Home Case Index All Cases Central Excise Central Excise + AT Central Excise - 2003 (6) TMI AT This
Forgot password New User/ Regiser ⇒ Register to get Live Demo
2003 (6) TMI 409 - AT - Central Excise
Issues:
1. Whether the appellant was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic diamond polishing powder. 2. Whether the processes undertaken by the appellant amount to manufacture. 3. Whether the extended period of limitation was correctly invoked by the Commissioner. Analysis: 1. The appeals challenged the Commissioner's order holding the appellant engaged in manufacturing synthetic diamond polishing powder and demanding duty, along with penalties on the appellant and its directors. The appellant imported synthetic diamond powder, selling copper-coated powder as imported and utilizing uncoated powder in manufacturing diamond-coated articles after treating with caustic soda and sulphuric acid. The Tribunal previously held such processes were not manufacturing but impurity removal, enhancing powder utilization for cutting diamonds. 2. The Tribunal refrained from deciding if the appellant's processes constituted manufacturing due to discrepancies in the appellant's declarations. The appellant's declarations indicated grading the powder into various sizes for different applications, potentially constituting manufacturing. However, the appellant argued that sieving was random to verify product size, which could impact the issue significantly. The inconsistent declarations prevented a clear determination on whether the processes amounted to manufacturing. 3. The Commissioner invoked the extended limitation period, alleging transformation of goods from industrial synthetic fiber to diamond polishing powder. The Tribunal disagreed, stating that cleaning the product did not result in a new substance's emergence. The possibility of sieving creating different grades for varied applications potentially constituting manufacturing was considered. As the appellant's declarations clearly mentioned sieving for grading, the information available to the Commissioner negated the need for the extended limitation period, leading to the appeals being allowed and the impugned order set aside.
|