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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of orders under Rule 148 of the Railway Establishment Code. 2. Constitutionality of the Security Rules under Articles 14, 19(1)(c), and 311 of the Constitution. 3. Validity of the impugned orders under the Security Rules. 4. Competence of the authorities passing the impugned orders. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: (I) Validity of Orders under Rule 148 of the Railway Establishment Code: The Court noted that the authorities took action only under the Security Rules, specifically Rule 3. The notice dated July 6, 1950, was issued under Rule 3, and the procedures prescribed therein were followed scrupulously. The orders terminating the services of the appellants explicitly cited Rule 3 of the Security Rules. The respondents did not plead that action was taken under Rule 148 of the Railway Establishment Code, only contending that the Security Rules were valid. The Court found substance in the criticism that the judgment under appeal proceeded on a ground not raised in the pleadings. The Court acknowledged the proposition that an order within an authority's competence cannot fail merely because it purports to be made under a wrong provision. The respondents did not contend that the orders were made under Rule 148(3) of the Railway Establishment Code, but rather under Rule 3 of the Security Rules. The Court concluded that the Security Rules have an independent operation, quite apart from Rule 148. (II) Constitutionality of the Security Rules: (IIa) Article 14: The appellants argued that the Security Rules prescribed a special procedure for persons suspected of subversive activities, leading to discrimination under Article 14. The Court held that the classification of persons based on subversive activities is not vague or indefinite. The Security Rules aimed at safeguarding national security, and the words "subversive activities" in the context of national security were sufficiently precise to sustain a valid classification. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the Security Rules were repugnant to Article 14. (IIb) Article 19(1)(c): The appellants contended that the impugned orders violated their right to form associations under Article 19(1)(c). The Court observed that the orders did not prevent the appellants from continuing to be Communists or trade unionists. The termination of their services did not infringe any of their constitutional rights, apart from Article 311. The Court rejected this contention. (IIc) Article 311: The appellants argued that the procedure prescribed by the Security Rules did not satisfy the requirements of Article 311. The Court held that Article 311 applies only to orders of dismissal or removal by way of punishment. The termination of services under Rule 3 of the Security Rules was not by way of punishment, as the terms of employment provided for termination on proper notice, and Rule 7 preserved the employees' rights to benefits. The Court found no forfeiture of benefits already acquired, and the order was not one of dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311. This contention was overruled. (III) Validity of the Impugned Orders under the Security Rules: The appellants argued that the charges in the notice dated July 6, 1950, referred to events prior to the Security Rules' enactment, giving them retrospective operation. The Court held that the rules were prospective, allowing action based on subversive activities in esse or in posse. The use of antecedent conduct as material for taking action did not render the rules retrospective. This contention was rejected. (IV) Competence of Authorities Passing the Impugned Orders: The appellants contended that the orders were not passed by the competent authorities, as the General Manager was the competent authority, but the orders were communicated by the Deputy Manager. The Court found that the orders were actually passed by the General Manager, and this finding was accepted. This contention was also rejected. Conclusion: The appeals were dismissed with costs. The appellants, permitted to file the appeals in forma pauperis, were also required to pay the court fees payable to the Government.
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