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Issues Involved:
1. Nature of the Order: Quasi-Judicial or Administrative 2. Issuance of Writ of Certiorari Against the Appellant 3. Public Purpose of the Requisition Order Detailed Analysis: 1. Nature of the Order: Quasi-Judicial or Administrative The primary issue was whether the order under Section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance (V of 1947) was quasi-judicial or purely administrative. The court examined whether the Provincial Government's decision to requisition land involved a judicial or administrative function. - Argument for Administrative Nature: The learned Attorney-General argued that the decision under Section 3 was purely administrative, as it was based on the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government regarding the necessity or expediency of requisitioning land for a public purpose. This was supported by the language of the Ordinance, which stated, "If in the opinion of the Provincial Government it is necessary or expedient to do so," indicating that the decision was left to the discretion of the Provincial Government. - Argument for Quasi-Judicial Nature: The respondent contended that the decision was quasi-judicial because it involved determining the existence of a public purpose, which is an objective fact. The respondent argued that this determination should be subject to judicial scrutiny. - Court's Analysis: The court referred to various precedents to distinguish between judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative functions. It concluded that the decision to requisition land under Section 3 was an administrative act because it was based on the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government. The court noted that the language of the Ordinance did not impose a duty to act judicially. 2. Issuance of Writ of Certiorari Against the Appellant The second issue was whether a writ of certiorari could be issued against the Provincial Government. - Argument Against Issuance: The learned Attorney-General argued that a writ of certiorari could not be issued against the Provincial Government, as it represented the Crown and enjoyed immunity from such judicial processes. - Court's Analysis: The court examined the legal provisions and precedents regarding the issuance of writs against the government. It concluded that the Provincial Government, acting in its administrative capacity, was not immune from judicial scrutiny. The court emphasized that the immunity granted under Section 306 of the Government of India Act, 1935, applied to the Governor personally, not to the Provincial Government as a whole. 3. Public Purpose of the Requisition Order The third issue was whether the requisition order was made for a public purpose. - Argument for Public Purpose: The appellant argued that the requisition was made for a public purpose, specifically for housing refugees, which was a matter of public interest. - Argument Against Public Purpose: The respondent contended that the requisition was not for a public purpose, as it involved taking property from one refugee to benefit another, which did not serve the general interest of the community. - Court's Analysis: The court examined the definition and scope of "public purpose." It agreed that housing refugees could constitute a public purpose. However, it also noted that the specific facts of the case, such as the selection of one refugee over another without clear justification, could raise questions about the bona fides of the requisition. Ultimately, the court found that the decision of the Provincial Government regarding the public purpose was not subject to judicial review, provided it was made in good faith and within the scope of the Ordinance. Conclusion: The court concluded that the decision to requisition land under Section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance was an administrative act based on the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government. Therefore, a writ of certiorari could not be issued to challenge the order. The court also held that the Provincial Government was not immune from judicial scrutiny in its administrative capacity. The appeal was allowed, and the petition was dismissed.
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