1992 (5) TMI 175 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether under Town Planning Act, a specific power has been given to the Development Authority to impose such development fee - Held that - Appeal dismissed. Whenever there is compulsory exaction of any money, there should be specific provision for the same and there is no room for intendment. Nothing is to be read and nothing is to be implied and one should look fairly to the language used - no occasion to interfere with the impugned decision of the High Court.

Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Sections 119(1) and 119(2)(c) of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976.
2. Legality of the regulations made under the Town Planning Act.
3. Authority of the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority to levy and collect development fees.
4. Legislative competence of the State Government to impose development fees.
5. Delegation of power to the Development Authority to impose development fees.
6. Refund of development fees collected from the petitioners.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Constitutionality of Sections 119(1) and 119(2)(c) of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976:
The respondents challenged the provisions of Sections 119(1) and 119(2)(c) of the Town Planning Act, arguing they were ultra vires Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. The High Court of Gujarat examined these provisions and found that the State Legislature has legislative competence under Entry 66 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution to make provisions for fees imposed by the Development Authority. However, the High Court concluded that the Development Authority lacked specific power under the Town Planning Act to impose development fees.

2. Legality of the Regulations Made Under the Town Planning Act:
The High Court scrutinized the regulations purportedly made under the Town Planning Act and found them ultra vires the Act itself. The court held that the regulations were unauthorized, illegal, and void because there was no express provision in the Act granting the Development Authority the power to levy development fees.

3. Authority of the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority to Levy and Collect Development Fees:
The High Court held that the Development Authority did not have the power to impose development fees, as no specific provision in the Town Planning Act authorized such imposition. The court referred to the principle that any compulsory exaction of money must have a specific legal provision, and nothing should be implied or read into the statute.

4. Legislative Competence of the State Government to Impose Development Fees:
The High Court recognized that the State Legislature had the competence to impose fees under Entry 66 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. However, the court emphasized that legislative competence alone does not validate the imposition of fees by the Development Authority without specific statutory authorization.

5. Delegation of Power to the Development Authority to Impose Development Fees:
The High Court found that the State Government had not delegated the power to impose development fees to the Development Authority. The court reiterated that in fiscal matters, the power to impose taxes or fees must be expressly provided for and cannot be implied. The court distinguished the case from other decisions where implied powers were recognized, emphasizing that those cases involved different factual contexts and constitutional provisions.

6. Refund of Development Fees Collected from the Petitioners:
The petitioners sought a refund of the development fees collected by the Development Authority. The High Court, having found the imposition of such fees unauthorized and illegal, implied that the collected fees should be refunded. However, the Supreme Court's judgment does not explicitly address the refund issue, as it primarily focused on the legality and authority of fee imposition.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the appeal and affirming that the Development Authority lacked the power to impose development fees under the Town Planning Act. The court emphasized the necessity of specific statutory authorization for any compulsory exaction of money and rejected the argument of implied powers in fiscal matters. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

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