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TMI Blog2023 (4) TMI 1394X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ppellant has got a very good case. It is also stated that the delay is not deliberate nor intentional. Beyond this, there is no explanation whatsoever to explain why the delay should be condoned. This does not satisfy the requirement of sufficient cause being made. Moreover, it is an appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act and as held by the Apex Court in Executive Engineer V/s. M/s. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. [ 2021 (3) TMI 1458 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] , the object of speedy disposal will be defeated if this Court condones the delay routinely without being satisfied that a sufficient cause is shown. Conclusion - A sufficient cause must be shown to justify condoning delays in filing appeals, particularly in the context of arbitration and commercial disputes, where the objective is to ensure speedy resolution. The interim applications for condonation of delay dismissed, as the applicant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Both interim applications stand dismissed. X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the Court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches. Paragraphs 56 to 63 of the said judgment read as under: 56. The expression "sufficient cause" contained in section 5 of the Limitation Act is elastic enough to yield different results depending upon the object and context of a statute. Thus, in Ajmer Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC 381, this Court, in the context of section 11(5) of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972, held as follows: 10. Permitting an application under Section 11(5) to be moved at any time would have disastrous consequences. The State Government in which the land vests on being declared as surplus, will not be able to utilise the same. The State Government cannot be made to wait indefinitely before putting the land to use. Where the land is utilised by the State Government, a consequence of the order passed subsequently could be of divesting it of the land. Taking the facts of the present c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2, show that the maximum period of limitation in case of appeal or review is ninety days. The appeal against the final order of the Collector dated 30-9- 1976 whereby 3.12 hectares of land had been declared as surplus was dismissed on 27-3-1979. The order was allowed to become final as it was not challenged any further. Thus the determination by the Collector became final on 27-3-1979. The same could not be reopened after a lapse of more than 6 years by order dated 23-7-1985. The subsequent proceedings before the Revenue Authorities did not lie. The order dated 23-7-1985 is non est. All the subsequent proceedings therefore fall through. The issue could not have been reopened. 57. Nearer home, in Brahampal v. National Insurance Company, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1053, this Court specifically referred to the difference between a delay in filing commercial claims under the Arbitration Act or the Commercial Courts Act and claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as follows: "14. This Court has firstly held that purpose of conferment of such power must be examined for the determination of the scope of such discretion conferred upon the court. [refer to Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwandin v. Dave ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tive of speedy resolution of disputes. The finality of award would also be in a limbo as a party can challenge an award even after the 120 day period." Coming back to the Motor Vehicles Act, the legislative intent is to provide appropriate compensation for the victims and to protect their substantive rights, in pursuit of the same, the interpretation should not be as strict as commercial claims as elucidated above. 22. Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts with discretionary powers to condone the delay, however at the same time it also places an obligation upon the party to justify that he was prevented from abiding by the same due to the existence of "sufficient cause". Although there exists no strait jacket formula for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must not only take into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of case but also the conduct of the parties. The concept of reasonableness dictates that, the Courts even while taking a liberal approach must weigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties. When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrain ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ctory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, Parimal v. Veena and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai. 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause". 11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature. 59. Likewise, merely because the government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... raphs 3-4. 61. In a recent judgment, namely, State of M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade, this Court referred to Postmaster General (supra), and held as follows : "1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing again and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal in terms of our order dated 15-10-2020. 2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 and the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the Legal Department! 3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made under s. 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of ss. 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of s. 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under s. 5 without reference to s. 14. 63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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