TMI Blog2025 (2) TMI 1045X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this position in an earlier round when the ITAT had similarly exceeded its jurisdiction. The issue of whether the income receivable by the petitioner from PGHH was income from house property or income from other sources was writ large before this Court in the Revenue's pending appeal. ITAT, exercising powers u/s 254[2] of the IT Act, could not have reviewed its earlier finding on this issue. ITAT's impugned order deserves to be set aside accordingly. However, we clarify that this judgment and order would in no way interfere with this Court deciding on whether the income receivable from PGHH should be classified as "income from house property" or "income from other sources" in revenue's appeal under Section 260-A of the Act. ITAT exceed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g agreement for personnel, administration, and other common costs. It was also agreed that Rs.90 per sq.ft. would be paid as usage charges for the use of the building premises. e) The petitioner's case was that this agreement was fully implemented except for the clause relating to the usage charges, which was never acted upon by and between the parties. Instead, the common costs were shared, and the excess costs incurred were reimbursed; f) An assessment order was made on 31 December 2009 under Section 143 (3) of the Act in which the notional rent at Rs.90 per sq.ft. was taxed as "income from house property". The petitioner appealed, but this appeal was dismissed by CIT (Appeals) on 20 February 2014. g) The petitioner challenged th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e order dated 20 February 2014 afresh or de novo.; l) The petitioner instituted Writ Petition No.2738 of 2017 before this Court challenging the ITAT order dated 28 July 2017 to the extent it had allowed the revenue's MA No. 209/Mum/2017; m) The Writ Petition No.2738 of 2017 was allowed by this Court by order dated 9 March 2018. The ITAT's order dated 28 July 2017, to the extent it had allowed the revenue's MA No.209/Mum/2017, was set aside. The matter was remanded to ITAT to decide the issues raised by the petitioner in main appeal and not adjudicated by the Tribunal, i.e. whether the real income theory would apply and adjudication of grounds 4 and 5. In effect, therefore, the issues which survived before the ITAT were whe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... titioner's Writ Petition No. 2738 of 2017. He submitted that the only issue that had survived before the ITAT was whether the real income theory would apply, given the ITAT's finding that the income receivable to be taxed as "income from other sources". He submitted that the ITAT exceeded its jurisdiction by once again reviewing its earlier order dated 6 June 2016, even though this Court had clarified that the MA under Section 254(2) of the Act is not akin to a substantive review. Mr. Pardiwalla submitted that on this short ground, the impugned order dated 2 September 2022 deserves to be set aside. 6. Mr. Mishra learned counsel for the respondent defended the impugned order by submitting that the MA filed by the revenue had questio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... w. 11. In effect, the impugned order indicates that the ITAT has reviewed its judgment and order dated 6 June 2016, despite an appeal against that judgment and order already being admitted by this Court at the revenue's request. While disposing of an application under Section 254 (2) of the Act, the ITAT lacked the jurisdiction to review its order. The application under Section 254 (2) of the Act must be resolved in accordance with the discipline outlined in that provision. This was more so because on an earlier occasion, in this very matter, the ITAT had exceeded its jurisdiction, and its order dated 28 July 2017 had to be judicially reviewed by this Court in Writ Petition No 2738 of 2017. 12. In any event, after this Court disposed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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