2021 (3) TMI 94 - SC - Insolvency and Bankruptcy

Dishonor of Cheque - insufficiency of funds - Proceedings under IBC versus offence under the NI Act - Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 - scope of Moratorium provision - whether the institution or continuation of a proceeding under Section 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be said to be covered by the moratorium provision namely Section 14 of the IBC? - Interpretation of section 14 of IBC - Application of the Noscitur A Soccis Rule of Interpretation - Object of Section 14 of the IBC - Section 14 in relation to other Moratorium sections in the IBC - Interplay between Section 14 and Section 32A of the IBC - Nature of proceedings under Chapter XVII of the NI Act - Quasi-Criminal proceedings - Nature of proceedings under Chapter XVII of the NI Act - Case Laws under provisions of other statutes - Whether Natural Persons are covered by Section 14 of the IBC? Interpretation of section 14 of IBC - HELD THAT - The expression institution of suits or continuation of pending suits is to be read as one category and the disjunctive or before the word proceedings would make it clear that proceedings against the corporate debtor would be a separate category. What throws light on the width of the expression proceedings is the expression any judgment decree or order and any court of law tribunal arbitration panel or other authority . Since criminal proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (CrPC) are conducted before the courts mentioned in Section 6 CrPC it is clear that a Section 138 proceeding being conducted before a Magistrate would certainly be a proceeding in a court of law in respect of a transaction which relates to a debt owed by the corporate debtor. Application of the Noscitur A Soccis Rule of Interpretation - HELD THAT - The ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis being rules as to the construction of statutes cannot be exalted to nullify the plain meaning of words used in a statute if they are designedly used in a wide sense. Importantly where a residuary phrase is used as a catch-all expression to take within its scope what may reasonably be comprehended by a provision regard being had to its object and setting noscitur a sociis cannot be used to colour an otherwise wide expression so as to whittle it down and stultify the object of a statutory provision. Object of Section 14 of the IBC - HELD THAT - The regard being had to the object sought to be achieved by the IBC in imposing this moratorium a quasi-criminal proceeding which would result in the assets of the corporate debtor being depleted as a result of having to pay compensation which can amount to twice the amount of the cheque that has bounced would directly impact the corporate insolvency resolution process in the same manner as the institution continuation or execution of a decree in such suit in a civil court for the amount of debt or other liability. Judged from the point of view of this objective it is impossible to discern any difference between the impact of a suit and a Section 138 proceeding insofar as the corporate debtor is concerned on its getting the necessary breathing space to get back on its feet during the corporate insolvency resolution process. Given this fact it is difficult to accept that noscitur a sociis or ejusdem generis should be used to cut down the width of the expression proceedings so as to make such proceedings analogous to civil suits - clause (b) of Section 14(1) also makes it clear that during the moratorium period any transfer encumbrance alienation or disposal by the corporate debtor of any of its assets or any legal right or beneficial interest therein being also interdicted yet a liability in the form of compensation payable under Section 138 would somehow escape the dragnet of Section 14(1). While Section 14(1)(a) refers to monetary liabilities of the corporate debtor Section 14(1)(b) refers to the corporate debtor s assets and together these two clauses form a scheme which shields the corporate debtor from pecuniary attacks against it in the moratorium period so that the corporate debtor gets breathing space to continue as a going concern in order to ultimately rehabilitate itself. Any crack in this shield is bound to have adverse consequences given the object of Section 14 and cannot by any process of interpretation be allowed to occur. Section 14 in relation to other Moratorium sections in the IBC - HELD THAT - When the language of Section 14 and Section 85 are contrasted it becomes clear that though the language of Section 85 is only in respect of debts the moratorium contained in Section 14 is not subject specific. The only light thrown on the subject is by the exception provision contained in Section 14(3)(a) which is that transactions are the subject matter of Section 14(1) - A legal action or proceeding in respect of any debt would on its plain language include a Section 138 proceeding. This is for the reason that a Section 138 proceeding would be a legal proceeding in respect of a debt. In respect of is a phrase which is wide and includes anything done directly or indirectly. Where individuals or firms are concerned the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or in possession of the individual or firm can be recovered during the moratorium period unlike the property of a corporate debtor. For all these reasons therefore given the object and context of Section 14 the expression proceedings cannot be cut down by any rule of construction and must be given a fair meaning consonant with the object and context. It is conceded before us that criminal proceedings which are not directly related to transactions evidencing debt or liability of the corporate debtor would be outside the scope of this expression. Interplay between Section 14 and Section 32A of the IBC - HELD THAT - The expression prosecution in the first proviso of Section 32A(1) refers to criminal proceedings properly so-called either through the medium of a First Information Report or complaint filed by an investigating authority or complaint and not to quasi-criminal proceedings that are instituted under Sections 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the corporate debtor the object of Section 14(1) of the IBC gets subserved as does the object of Section 32A which does away with criminal prosecutions in all cases against the corporate debtor thus absolving the corporate debtor from the same after a new management comes in. Nature of proceedings under Chapter XVII of the NI Act - HELD THAT - The gravamen of a proceeding under Section 138 though couched in language making the act complained of an offence is really in order to get back through a summary proceeding the amount contained in the dishonoured cheque together with interest and costs expeditiously and cheaply. We have already seen how it is the victim alone who can file the complaint which ordinarily culminates in the payment of fine as compensation which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque which would include the amount of the cheque and the interest and costs thereupon. Given our analysis of Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act together with the amendments made thereto and the case law cited hereinabove it is clear that a quasi-criminal proceeding that is contained in Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act would given the object and context of Section 14 of the IBC amount to a proceeding within the meaning of Section 14(1)(a) the moratorium therefore attaching to such proceeding. Quasi-Criminal proceedings - HELD THAT - In criminal contempt cases cognizance in contempts other than those referred to in Section 14 of the Act is taken by the Supreme Court or the High Court in the manner provided by Section 15. Section 17 then lays down the procedure that is to be followed after cognizance is taken. Finally by Section 23 the Supreme Court and the High Courts are given the power to make rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act providing for any matter relating to its procedure - the hybrid nature of a civil contempt proceeding described as quasi-criminal by several judgments of this Court there is nothing wrong with the same appellation quasi-criminal being applied to a Section 138 proceeding for the reasons given by us on an analysis of Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act. We therefore reject the learned Additional Solicitor General s strenuous argument that the appellation quasi-criminal is a misnomer when it comes to Section 138 proceedings and that therefore some of the cases cited in this judgment should be given a fresh look. Other sections of IBC in relation to Section 14 of IBC - HELD THAT - Contrasted with Section 25(2)(b) and Section 33(5) an argument could be made that the absence of the expressions prosecution and criminal proceedings in Section 25(2)(b) and Section 33(5) would show that they were designedly eschewed by the legislature. We have seen how inelegant drafting cannot lead to absurd results or results which stultify the object of a provision given its otherwise wide language. Thus nothing can be gained by juxtaposing various provisions against each other and arriving at conclusions that are plainly untenable in law. Case Laws under provisions of other statutes - HELD THAT - Given the object of Section 22(1) of the SICA which was amended in 1994 by inserting the words that were interpreted by this Court parliament restricted proceedings only to suits for recovery of money etc. thereby expressly not including prosecution proceedings as was held by this Court. The observations contained in paragraph 20 that Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a penal provision in a criminal proceeding cannot now be said to be good law given the march of events in particular the amendments of 2002 and 2018 to the Negotiable Instruments Act. The winding-up court under Section 446(2) is to take up all matters which the company court itself can conveniently dispose of rather than exposing a company which is under winding up to expensive litigation in other courts. This being the object of Section 446(2) the expression proceeding was given a limited meaning as it is obvious that a company court cannot dispose of an assessment proceeding in income tax or a criminal proceeding. Whether Natural Persons are covered by Section 14 of the IBC - HELD THAT - As far as the Directors/persons in management or control of the corporate debtor are concerned a Section 138/141 proceeding against them cannot be initiated or continued without the corporate debtor - This is because Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act speaks of persons in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company - Since the corporate debtor would be covered by the moratorium provision contained in Section 14 of the IBC by which continuation of Section 138/141 proceedings against the corporate debtor and initiation of Section 138/141 proceedings against the said debtor during the corporate insolvency resolution process are interdicted. The legal impediment contained in Section 14 of the IBC would make it impossible for such proceeding to continue or be instituted against the corporate debtor. Thus for the period of moratorium since no Section 138/141 proceeding can continue or be initiated against the corporate debtor because of a statutory bar such proceedings can be initiated or continued against the persons mentioned in Section 141(1) and (2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This being the case it is clear that the moratorium provision contained in Section 14 of the IBC would apply only to the corporate debtor the natural persons mentioned in Section 141 continuing to be statutorily liable under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Section 138/141 proceedings in this case will continue both against the company as well as the appellants for the reason given as well as the fact that the insolvency resolution process does not involve a new management taking over - Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the institution or continuation of proceedings under Section 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be said to be covered by the moratorium provision, namely, Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC).
2. The interpretation of Section 14 of the IBC in relation to other moratorium sections within the IBC.
3. The nature of proceedings under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
4. The applicability of Section 14 of the IBC to natural persons.
5. The interplay between Section 14 and Section 32A of the IBC.
6. Case law under provisions of other statutes in relation to Section 14 of the IBC.
7. The distinction between civil and criminal contempt and its relevance to quasi-criminal proceedings.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC and Section 138/141 Proceedings:
The Supreme Court considered whether the institution or continuation of proceedings under Section 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is covered by the moratorium provision under Section 14 of the IBC. The Court held that a quasi-criminal proceeding under Section 138/141, which involves the payment of compensation that can amount to twice the amount of the bounced cheque, directly impacts the corporate insolvency resolution process. Therefore, such proceedings fall within the ambit of "proceedings" under Section 14(1)(a) of the IBC, and the moratorium attaches to these proceedings.

2. Interpretation of Section 14 of the IBC:
The Court emphasized that the expression "proceedings" in Section 14(1)(a) should be interpreted broadly to include all judicial, quasi-judicial, or arbitration proceedings against the corporate debtor. The Court rejected the application of the ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis rules of interpretation to narrow the scope of "proceedings" to only civil proceedings. The purpose of Section 14 is to provide the corporate debtor with a breathing space to facilitate its revival and continuation as a going concern, which would be hampered if Section 138/141 proceedings were allowed to continue.

3. Nature of Proceedings under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act:
The Court analyzed the hybrid nature of Section 138 proceedings, which, though criminal in form, primarily aim to ensure the payment of the cheque amount to the complainant. The Court noted that the punitive aspect of Section 138 is secondary to its compensatory objective. The amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Act, including provisions for interim compensation and summary trials, further tilt the balance towards treating these proceedings as quasi-criminal.

4. Applicability of Section 14 of the IBC to Natural Persons:
The Court held that while the moratorium under Section 14 applies to the corporate debtor, it does not extend to natural persons such as directors or persons in charge of the corporate debtor. Therefore, Section 138/141 proceedings can continue against these individuals even during the moratorium period.

5. Interplay between Section 14 and Section 32A of the IBC:
The Court clarified that Section 32A, which absolves the corporate debtor of liability for offences committed prior to the commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process upon approval of a resolution plan, operates only after the moratorium ends. Section 32A does not limit the scope of Section 14. The Court harmonized the two provisions by interpreting "prosecution" in Section 32A to refer to criminal proceedings properly so-called, excluding quasi-criminal proceedings under Section 138/141.

6. Case Law under Provisions of Other Statutes:
The Court distinguished the judgments under Section 22(1) of the SICA and Section 446(2) of the Companies Act, which limited the scope of "proceedings" to civil proceedings. The Court noted that the language, object, and context of Section 14 of the IBC differ significantly from these provisions, and thus, the judgments under these statutes do not apply to Section 14 of the IBC.

7. Distinction between Civil and Criminal Contempt:
The Court discussed the hybrid nature of civil contempt, which, though punishable by fine or imprisonment, is primarily aimed at enforcing the rights of the party in whose favor the court's order was made. The Court drew parallels to Section 138 proceedings, reinforcing their quasi-criminal nature.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, setting aside the judgment under appeal, and held that Section 138/141 proceedings against a corporate debtor are covered by the moratorium provision under Section 14(1)(a) of the IBC. However, these proceedings can continue against natural persons such as directors or persons in charge of the corporate debtor. The Court remanded cases to the Magistrate to apply the law laid down in this judgment.