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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the orders of the Collector of Customs and Central Excise are quasi-judicial and subject to certiorari. 2. Whether the doctrine of merger applies when an order is confirmed by a superior authority outside the jurisdiction of the High Court. 3. Whether the principles of natural justice were violated in the imposition of penalties. 4. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs against orders confirmed by authorities outside its territorial jurisdiction. 5. The validity of penalties imposed under Section 167 of the Sea Customs Act. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Quasi-Judicial Nature of Orders The court examined whether the orders passed by the Collector of Customs and Central Excise are quasi-judicial and thus subject to certiorari. It concluded that the Collector of Customs, while adjudging confiscation or imposing penalties under the Sea Customs Act, is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. The court disagreed with the Calcutta High Court's ruling in *Collector of Customs v. Shewpujanrai*, which held that such orders are administrative. The court emphasized that the use of the word "adjudge" in Sections 182 and 183 of the Sea Customs Act implies a judicial approach, and thus, such orders are amenable to certiorari. Issue 2: Doctrine of Merger The court addressed the doctrine of merger, which posits that once an order is confirmed by a superior authority, the original order merges into the final order. The court noted that if the superior authority, such as the Central Board of Revenue or the Government of India, is outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, the High Court cannot issue a writ against the original order. This principle was reinforced by the Supreme Court's observations in *Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. Venkatachalam Potti*, which the court found binding. Issue 3: Violation of Natural Justice In Writ Application No. 120 of 1955, the court found that the respondent was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard before the penalty was imposed, violating principles of natural justice. The court held that such a violation rendered the order a nullity, and thus, the doctrine of merger did not apply. The court cited *Rex v. North; Ex parte, Oakey* to support its view that an order made without notice is fundamentally unjust and void ab initio. Issue 4: Jurisdiction of the High Court The court examined its jurisdiction to issue writs against orders confirmed by authorities outside its territorial jurisdiction. It concluded that when an appeal is dismissed in limine for non-compliance with procedural requirements (e.g., deposit of penalty), the doctrine of merger does not apply. The court referred to the Privy Council's decision in *Chandri Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal*, which held that dismissal for want of prosecution does not merge the original order into the appellate order. Issue 5: Validity of Penalties The court addressed the interpretation of Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, which allows for a penalty "not exceeding three times the value of the goods or not exceeding Rs. 1000." The court rejected the contention that the word "or" should be read as "and," which would cap the penalty at Rs. 1000. The court agreed with the Bombay High Court's interpretation in *Mohandas Issardas v. A.N. Sattanathan*, affirming that the customs authorities have the discretion to impose a penalty that satisfies either condition. Judgments: W.A. No. 120 of 1955: The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision that the order was void due to a lack of notice and opportunity to be heard, thus violating natural justice. The doctrine of merger did not apply as the original order was a nullity. W.A. No. 53 of 1956: The court allowed the appeal, applying the doctrine of merger. It held that the High Court cannot quash the order of the Collector as it had merged with the order of the Central Board of Revenue, which is outside its jurisdiction. W.A. No. 55 of 1956: The court allowed the appeal, applying the doctrine of merger. It held that the Assistant Collector's order was not void ab initio, and thus, the High Court cannot quash it. W.A. No. 89 of 1956: The court allowed the appeal, noting that the appeal to the Central Board of Revenue was dismissed in limine, so the doctrine of merger did not apply. However, it found that the penalty imposed was valid under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. Conclusion: The court's judgments emphasized the importance of adhering to principles of natural justice and clarified the application of the doctrine of merger in the context of quasi-judicial orders under the Sea Customs Act. The High Court's jurisdiction to issue writs was limited by the territorial location of the superior authority confirming the orders.
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