2022 (11) TMI 1426 - AT - Income Tax

Inordinate delay of 339 days in filing appeal before ITAT - appeal as barred by limitation - HELD THAT - Law of limitation has to be construed strictly as it has an effect of vesting on one and taking away the right from the other party. The delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned in a mechanical or a routine manner since that would undoubtedly jeopardize the legislative intent behind Section 5 of the Limitation Act. As the assessee appellant in the present case is habitually acting in defiance of law therefore there can be no reason to allow his application and condone the substantial delay of 339 days involved in preferring of the present appeal. In the present case the delay of 339 days cannot be simply condoned for the reason that the regular counsel of the assessee lacked proper knowledge about the appellate proceedings specifically when the conduct of the assessee before the lower appellate authority clearly evidences his disregard for the process of law which I find he had carried forward before me by preferring the appeal beyond a period of 339 days after the lapse of the stipulated time period. Also as observed in the case of Ramlal Motilal and Chotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. 1961 (5) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT that seeker of justice must come with clean hands therefore now when in the present case the reasons advanced by the assessee do not reveal any good and sufficient reason justifying condonation of the substantial delay involved in preferring of the present appeal therefore, decline to condone the delay of 339 days and thus dismiss the appeal of the assessee as barred by limitation.

Summary

Issues:
1. Appeal filed by the assessee is time-barred by 339 days.
2. Whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned.
3. Application for condonation of delay due to lack of genuine cause.
4. Habitual lackadaisical approach of the assessee before appellate authorities.
5. Interpretation of the law of limitation and the concept of "sufficient cause."
6. Comparison between normal delay and inordinate delay.
7. Consideration of prejudice to the other side in case of delay.
8. Requirement for the seeker of justice to come with clean hands.

Analysis:
1. The appeal was filed 339 days beyond the stipulated time, leading to a time-barred situation. The assessee provided an "affidavit" explaining the delay, citing the lack of knowledge of the regular counsel in appellate procedures as the reason. However, the Judicial Member found no genuine cause for the substantial delay and noted the assessee's lackadaisical conduct throughout the proceedings.

2. The Departmental Representative argued against condoning the delay, emphasizing the past conduct of the assessee. After reviewing the lower authorities' orders and the available material, the Judicial Member concluded that the assessee failed to provide a justifiable reason for the 339-day delay. The habitual lackadaisical approach of the assessee in the proceedings was a significant factor in denying condonation.

3. Referring to a previous case, the Judicial Member highlighted that unexplained and inordinate delays, coupled with negligence or carelessness, typically lead to denial of condonation. In this case, the lack of a bonafide reason for the delay, coupled with the negligent behavior of the assessee, led to the decision not to condone the delay in filing the appeal.

4. The Judicial Member emphasized the strict construction of the law of limitation, stating that condoning delays mechanically could undermine the legislative intent behind such laws. The lack of a reasonable explanation for the delay, coupled with the assessee's non-cooperative attitude, reinforced the decision not to condone the delay.

5. Drawing from legal precedents, the Judicial Member highlighted the importance of a "sufficient cause" for condonation, which should align with normal human conduct. The habitual defiance of the law by the assessee led to the rejection of the condonation application due to the lack of a justifiable reason for the substantial delay.

6. The distinction between normal and inordinate delays was discussed, emphasizing that in cases of significant delays like the present one, a cautious approach is warranted. The lack of proper knowledge about appellate proceedings by the regular counsel was deemed insufficient to condone the delay, given the assessee's disregard for the legal process.

7. Finally, the Judicial Member invoked the principle that the seeker of justice must come with clean hands. Since the reasons provided did not justify condonation of the substantial delay, the appeal was dismissed as time-barred without delving into its merits.

This detailed analysis of the judgment showcases the considerations made by the Judicial Member in deciding not to condone the substantial delay in filing the appeal, ultimately leading to the dismissal of the appeal.