1994 (6) TMI 216 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking-over of Management and Control) Act, 1981.
2. Application of the doctrine of pleasure to statutory authorities.
3. Requirement of natural justice in the exercise of removal power.
4. Allegations of malice in the removal of the appellant.

Summary:

1. Interpretation of sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the Act:
The appellant challenged his removal u/s 10(7) of the Act, arguing that the provision, if interpreted to confer absolute power of removal upon the State Government, would be arbitrary and unreasonable. The High Court held that the Legislature intended to exclude the requirement of natural justice by omitting the proviso that existed in the Ordinance while enacting the Act. The High Court found that the power of removal under Section 10(7) was not absolute and unguided but was subject to the condition that the State Government must be satisfied that the Chairman or any member of the Board was incapable of working, refused to work, or worked in a manner detrimental to the interest of the Board.

2. Application of the Doctrine of Pleasure:
The appellant contended that the doctrine of pleasure applied only to government servants/public servants employed under the State and not to statutory authorities like the Chairman of the Board. The High Court, however, ruled that there was nothing in the doctrine to inhibit the State Legislature from extending it to the office in question. The High Court noted that the term of office of the Chairman and members of the Board was three years or during the pleasure of the State Government, indicating that the State Government had the right to curtail the tenure.

3. Requirement of Natural Justice:
The appellant argued that the power of removal could only be exercised consistently with the rule of natural justice. The High Court observed that while the Ordinance required giving a reasonable opportunity to show cause before removal, this requirement was deliberately omitted in the Act. The High Court concluded that the deliberate omission indicated the legislative intent to exclude the rule of natural justice in the exercise of removal power. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's view, stating that the Legislature intended to do away with the requirement of giving an opportunity to show cause before removal.

4. Allegations of Malice:
The appellant alleged that his removal was tainted with malice, claiming that the Cabinet Minister in charge of Secondary Education was responsible for his removal due to the appellant's refusal to select the Minister's favorites for appointment. The High Court examined the material and found no evidence to support the allegation of malice or lack of bona fides. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding, stating that the State Government's decision for removal was justified and that there was no serious infirmity in the High Court's evaluation of the factual data.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the High Court's interpretation of sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the Act, the application of the doctrine of pleasure, the exclusion of the requirement of natural justice, and the rejection of the allegations of malice. The Court emphasized that the power of removal must be exercised in public interest and for public good, and the State Government must satisfy the court that it acted bona fide and on relevant material.