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TMI Blog1979 (9) TMI 91X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cealment of Rs. 32,710 under the Expln. To s. 271(1)(c). 3. Being aggrieved, the assessee carried the dispute in appeal to the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, Shri H.L. Chadha, the learned representative for the assessee, raised a preliminary objection relating to the jurisdiction of the IAC. The facts relating to the point filed on 18th July, 1973, reference to the IAC was made by the ITO on or after 12th Jan., 1978. s. 274(4) was omitted by the Taxation Law (Amendment) Act, 1975 w.e.f. 1st April, 1976 and the impugned order levying the penalty was passed by the IAC on 6th Feb., 1978. The contention of the assessee is that after 1st April, 1976 when s. 274(2) was omitted, the IAC ceased to be a competent authority and the ITO was competent authority to conduct and conclude the penalty proceedings and that reference having been made by the ITO to the IAC on or after 12th Jan., 1978 was invalid, inasmuch as, no reference could have been made to the IAC after 1st April, 1976. Thus according to the assessee, the IAC passed the impugned order without any jurisdiction. On the other hand, the contention of the Revenue is that the jurisdiction of the IAC be determined with reference to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd relates, not to the process of litigation, but to its purpose and subject-matter. To define procedure as concerned not with rights, but with remedies, is to confound the remedy with the process by which it is made available. Substantive law is concerned with the ends which the administration of justice seeks; procedural law deals with the means and instruments by which those ends are to be attained. The latter regulates the conduct and relations of Courts and litigants in respect of the litigation itself, the former determines their conduct and relations in respect of the matter litigated. Thus what facts constitute a wrong is determined by the substantive procedure, the first relates to the subject-matter of litigations; the second to the process merely. Having understood the distinction between the procedural law and the substantive law, we deal with another question whether the provisions of s. 274(2) pertained to the domain of procedural law and is so whether any amendment in the section was to operate retrospectively. Jurisdiction, in our opinion, relates to the domain of procedural law and that cannot be a part of the substantive law. The jurisdiction comes into picture ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... roceeded to decree that suit with costs. On appeal to the District Judge, the defendant raised the plea of want of jurisdiction in the civil Court at the date when the decree was passed. The District Judge upheld the decision of the Munsif that the civil Court continued to have jurisdiction to dispose of the suit inspite of the amendment of s. 180 U.P. Tenancy Act. The defendant, therefore, preferred the second appeal before the Allahabad High Court. On these facts, the Allahabad High Court observes in the end of para 5 and in para 6 of its order on page 189 as follows: "5. The only question involved is what is the effect of the amendment in the law during the pendency of the suit. 6. The amendment which has taken place is in the law of procedure. The well-under-stood principle is that an alteration in the law of procedure has immediate effect-vide Craies on the Interpretation of Statutes, p. 332. The reason for this is that "no one has any vested interest in the course of proceedure" and consequently vested rights are not affected by any change in procedure. This matter is fully discussed in Naqui Ahmad vs. Shio Shankar Lal AIR (20) 1933 Oudh 274 in which case the English an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ecial Judge also acquitted the appellant of the charge under s. 474/466 IPC. The matter was taken in appeal to the High Court which by its judgment dt. 14th Sept., 1965 set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant under s. 411 IPC., and confirmed the conviction of the appellant under s. 3(2) of the Act. s. 5 sub-s. (3) of the Act as it stood before its amendment by Act 40 of 1964 read: "(3) In any trial of an offence punishable under sub-s. (2) the fact that the accused person or any other person on his behalf is in possession, for which the accused person cannot satisfactorily account of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known of income may, be provided, and no such proof the Court shall presume unless the contrary is proved that the accused person is guilty of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his official duty and his conviction therefore shall not be invalid by reason only that it is based solely on such presumption". 7. On 18th Dec., 1964, the parliament enacted the Anti Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964, which repealed sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Act and enlarged the scope of criminal misconduct in s. 5 of the Act by enchancing a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n invoking the presumption under s. 5(3) of the Act even though it was repealed on 18th Dec., 1964 by the amending Act. We accordingly reject the argument of the appellant on the aspect of the case". 10. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court is, therefore, clear that any amendment made in the procedural law will become operative retrospectively and this will not be so only in the situation where the un amended procedure was correctly adopted and concluded under the old law. The procedure which was correctly adopted under the old law and concluded will not be reopened for the purpose of applying the new procedure. Applying these principles to the case in hand, we hold that the IAC ceased to be a competent authority and the ITO was competent authority to conduct and conclude the penalty proceedings, inasmuch as, the penalty proceedings initiated under the old procedural law were not concluded till 1st April, 1976 when sub-s. (2) of s. 274 authorising the IAC to conduct and conclude the proceedings was omitted. The Revenue is, therefore, incorrect in arguing that the law including the procedural law as was in force on 18th July, 1973 when return was filed by the assessee, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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