Issues Involved: 1. Delay in filing appeals under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 2. Binding nature of the decree in Title Suit No. 34 of 1961. 3. Executability of the Land Acquisition Award. 4. Sufficient cause for excusing the delay in filing appeals.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Delay in Filing Appeals under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963: The appellant filed applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to excuse the delay in filing three appeals against the decision of the Additional District Judge, Howrah, dated June 27, 1963. The High Court dismissed these applications on August 18, 1966, citing unexplained delay between August 27, 1964, and July 3, 1965. The appellant argued that the delay was due to unawareness of the judgment and subsequent wrong legal advice.
2. Binding Nature of the Decree in Title Suit No. 34 of 1961: The appellant contended that the decree in Title Suit No. 34 of 1961, which held that the State was entitled to recover possession of the entire area, rendered the Land Acquisition Award illegal and without jurisdiction. The respondents argued that the decree was not binding on them as they were not parties to the suit.
3. Executability of the Land Acquisition Award: The appellant objected to the execution of the Land Acquisition Award on the grounds that it was not executable in view of the decree in Title Suit No. 34 of 1961. The High Court initially granted a stay of execution but later dismissed the appellant's applications for excusing the delay in filing appeals.
4. Sufficient Cause for Excusing the Delay: The Supreme Court emphasized that the legal position under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is well-settled, and "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction to advance substantial justice. The High Court failed to properly scrutinize the reasons provided by the appellant for the delay. The Supreme Court noted that the appellant acted on wrong legal advice and took diligent steps after becoming aware of the need to file appeals.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and allowed the appeals, condoning the delay in filing them. The High Court was directed to take up the three appeals and dispose of them according to law. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondents in all proceedings. The Supreme Court also emphasized the need for an early disposal of the appeals by the High Court.