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Issues Involved:
1. Indefiniteness or vagueness of the purpose mentioned in the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 2. Allegation of collusion and mala fide intentions in the acquisition proceedings. 3. Whether the State Transport Corporation is a local authority or a company, and compliance with Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act. Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Indefiniteness or Vagueness of the Purpose: The appellants argued that the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was indefinite or vague, making it invalid. The Court noted that the notification explicitly stated that the acquisition was for a public purpose, namely, for "State Transport." The notification under Section 6 reiterated this purpose and specified that the land was needed for the purposes of and at the expense of the State Transport Corporation. The Court held that the declaration of public purpose by the Government is final unless it is a colorable exercise of power. Since the appellants failed to prove collusion, the notification was deemed conclusive on the question of public purpose. 2. Allegation of Collusion and Mala Fide Intentions: The appellants contended that the acquisition proceedings were collusive and initiated for the benefit of the landowner, the second respondent. The Court emphasized that the question of whether the acquisition was collusive or mala fide is a factual matter. The High Court and the lower courts had found no evidence to substantiate the appellants' claims of collusion or mala fide intentions. The Supreme Court, adhering to the principle of not reviewing concurrent findings of fact without exceptional reasons, upheld the lower courts' conclusions. Consequently, the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 were held conclusive on the requirement for a public purpose. 3. Status of the State Transport Corporation and Compliance with Part VII: The appellants argued that the State Transport Corporation was not a local authority but a company, and the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act were not complied with, rendering the acquisition invalid. The respondents contended that the Corporation was a local authority. The Court examined the definition of "company" under Section 3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act and concluded that the State Transport Corporation, incorporated under an Indian law, qualified as a company. Since the compensation was to be paid solely by the Corporation, the terms of the proviso to Section 6(1) were satisfied. However, the acquisition was deemed invalid due to non-compliance with Part VII of the Act. The Court also analyzed whether the State Transport Corporation could be considered a local authority. The definition of "local authority" in Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, requires control or management of a local fund. The Court found no material to suggest that the Corporation's funds could be regarded as local funds. The definition in the Bombay State Road Transport Act, 1950, which deemed the Corporation a local authority, could not override the General Clauses Act's definition applicable to the Land Acquisition Act. The Court concluded that the Corporation was not a local authority. Conclusion: The Supreme Court held that the acquisition, though for a public purpose, was invalid due to non-compliance with Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act. The appeals were allowed, and the suits of the appellants were decreed with costs in all courts.
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