2009 (2) TMI 796 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether only because a mistake has been committed by or on behalf of the appellants in approaching the appropriate forum for ventilating their grievances, the same would mean that the provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which is otherwise available, should not be taken into consideration at all?

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation and application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
2. Whether the second execution petition filed by the respondents was barred by limitation.
3. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Interpretation and application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
The appeal questioned the interpretation and/or application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The High Court had dismissed an application as barred by limitation, stating that Section 14 was not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court reasoned that the expression "other cause of like nature" in Section 14 must be read ejusdem generis with "defect of jurisdiction," meaning that the defect must be something analogous to a jurisdictional defect. The Supreme Court, however, noted that the provisions of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act should be applied in a broad-based manner and that the principles of Section 14 could be applied for the purpose of condonation of delay under Section 5, even if Section 14 per se was not applicable.

2. Whether the second execution petition filed by the respondents was barred by limitation:
The respondents had filed a second execution petition on 11.9.2001, which the appellants objected to, claiming it was barred by limitation. The initial objection was rejected, and subsequent appeals were deemed not maintainable. The Supreme Court noted that the appellants had bona fide prosecuted the first appeal and second appeal before a wrong forum, and thus, the principles of Section 14 should be considered for condonation of delay. The Court emphasized that the provisions of Sections 5 and 14 are meant to grant relief where a person has committed some mistake, and these provisions should not be applied pedantically.

3. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay:
The appellants initially filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay but later withdrew it to file under Section 14. The Supreme Court held that even though Section 14 per se was not applicable, its principles could be applied for condonation of delay under Section 5. The Court cited precedents where it was held that an element of mistake is inherent in the invocation of Section 14, and the equity underlying the section should be applied to its fullest extent. The Court concluded that the High Court should not refuse to apply these principles merely because a wrong provision was mentioned.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remitted the matter for consideration on merits, requesting the High Court to dispose of the revision application expeditiously. The Court emphasized the need for a broad-based application of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act to ensure justice, especially when a party has acted in good faith and with due diligence.