2011 (9) TMI 951 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether the High Court is justified in treating the operative portion of the Order of the learned Special Judge as a direction issued to the sanctioning authority to sanction the prosecution of the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 4? Whether the High Court had grossly erred in considering and treating the mere observation of the learned Special Judge as the direction of the Court.?

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Legality and jurisdiction of the Special Judge's Order.
2. Nature of the Special Judge's Order - whether it is a direction or an observation.
3. High Court's interpretation of the Special Judge's Order.
4. Sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA).

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality and Jurisdiction of the Special Judge's Order:
The appeals challenge the High Court's decision to quash the Special Judge's Order dated 26.4.2005, which had rejected the closure report submitted by the Lokayukta Police and sought sanction for prosecution. The High Court found the Special Judge's Order illegal and without jurisdiction, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra that a Magistrate cannot direct the police to change their opinion when a closure report is filed under Section 169 of the Cr.P.C.

2. Nature of the Special Judge's Order - Whether it is a Direction or an Observation:
The central issue is whether the Special Judge's Order constituted a direction to the sanctioning authority to prosecute the accused or was merely an observation. The Supreme Court examined the nature and scope of the term "direction" and distinguished it from "sanction," emphasizing that a direction is a command or authoritative instruction, whereas a sanction is a permission. The Court cited various precedents, including Rameshwar Bhartia v. The State of Assam and Rajinder Nath v. CIT, to elucidate the meaning of "direction."

3. High Court's Interpretation of the Special Judge's Order:
The High Court treated the Special Judge's remarks about seeking sanction for prosecution as a direction, which it deemed illegal and without jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court found that the operative portion of the Special Judge's Order, which suggested seeking sanction, was not a command or authoritative instruction. Instead, it was an obiter dictum or mere observation, not binding or enforceable. The Court cited definitions and interpretations of obiter dicta from various legal dictionaries and precedents, such as Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur and State of Haryana v. Ranbir, to support this conclusion.

4. Sanction for Prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA):
The necessity of obtaining government sanction under Section 19 of the PCA for prosecuting government servants was a crucial aspect of the case. The Supreme Court reiterated that the sanctioning authority must apply its independent mind and not be influenced by external pressures, as established in Mansukh Lal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat. The Court found that the Special Judge's Order did not direct the sanctioning authority but merely suggested seeking sanction, which did not amount to a legal directive.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the Special Judge's Order was not a direction but an observation, and the High Court had erred in treating it as a directive. Therefore, the appeals were allowed, the High Court's decision was set aside, and the Special Judge's Order was restored. Respondents were directed to comply with the Trial Court's Order within two months.