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Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Controller under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 after the deletion of Section 29 by Amendment Act VI of 1953. 2. Right of a Thika Tenant to a notice as provided under the Deed of Lease. Detailed Analysis: 1. Jurisdiction of the Controller: The primary issue was whether the Controller retained jurisdiction over proceedings pending before him after the deletion of Section 29 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, by Amendment Act VI of 1953. The appellant argued that the deletion deprived the Controller of jurisdiction, rendering the subsequent judgment and orders invalid. The Court held that the deletion of Section 29 did not affect pending proceedings. The transfer of the suit to the Controller was lawful under Section 29 before its deletion, and the deletion did not alter the law applicable to the claim in the litigation. The Court relied on Section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899, which preserved the jurisdiction of the Controller over pending matters, despite the absence of a saving clause in the Amendment Act. Therefore, the High Court correctly held that the Controller retained jurisdiction to proceed with the suit transferred to him. 2. Right to Notice under the Deed of Lease: The second issue concerned whether the non-obstante clause in Section 3 of the Act deprived the tenant of the right to a notice before termination of tenancy, as stipulated in the Deed of Lease. The appellant contended that the landlord must first terminate the contractual tenancy by giving the required notice before seeking eviction under Section 3. The Court emphasized that the Thika Tenancy Act, like other Rent Acts, is a protective statute intended to safeguard tenants' security of possession. It restricts landlords' rights to evict tenants, imposing additional conditions beyond those in the lease or general law. The Court clarified that Section 3 of the Act does not confer new rights on landlords but imposes further restrictions on their existing rights. The Court ruled that the non-obstante clause in Section 3 means that even if a landlord terminates the contractual tenancy properly, they cannot evict the tenant unless they satisfy one or more grounds in Section 3. The Court referred to precedents, including Meghji Lakshamshi and Bros. v. Furniture Workshop and Abasbhai v. Gulamnabi, to support the interpretation that statutory tenancy arises when a tenant holds over after the contractual tenancy expires, and the landlord must comply with both the lease provisions and the Act's requirements. The Court rejected the respondent's argument that no notice was necessary because the lease expired by efflux of time and no renewal was agreed upon. The Court held that the proviso to Clause 7 of the lease, requiring six months' notice, was intended to give the tenant a fair opportunity to remove structures and vacate the premises. The absence of such notice rendered the eviction suit unsustainable. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed the respondent's suit. The respondents were ordered to pay the appellant's costs throughout the proceedings. The Court concluded that the High Court erred in its interpretation of Section 3 and the non-obstante clause, and the appellant was entitled to the six months' notice as stipulated in the lease before eviction could be sought.
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