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TMI Blog1993 (4) TMI 73X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urpose. Individual preference or choice or taste of a particular soap for bath is not relevant. The soap toilet would, therefore fall within the meaning of the word household in sub-item (1) of Item 15 of the Schedule. The classification shall accordingly be adopted. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The cases are remitted to the primary authority to deal with the matters accordingly. - 2702 of 1984 - - - Dated:- 27-4-1993 - K. Ramaswamy and R.M. Sahai, JJ. [Judgment per : K. Ramaswamy, J.] - Common questions of law arose for decision in these 8 appeals need disposal by this judgment. The question relates to classification of "toilet soap" in Excise Item 15 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act 1 of 1944 as amended in 1964 for short 'the Act'. In addition, in C.A. Nos. 813/86,3632-34/88 and 1102/89 sequel to its finding, they claim refund of excess excise duty. The facts in C.A. Nos. 2702/84 and 2785/84 are sufficient for disposal. The appellants laid before Assistant Collector classification list claiming "toilet soaps" Kalpa and Oasis, in other appeals Jai, O.K., Moti, Rain drop. Gold and Ria as bath soaps under Tariff Item 15(1) of the First ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erein as seen earlier is thus : 'soap' means all varieties' of products known commercially as soap. (1) Soap, household and laundry (2) "Other sorts" and graded ad valorem tariff has been prescribed. It is seen that household and laundry soap was subjected to levy of tariff at a lesser rate than "other sorts" ad valorem. The contention of Sri Ganguli, the learned Senior Counsel for the Union is that statute always kept distinction between soap "household and laundry" and "other sorts". Toilet soap was kept in the packet of other sorts. Household and laundry soaps are being used for cleaning household articles and utensils and washing the clothes while toilet soaps are for bathing purpose. The latter compose of diverse varieties, based on personal liking and taste, are being used. They are commercially known as other sorts but not household. The legislative history furnishes unimpeachable evidence that soaps used for household and laundry are compendiously treated as a class and are subjected to imposition of lesser tariff. They receive their colour from each other as compendiously known in the commercial parlance that the former are meant for use for household purposes while to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tified entity attracts duty. The goods are to be identified and then to find the appropriate heading, sub-heading under which the identified goods/products would be classified. To find the appropriate classification description employed in the tariff nomenclature should be appreciated having regard to the terms of the headings read with the relevant provisions or statutory rules of interpretation put up thereon. For exigibility to excise duty the entity must be specified in positive terms under a particular tariff entry. In its absence be deduced from a proper construction of the tariff entry. There is neither intendment nor equity in a taxing statute. Nothing is implied. Neither can we insert nor anything can we delete but it should be interpreted and construed as per the words the legislature has chosen to employ in the Act or Rules. There is no room for assumption or presumptions. The object of the Parliament has to be gathered from the language used in the statute. The contention that toilet soap is commercially different from household and laundry soaps, as could be seen from the opening words of Entry 15, needs careful analysis. It is well, at the outset, to guard against con ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... table" within the meaning of Item 6 of the u Schedule to the M.P. Sales Tax Act. It was contended that betel leaves are vegetable and, therefore, they are exempted from the payment of sales tax. While construing Item 6, this Court held that the words must be construed not in any technical sense nor from the botanical point of view but as understood in common parlance. It has not been defined in the Act and being a word of every day use it must be construed in its popular sense meaning "that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it". It is to be construed as understood in common language. Therefore, betel leaves were held to be not vegetable. The term 'vegetables' is to be understood as commonly understood denoting those classes of vegetable matter which are grown in kitchen gardens and are used for the table. The same view was reiterated in Motipur Zamindari Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of Bihar [(1962) Supp. 1 SCR 498] and State of West Bengal and Ors. v.Washi Ahmed etc. [(1977) 3 SCR 149], In Washi Ahmed's case green ginger was held to be vegetable within the meaning of the word used in common parlance. In Motipur Z ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erstands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning." 5. In Shri Bharuch Coconut Trading Co. and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors. [(1992) Supp. 1 SCC 298], this Court applied the test as "would a householder when asked to bring some fresh fruits or some vegetable for the evening meal, bring coconut too as vegetable? Obviously the answer is in the negative". Again when a person goes to a commercial market asks for coconuts, "no one will consider brown coconut to be vegetable or fresh fruit, no householder would purchase it as a fruit. Therefore, the meaning of the word brown coconut, whether it is a green fruit has to be understood in its ordinary commercial parlance". Accordingly it was held that brown coconut was not green fruit. In interpreting the statute the individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Legislature is to be put aside. In Hansraj Gordhan Das v. H.H. Dave, Assistant Collector of Central Excise Customs and Ors. [(1969) 2 SCR 253], this Court held that the operation of the statutory notification had to be judged not by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l that the legislative history and memorandum appended to the Finance Bill would furnish aid to the construction of the word "household" soap is not apposite to the fact situation. When there is ambiguity in the word, statement and objects the legislative history, the memorandum appended to the Bill and the speech of the mover of the Bill are relevant material to discover the intention of the Legislature. In Shashikant Laxman Kale and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. [(1990) 4 SCC 366 at 376 para 17], this Court held that "for determining the purpose or object of the legislation, it is permissible to look into the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law was made, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill which actuated the step to provide a remedy for the then existing malady can be used for the limited purpose of appreciating the background and the antecedent state of affairs leading to the legislation. The memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance Bill which were not part of the 'Notes on Clauses' appended to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill cannot be used to draw support therefrom as it is not an accurate guide of the final Act. In ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... te and applied the doctrine to the understanding by the revenue of the provisions in Income-tax Act. In Desh Bandhu Gupta and Ors. v. Delhi Stock Exchange [1979 (3) SCR373], this Court held that this principle can be invoked, though the same will not always be decisive on the question of construction. But the contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive officers charged with executing the statute, although not controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight as highly persuasive. We may also add that if the interpretation is erroneous, court would without hesitation refuse to follow such construction. This Court also equally expressed the view that its application was in restricted sense to ancient legislation in J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. [1987 Supp. SCC 350 = 1987 (32) E.L.T.234 (SC)] and in Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. case [(1988) 2 SCR 962 at 1000 F to H = 1988 (36) E.L.T. 201 (SC)]. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills [(1992) Supp. 1 SCC 150 at 153 para 18], this Court doubted the application of the doctrine of contemporanea expositio as given to the construction or it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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