2007 (5) TMI 326 - SC - VAT and Sales Tax

Whether mere calling for the records for examination of the case on March 14 1996 by the Additional Commissioner constituted exercise of power within the meaning of section 15(4) of the said 1979 Act so as to fall within the limitation period specified therein? Held that - Appeal dismissed. As under the scheme of the 1979 Act the initiation proceedings took place when the revisional authority called for the records of the case from the first appellate authority and therefore the jurisdiction stood exercised within the period of limitation. Lastly on April 1 1997 in the present case the tax appeal against the order of the revisional authority was pending decision vide Tax Appeal No. E.T. 22/96. Moreover the law of limitation is generally procedural hence in our view section 15B was retrospective. For the above reasons no infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether calling for records for examination by the Additional Commissioner constitutes the exercise of power under section 15(4) of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979.
2. Whether the issuance of the show cause notice on May 20, 1996, was within the prescribed period of limitation.
3. Interpretation and applicability of sections 15 and 15B of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Exercise of Power under Section 15(4)
The core question was whether the act of calling for records on March 16, 1996, by the Additional Commissioner constituted the exercise of power under section 15(4) of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979. The court noted that the revisional authority's power under section 15(1) is supervisory, requiring the authority to call for and examine records to ascertain if an error prejudicial to the Revenue existed. The court emphasized that the exercise of power occurs when the revisional authority calls for and examines the records, which can be equated to the initiation of proceedings. Therefore, the court concluded that the calling for records by the Additional Commissioner on March 16, 1996, did constitute the exercise of power under section 15(4).

Issue 2: Limitation Period for Issuance of Show Cause Notice
The appellant argued that the issuance of the show cause notice on May 20, 1996, was beyond the four-year limitation period from the date of the first appellate authority's order on March 28, 1992. The court clarified that the limitation period under section 15(4) pertains to the initiation of proceedings, not their completion. The initiation of proceedings was deemed to occur when the Additional Commissioner called for the records on March 16, 1996, which was within the four-year limitation period. The court further explained that section 15B prescribes the limitation for the completion of proceedings, which is three years from the date of calling for the records, thus making the issuance of the show cause notice timely.

Issue 3: Interpretation and Applicability of Sections 15 and 15B
The court provided an in-depth interpretation of sections 15 and 15B. Section 15(1) allows the Commissioner and other designated authorities to revise orders that are erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue's interest, without a provision for a show cause notice. Section 15(4) mandates that the power to revise must be exercised within four years from the date of the order sought to be revised. Section 15B, introduced by the Karnataka Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997, prescribes a three-year period for the completion of proceedings from the date of initiation or calling for records. The court held that section 15B was retrospective, applying to proceedings initiated before its enactment, thereby allowing a four-year period for completion in such cases. The court concluded that the legislative intent was to provide a clear distinction between the initiation and completion of proceedings, ensuring maximum leeway to address errors resulting in revenue loss.

Conclusion:
The court upheld the Karnataka High Court's judgment, finding no infirmity in the decision that the proceedings initiated by the Additional Commissioner were within the prescribed limitation period. The civil appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed with no order as to costs, and the court expressed no opinion on the merits of the case as they were not argued.

← Previous Next →