9911796707
|
Home
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Sanad issued in favor of the appellant is existing law under Article 372 of the Constitution. 2. Whether the respondent State of Orissa was bound to continue the payment of the cash allowance to the appellant. 3. Whether the respondent's act of discontinuing the appellant's pension was illegal and unconstitutional. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the Sanad issued in favor of the appellant is existing law under Article 372 of the Constitution: The appellant argued that the Sanad issued by the Ruler of Dhenkanal in 1931 constituted law within the meaning of Article 372 of the Constitution. The appellant's counsel contended that since the Ruler was an absolute monarch, his orders, including the Sanad, should be considered law. The appellant relied on the definition of "existing law" under Article 366(10) and the provisions of Article 372(1), asserting that the Sanad should continue to be in force unless altered or repealed by a competent authority. The Court, however, rejected this argument, emphasizing that the distinction between legislative and executive acts remains relevant even for absolute monarchs. The Court held that the Sanad was a purely executive act, intended to discharge the Ruler's obligations under the personal and customary law of the family, and not a legislative act. The Court concluded that the Sanad did not constitute law within the meaning of Article 372. 2. Whether the respondent State of Orissa was bound to continue the payment of the cash allowance to the appellant: The appellant claimed that the respondent was bound to continue the payment of the cash allowance as the Sanad constituted law. The appellant also argued that the respondent had recognized and acted upon the grant after the merger of Dhenkanal with Orissa. The Court found no merit in this argument, stating that since the Sanad was an executive act, it could be modified or discontinued by an executive act of the respondent. The Court noted that the customary law requiring maintenance for junior members of the family continued under Clause 4(b) of Order 31 of 1948 and Article 372, but the specific amount of maintenance could be altered by the respondent. The Court held that the respondent had the right to determine what would be adequate and appropriate maintenance, which was an executive function. 3. Whether the respondent's act of discontinuing the appellant's pension was illegal and unconstitutional: The appellant alleged that the discontinuation of the cash allowance was illegal and unconstitutional. The Court examined the Sanad and found that it did not contain any legislative element or command that had to be obeyed by the citizens of the State. The Sanad was a gift made by the Ruler out of love and affection, recognizing the customary law obligation to maintain his junior brother. The Court held that the respondent's act of discontinuing the cash allowance was a legitimate exercise of its executive authority. The Court also noted that the grant of land under the Sanad had not been disturbed, and the respondent had merely reduced the total maintenance allowance. The Court concluded that the respondent's action did not alter the customary law but determined the quantum of maintenance, which was within its executive powers. Conclusion: The Court confirmed the decision of the High Court, holding that the Sanad was an executive act and not law under Article 372. The respondent had the authority to discontinue the cash allowance, and the action was neither illegal nor unconstitutional. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
|
