1975 (7) TMI 144 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether the sub sequent amendments to s. 21 of the Penal Code after its incorporation in the Act would have to be read into the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 or not? Held that - In the facts and circumstances of the present case and having regard to the nature and scope or the Prevention of Corruption Act, the extended definition of s.21 of the Penal Code would have to be imported into s. 2 of the Act. That being the position there can be no doubt that the respondent was a public servant within the meaning of s. 2 of the Act and his conviction by the learned Special Judge, Indore, did not suffer from any legal infirmity. The judgment of the High Court holding that the respondent was not a public servant is legally erroneous and cannot be allowed to stand. The High Court has itself pointed out that the respondent had been forced under duress exercised by his superior officer in drawing the inflated travelling allowance. The High Court has also expressed the view that having regard to the fact that as the accused had to face a trial for a number of years, the Government will consider the desirability of not prosecuting him again. In view of these circumstances, therefore, we feel the respondent has committed only a technical offence and a token sentence is called for - allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court - convict the respondent under s. 420 I.P.C. and s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act but reduce his sentence to the imprisonment already served

Issues Involved:
1. Definition and scope of "public servant" under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
2. Applicability of amendments to Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) to the Prevention of Corruption Act.
3. Jurisdiction of the trial under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
4. Sentencing considerations.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Definition and Scope of "Public Servant" under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947:
The primary issue was whether the respondent, an employee of a Government company, qualified as a "public servant" under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The High Court had acquitted the respondent, ruling that he was not a public servant as defined by Section 21 of the IPC prior to its amendments. The Supreme Court, however, highlighted that Section 2 of the Act incorporates the definition of "public servant" from Section 21 of the IPC. Initially, Section 21 did not include employees of Government companies, but amendments in 1958 and 1964 expanded this definition to include such employees. The Court concluded that these amendments should be read into the Act, thereby classifying the respondent as a public servant.

2. Applicability of Amendments to Section 21 of the IPC to the Prevention of Corruption Act:
The Supreme Court addressed whether subsequent amendments to Section 21 of the IPC should be incorporated into the Prevention of Corruption Act. The doctrine of legislation by incorporation was discussed, which generally implies that amendments to the original statute do not affect the incorporated statute. However, exceptions exist where the statutes are supplemental to each other or in pari materia. The Court determined that the Prevention of Corruption Act and the IPC are not in pari materia but are supplemental. Therefore, the amendments to Section 21 of the IPC should be read into the Prevention of Corruption Act to ensure its effective functioning and to meet its objective of eradicating corruption.

3. Jurisdiction of the Trial under the Prevention of Corruption Act:
The High Court had ruled that the respondent's trial under the Prevention of Corruption Act was without jurisdiction since he was not a public servant under the Act. The Supreme Court overturned this decision, stating that the respondent was indeed a public servant as per the expanded definition in Section 21 of the IPC, post-amendment. Therefore, the trial under the Act was within jurisdiction.

4. Sentencing Considerations:
The Supreme Court considered the High Court's observations regarding the respondent's actions being under duress from a superior officer and the prolonged duration of the trial. The Court acknowledged these mitigating factors and noted that the respondent had already faced significant legal proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to the imprisonment already served, emphasizing that the respondent had committed only a technical offence.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment acquitting the respondent, and convicted the respondent under Section 420 IPC and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The sentence was reduced to the imprisonment already served, considering the mitigating circumstances. The judgment underscores the importance of incorporating subsequent amendments to the IPC into the Prevention of Corruption Act to ensure its effective application and to meet its objective of combating corruption.

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