1970 (1) TMI 63 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Summary

Issues:
1. Whether the Financial Commissioner was justified in dismissing the revision petition on the ground of delay when no statutory period of limitation was prescribed?
2. Whether the Financial Commissioner has the discretion to entertain revision petitions beyond a specified time frame under section 21(3) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948?

Analysis:

The case involved a partnership firm engaged in the business of commission agents dealing in ghee. The firm filed quarterly returns for the assessment year 1955-56, claiming deductions under section 5(2)(b) of the Act. The assessing authority made additions to the taxable turnover, leading to a dispute. The firm's appeals and revisions were successively rejected, culminating in a revision before the Financial Commissioner. The Financial Commissioner rejected the revision petition as time-barred, citing a delay of 22 days beyond the presumed 90-day limit. The firm challenged this decision, arguing that section 21(3) of the Act did not impose a specific time limit for filing revision petitions, emphasizing the phrase "at any time" in the provision.

The court scrutinized the statutory provision of section 21(3) and noted that the legislature intentionally omitted a statutory period of limitation for the Financial Commissioner's revisional jurisdiction. The court criticized the rigid approach adopted by the Financial Commissioner, equating the 90-day practice with a statutory limitation. It emphasized that without a statutory time limit, a flexible approach based on individual case circumstances should prevail. The court directed the Financial Commissioner to decide the case on merits, rejecting the dismissal of the revision petition solely on grounds of delay.

Furthermore, the court clarified that while a statutory period of limitation was absent, the Financial Commissioner could establish a reasonable practice specifying the period for invoking revisional jurisdiction. The court endorsed the necessity of such a practice, citing precedents that upheld the reasonableness of a 90-day timeframe for invoking revisional jurisdiction. The judgment emphasized the distinction between a statutory period and a practice-based timeframe, asserting that the latter should not render the right of approaching the Financial Commissioner illusory.

In conclusion, the court answered both issues in the negative, asserting that the Financial Commissioner should not dismiss revision petitions solely based on delay in the absence of a statutory time limit. The judgment underscored the need for a flexible approach in the absence of statutory constraints and upheld the importance of reasonable practices in exercising revisional jurisdiction.