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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of amendments to Sections 40 and 41 of the Land Acquisition Act. 2. Validity of Section 7 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1962. 3. Compliance with Article 31(2) and Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. 4. Compliance with Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. Validity of acquisitions made before July 20, 1962. 6. Whether the acquisition was for a public purpose. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of amendments to Sections 40 and 41 of the Land Acquisition Act: The petitioner challenged the amendments to Sections 40 and 41 of the Land Acquisition Act, arguing that they contravene Articles 31(2) and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The amendments allowed land acquisition for a company engaged in any industry or work for a public purpose. The court held that the amendments were valid, interpreting that the public purpose of the company must also be implicit in the purpose of the building or work for which the land is acquired. The court emphasized that the acquisition must subserve the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged. 2. Validity of Section 7 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1962: Section 7 of the Amendment Act validated acquisitions made before July 20, 1962, by deeming them to fall under the new clause (aa) of Section 40(1). The petitioner argued that this section contravenes Articles 31(2) and 14 by making an irrebuttable presumption of public purpose. The court held that Section 7 does not contravene Article 31(2) or Article 14, as the validity conferred by it is conditioned by the fact that the acquisitions must satisfy the conditions of clause (aa). 3. Compliance with Article 31(2) and Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution: The petitioner argued that the amendments allowed acquisitions for purposes other than public purposes, violating Article 31(2). The court interpreted the amendments to mean that the building or work must subserve the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged. Thus, the acquisition would be for a public purpose, and the amendments do not contravene Article 31(2) or Article 19(1)(f). 4. Compliance with Article 14 of the Constitution: The petitioner argued that Section 7 discriminates between acquisitions made before and after July 20, 1962. The court held that there is no discrimination, as the conditions of clause (aa) must be satisfied in both cases. The validation by Section 7 applies only to acquisitions that meet the criteria of clause (aa), ensuring compliance with Article 14. 5. Validity of acquisitions made before July 20, 1962: The petitioner contended that Section 7 does not reopen decided cases or revive notifications struck down by courts. The court held that Section 7 validates acquisitions notwithstanding any judgment, decree, or order of any court. The validation applies to acquisitions where the property has vested in the Government under Sections 16 or 17(1) of the Act. 6. Whether the acquisition was for a public purpose: The petitioner argued that the acquisition was not for a public purpose because the agreement did not regulate or control the products of the company in the public interest. The court held that the agreement's terms ensured that the land would be used for the public purpose of manufacturing textile machinery parts. The Act does not require the agreement to control the company's products, and the acquisition was deemed to be for a public purpose. Dissenting Opinion: Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar dissented, arguing that Section 40(1)(aa) was unconstitutional as it allowed compulsory acquisition for purposes that might not be public purposes, violating Article 31(2). He also contended that Section 7 of the Amendment Act did not cover the present case and was invalid if clause (aa) was unconstitutional. He would have allowed the petition and granted the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner. Order: The petition was dismissed in accordance with the majority opinion, with no order as to costs.
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