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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of bye-law No. 3 and other relevant bye-laws framed by the Municipal Board of Tanda. 2. Whether the bye-laws are ultra vires the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916. 3. Consistency of the bye-laws with Section 241 of the Act. 4. The High Court's decision to convict the appellant under Section 299(1) of the Act. 5. Allegations of mala fide intentions behind the bye-laws. 6. Validity of the fee prescribed by bye-law 16. 7. Procedural issues regarding the publication and resolution of the bye-laws. Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of bye-law No. 3 and other relevant bye-laws: The appellant contended that the bye-laws, including bye-law 3(a), were invalid as they were outside the authority conferred on the Municipal Board by Section 298 of the Act. The Supreme Court examined the scheme of the bye-laws and noted that they were framed under Section 298 A(a), (b), (c), and (d) of the Act. The Court found that the bye-laws were sanctioned by the Commissioner as required by Section 301(2) of the Act. The Court held that the bye-laws, including the requirement for a licence to run a market, were valid and within the powers conferred by the Act. 2. Whether the bye-laws are ultra vires the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916: The Supreme Court analyzed the relevant sections of the Act, particularly Sections 241 and 298. It concluded that the bye-laws were not ultra vires. The Court stated that Section 298(2)-F(d) and (dd) empowered the Board to make bye-laws for the establishment, regulation, and inspection of markets, including grain markets. The Court also noted that the general power conferred by Section 298(1) further supported the validity of the bye-laws. 3. Consistency of the bye-laws with Section 241 of the Act: The appellant argued that the bye-laws were inconsistent with Section 241(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that Section 241(1) did not apply to the appellant's market as it was not a market for the sale of fruits, vegetables, animals, meat, or fish intended for human food. The Court further held that even if Section 241(1) were applicable, the bye-laws would still be valid under Section 298(2)-F(d) and (dd). 4. The High Court's decision to convict the appellant under Section 299(1) of the Act: The High Court had set aside the Tehsildar's order of acquittal and convicted the appellant under Section 299(1) of the Act for failing to obtain a licence for running a market. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, stating that the appellant's shops constituted a market within the meaning of bye-law 3(a) and that the appellant was obligated to obtain a licence. 5. Allegations of mala fide intentions behind the bye-laws: The appellant claimed that the bye-laws were passed mala fide to target him specifically. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the appellant had not made appropriate allegations or provided evidence to prove mala fides during the trial. The Court emphasized that such a plea could not be raised for the first time on appeal. 6. Validity of the fee prescribed by bye-law 16: The appellant argued that the fee of up to Rs. 1,000 prescribed by bye-law 16 was unreasonable. The Supreme Court dismissed this argument as premature, noting that no fee had yet been imposed on the appellant. The Court also highlighted that the fee would depend on the services rendered by the Board, making it impossible to assess its reasonableness in the abstract. 7. Procedural issues regarding the publication and resolution of the bye-laws: The appellant contended that the bye-laws had not been published in the local paper as required by Section 94(3) of the Act and had not been made by a special resolution as required by Section 298(1). The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that these were factual issues that should have been raised at the trial stage. The Court found no justification for allowing these pleas to be raised for the first time on appeal. Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the validity of the bye-laws and the High Court's decision to convict the appellant. The Court found no merit in the appellant's arguments regarding the ultra vires nature of the bye-laws, their inconsistency with Section 241, allegations of mala fides, the reasonableness of the fee, and procedural issues. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.
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