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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the failure to file abstracts of accounts under section 421 of the Companies Act constitutes a continuing offence or a completed offence. 2. Applicability of section 468(2)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, regarding the limitation period for taking cognizance of the offence. 3. Validity of the trial court's cognizance of the offences beyond the prescribed limitation period. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Continuing Offence vs. Completed Offence: The primary issue was whether the failure to file abstracts of accounts under section 421 of the Companies Act is a continuing offence or a completed offence. The court examined the nature of the offence, comparing it to other statutory obligations. It was noted that a "continuing offence" is one where the liability persists until compliance, whereas a "completed offence" is one that is complete upon the initial act of non-compliance. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in *State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi*, which distinguished between these two types of offences. The court concluded that the failure to file abstracts of accounts for each half-year period is a completed offence, not a continuing one. The offence is complete at the end of each half-year period if the abstracts are not filed, making each default a distinct offence. 2. Applicability of Section 468(2)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 468(2)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, prescribes a limitation period of six months for taking cognizance of offences punishable with fine only. Since the offence under section 423 of the Companies Act is punishable with fine, this provision was applicable. The court emphasized that the Companies Act does not provide a specific limitation period for prosecution. Therefore, section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs the limitation period for these offences. 3. Validity of the Trial Court's Cognizance: The trial court had taken cognizance of the offences beyond the six-month limitation period prescribed by section 468(2)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court held that the trial court's cognizance was valid only for the offence related to the period from July 1, 1976, to December 31, 1976, as the complaint was filed within six months of the commission of the offence. For the rest of the periods, the trial court acted without jurisdiction by taking cognizance beyond the limitation period. Judgment: The court allowed the miscellaneous petitions and quashed the cognizance of offences in all cases except for Criminal Case No. 1869 of 1977 (Miscellaneous Case No. 750 of 1981), where the trial court's cognizance was maintained. The applicants-accused were discharged in the quashed cases.
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