2010 (4) TMI 904 - Commissioner - Service Tax

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellant's activities fall under the category of 'manpower supply agency' service.
2. Whether the appellant is considered a service provider and the sugar factory a service receiver.
3. Whether the adjudicating authority passed a speaking order.
4. Whether the extended period for demand is applicable.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the appellant's activities fall under the category of 'manpower supply agency' service:
The primary issue was whether the appellant's activities of cutting/harvesting and transporting sugarcane fell under the 'manpower supply agency' service. The appellant argued that they were not supplying manpower but were assisting farmers in their activities. The judgment concluded that the appellant cannot be considered a service provider as they were merely facilitating the farmers, who were the actual service receivers. The labor contractors supplied manpower to the farmers, and the services were rendered in the farmers' fields, not to the sugar factory.

2. Whether the appellant is considered a service provider and the sugar factory a service receiver:
The judgment clarified that the appellant (a cooperative society) was formed to assist farmers with the harvesting and transportation of sugarcane. The society entered into agreements with labor contractors on behalf of the farmers, and the payments for these services were deducted from the farmers' dues by the sugar factory. Thus, the appellant was not a service provider, and the sugar factory was not a service receiver. The service was provided by labor contractors to the farmers, not to the sugar factory.

3. Whether the adjudicating authority passed a speaking order:
The appellant contended that the adjudicating authority did not consider their submissions and passed a stereotype order. The judgment supported this contention, noting that the adjudicating authority failed to consider the detailed explanations provided by the appellant. The adjudicator did not hear both sides adequately and confirmed the demand based solely on the allegations in the SCN, without addressing the appellant's arguments.

4. Whether the extended period for demand is applicable:
The judgment also addressed the issue of the extended period for demand. The appellant had previously been issued a SCN for a different service category ('Clearing & Forwarding Agent' service) for an earlier period, which was set aside. The department's vacillating stance created confusion, and the activities were known to the department at the time of the first SCN. Therefore, the extended period was not applicable. The judgment cited the case of Nexcus Computers (P) Ltd. v. CCE, Pondicherry, where the tribunal held that the department's changing views led to confusion, making the extended period inapplicable.

Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order confirming duty, interest, and imposing penalty under Section 78 was set aside. The appellant succeeded on both merits and the aspect of time bar, as the adjudicating authority did not consider the appellant's detailed submissions, and the extended period for demand was not applicable due to the department's inconsistent stance.