1969 (4) TMI 103 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether there is reasonable ground for believing that selection board was likely to have been biased? Whether the principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings? Whether mere fact that one of the members of the Board was biased against some of the petitioners cannot vitiate the entire proceedings? Held that - Unable to accept the contention that in adjudging the suitability of the candidates the members of the board did not have any mutual discussion. It is not as if the records spoke of themselves. We are unable to believe that the members of selection board functioned like computers. At this stage it may also be noted that at the time the selections were made, the members of the selection board other than Naqishbund were not likely to have known that Basu had appealed against his supersession and that his appeal was pending before the State Government. Therefore there was no occasion for them to distrust the opinion expressed by Naqishbund. Hence the board in making the selections must necessarily have given weight to the opinion expressed by Naqishbund. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. As seen earlier Naqishbund was a party to the preparation of the select list in order of preference and that he is shown as No. 1 in the list. To that extent he was undoubtedly a judge in his own case, a circumstance which is abhorrent to our concept of justice. Now coming to the selection of the officers in the. junior scale service, the selections to both senior scale service as well as junior scale service were made from the same pool. Every officer who had put in a service of 8 years or more, even if he was holding the post of an Assistant Conservator of Forests was eligible for being selected for the senior scale service. In fact some Assistant Conservators have been selected for the senior scale service. At the same time some of the officers who had put in more than eight years of service had been selected for the junior scale service. Hence it is not possible to separate the two sets of officers. For the reasons mentioned above these petitions are allowed and the impugned selections set aside.

Issues Involved:
1. Violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
2. Contravention of principles of natural justice.
3. Vires of Section 3 of the All India Services Act, Rule 4 of the rules framed under that Act, and Regulation 5 of the Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966.
4. Nature of power conferred on the selection board (quasi-judicial vs. administrative).
5. Bias and conflict of interest in the selection process.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution:
The petitioners, Gazetted Officers serving in the forest department of Jammu and Kashmir, challenged the selections made to the Indian Forest Service. They argued that the selections were violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, which guarantee equality before the law and equality of opportunity in matters of public employment, respectively. The Court found that the selection process was flawed due to bias and lack of adherence to principles of natural justice, thereby violating these constitutional provisions.

2. Contravention of Principles of Natural Justice:
The petitioners contended that the selection process violated principles of natural justice. Specifically, adverse entries in the character rolls of the officers were not communicated to them, nor were their explanations called for, contravening the instructions issued by the Chief Secretary of the State. The Court held that the principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings and emphasized that "the requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously."

3. Vires of Section 3 of the All India Services Act, Rule 4 of the Rules Framed Under That Act, and Regulation 5 of the Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966:
The petitioners challenged the vires of Section 3 of the All India Services Act, Rule 4 of the rules framed thereunder, and Regulation 5 of the Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966, arguing that these provisions conferred unguided, uncontrolled, and uncanalised power on the delegates. The Court did not find it necessary to delve into the question of the vires of Rule 4 and Regulation 5, as the impugned selections were struck down on other grounds.

4. Nature of Power Conferred on the Selection Board (Quasi-Judicial vs. Administrative):
There was significant debate on whether the power conferred on the selection board was quasi-judicial or administrative. The petitioners argued that the power was quasi-judicial, requiring adherence to principles of natural justice, while the respondents contended it was purely administrative. The Court noted that the dividing line between administrative and quasi-judicial power is thin and evolving. Ultimately, the Court assumed the power to be administrative for the purpose of the case but emphasized that even administrative powers must be exercised fairly and justly.

5. Bias and Conflict of Interest in the Selection Process:
The Court found that the inclusion of Naqishbund, who was also a candidate for selection, in the selection board was improper and against the principles of natural justice. Naqishbund participated in the deliberations of the board when the names of his rivals were considered, creating a conflict of interest. The Court stated, "It is against all canons of justice to make a man judge in his own cause," and emphasized that there must be a "reasonable likelihood of bias." The affidavits filed by other members of the selection board stating that Naqishbund did not influence their decisions were not sufficient to negate the likelihood of bias.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the petitions and set aside the impugned selections. The Court held that the selection process was vitiated due to bias, lack of adherence to principles of natural justice, and the improper inclusion of a candidate in the selection board. The Union Government and the State Government were directed to pay the costs of the petitioners.

← Previous Next →