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Issues Involved:
1. Whether 'ghee' is a 'product of livestock' under the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce & Livestock) Markets Act, 1966. 2. Validity of Government Notification G.O.Ms. No. 286, dated 05.07.1994, notifying 'ghee' as a product of livestock. 3. Procedural compliance under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. Issue-wise Analysis: 1. Whether 'ghee' is a 'product of livestock' under the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce & Livestock) Markets Act, 1966: The court examined the definitions of 'livestock' and 'products of livestock' under Sections 2(v) and 2(xv) of the Act. It was noted that 'ghee' is not directly extracted from livestock but is derived from butter or cream, which are products of livestock. The court concluded that 'ghee' is a natural product derived ultimately from milk, a product of livestock. The legislative intention was interpreted to include derivative items as products of livestock. The court cited multiple precedents, including the Supreme Court's decision in Park Leather Industry (P) Limited v. State of U.P., which supported the broader interpretation of products derived from livestock. Thus, the court held that 'ghee' is a product of livestock under the Act. 2. Validity of Government Notification G.O.Ms. No. 286, dated 05.07.1994, notifying 'ghee' as a product of livestock: The court analyzed the procedural requirements under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act for issuing notifications. It was argued that the impugned notification was issued without following the mandatory procedure of inviting objections and suggestions. The respondents contended that the power to issue general notifications under Section 4(4) was valid and did not require separate notifications for each market area. The court noted that while Section 3 mandates inviting objections, Section 4 does not explicitly require this for every notification. The court held that the impugned notification did not suffer from procedural irregularities, as the legislature did not intend for the principles of natural justice to apply in this context. The court relied on precedents, including Sasa Musa Sugar Works v. State of Bihar, which supported the view that procedural compliance under Sections 3 and 4 is not always mandatory for every notification. 3. Procedural compliance under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act: The court examined whether the procedural steps under Sections 3 and 4 were followed before issuing the impugned notification. It was argued that the notification was issued without establishing market committees and providing necessary facilities as required under Section 4. The court held that the procedural steps under Sections 3(1) to 3(3) and 4(1) to 4(3) are mandatory only when merging or de-merging notified areas or market areas. For issuing notifications under Section 4(4), the court found that the government could issue general notifications without following the entire procedure each time. The court emphasized that the interpretation should make the statute workable and further its object. The court concluded that the impugned notification was valid and did not suffer from any procedural irregularities. Conclusion: The court held that 'ghee' is a product of livestock under the Act and that the impugned notification G.O.Ms. No. 286, dated 05.07.1994, was valid. The court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the notification's validity and confirming that the procedural requirements under Sections 3 and 4 were not violated. The court emphasized the need for a practical interpretation of the statute to ensure its effective implementation.
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