Determinations on Each Issue: The Court determined that it lacks the jurisdiction to condone delays beyond the period specified in Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply to such appeals.

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