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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Court is considered closed on a Saturday when Judges do not sit, for the purposes of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act or Section 4 of the Limitation Act. 2. Applicability of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act to election petitions by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. 3. Whether the facts of the case warrant condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the Court is considered closed on a Saturday when Judges do not sit, for the purposes of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act or Section 4 of the Limitation Act: The Court examined whether the Court could be considered closed within the meaning of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1962, or Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 4 of the Limitation Act provides that if the prescribed period for any suit, appeal, or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal, or application may be instituted on the day when the Court reopens. The Explanation states that a Court shall be deemed closed if it remains closed during any part of its normal working hours on that day. The Court noted that even if Section 4 of the Limitation Act does not apply, Section 10 of the General Clauses Act would apply to election petitions, as held in H.H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh. The Court referred to a long course of decisions that held a Court is not closed notwithstanding the fact that Judges do not sit if the Court is otherwise open. It was observed that the office of the Court might remain open for the presentation of pleadings even if the Judges are not engaged in judicial functions. The Court concluded that a Court is not closed on a Saturday even if Judges do not sit, provided the office is open. 2. Applicability of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act to election petitions by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act: The Court examined whether Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act applied to election petitions under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Section 29(2) provides that where a special or local law prescribes a different period of limitation, the provisions of the Limitation Act shall apply only to the extent they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. The Court noted that the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is a complete and self-contained code that does not admit the introduction of the principles or provisions of the Limitation Act. The Court referred to the decision in Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel, which held that the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to appeals under the Representation of the People Act unless expressly excluded. However, the Court distinguished this case as it dealt with appeals and not election petitions. The Court concluded that the provisions of the Limitation Act, including Section 5, do not apply to election petitions under the Representation of the People Act. 3. Whether the facts of the case warrant condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act: The Court considered whether the facts of the case warranted condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the extension of the prescribed period if the applicant shows sufficient cause for not filing within that period. The Court noted that the Representation of the People Act does not provide for condonation of delay in the presentation of election petitions, unlike the repealed Section 85, which allowed the Election Commission to condone delay. The Court emphasized that the Representation of the People Act aims for the expeditious disposal of election disputes and does not permit delays. The Court held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act do not govern the filing of election petitions or their trial. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the merits of the application for condonation of delay. Conclusion: The appeal and the connected application for condonation of delay were dismissed, with the Court holding that the election petition was time-barred and the provisions of the Limitation Act, including Section 5, were not applicable to election petitions under the Representation of the People Act. The Court reiterated that the Act is a complete and self-contained code, and any delay in the filing of election petitions cannot be condoned under the Limitation Act.
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